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Abstract 
It is commonly assumed that sex offenders lack empathy. However, this assumption 
is often a source of confusion. Theorists have been unable to agree on a coherent 
definition of empathy, subsequently often measuring different aspects of what is 
essentially a multicomponent phenomenon. This confusion is particularly evident in 
the sexual offending literature, where sex offenders are presumed to lack empathy. 
In a recent attempt to ameliorate this uncertainty, a four-stage model of the empathic 
process has been presented and it is now realised that sex offender empathy deficits 
are most likely victim-specific. This study is an attempt to create a new measure of 
empathy in the child sex offender, which measures empathic competency towards 
their own victim(s), other victims, and generalised contexts. The measure also 
sought to discover if offender empathy deficits emanate in one, or all, of the four 
necessary stages of empathy. 
Twenty incarcerated child sex offenders and twenty community non-offenders were 
administered the Emotional Apperception Test. The EAT provided reliable and 
discriminating results. The sex offenders presented significant victim specific 
empathy deficits, but were also generally less empathic than the non-offenders. 
Their deficits emanated at the perspective taking stage of empathy, particularly 
towards their own victims. They presented more general deficits at the following 
emotional replication stage. These deficits were consistent during and immediately 
after the sexual encounter with their most recent victim. These results were mostly 
consistent with recent research, and emphasised the need for further development of 
competency based measure·s which are not subject to the fundamental bias associated 
with self report scales. The limitations and research implications are discussed with 
particular emphasis on the Emotional Apperception Test and the factors that manifest 
these victim specific empathy deficits. 
· Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements 
Abstract 
Table of Contents 
List of Tables 
List of Figures 
Chapter One: The concept of empathy 
1.1 Conceptual definitions 
1.2 Related constructs 
1.3 A cognitive perspective 
1.4 The affective perspective 
1.5 The process versus content argument 
1.6 A mulidimensional approach 
1.7 A reconceptualisation of empathy 
1.7.1 Emotional recognition 
1.7.2 Perspective taking 
1.7.3 Emotional replication 
1.7.4 Response decision 
1.8 Difficulties at any stage 
Chapter Two: Empathy deficits in sex offenders 
2.1 Theory 
2.2 Empathy: Ail important factor in multivariate 
Theories 




Treatment of the sex offender and empathy 

























2.5.1 Emotional recognition 
2.5.2 Perspective taking 
2.5.3 Emotional replication 
2.5.4 Response decision 
2.6 Generalised empathy deficits 
2.7 Specific empathy deficits 
2.8 Victim specific empathy deficits across the offence 
chain 
2.9 Sex offenders and a lack of empathy: Summary 
Chapter Three: The measurement of empathy 
3.1 Measuring empathy 
3.2 Measures of cognitive empathy 
3.3 Affective measures of empathy 
3.4 Multidimensional empathy measures 
3.5 Instrument significance 
3.6 Problematic in terms of generality 
3.7 Specific empathy measures 
3.8 Problematic in terms of the reliance on self report 
3.9 Competency based designs 
3.10 Ambiguity as index of difficulty 




Empathy in sex offenders - a summary 
The aims of this study 






















4.3 .1 Relating to empathy during the offence chain 67 
4.3.2 Predictions based on recent sex offender and 
empathy research findings 68 
4.3.3 Exploratory hypotheses based on empathy 
model 68 
iv 
Chapter Five: Method 
5.1 Materials 
5.1.1 Overview of Emotional Apperception Test 
5.1.2 Pilot study - The Emotional Reactivity Index 
5 .1.2 .1 Design 
5.1.2.2 Implementation and evaluation 
5.1.2.3 Sources of bias 
5.1.3 The Emotional Apperception Test 
5.1.3.1 Structure 
5 .1. 3 .2 Competency based design 
5 .1.3 .3 Criteria for distinguishing a 
competent response 
5 .1.3 .4 Section B. Non-specific sexual and 
generalised vignettes 
5 .1.3 .5 Section A. Offence specific vignettes 
5.1.3.6 Measuring responses to the EAT 
5.1.3.7 Level of Emotional awareness 
5.1.3.8 Perspective taking 
5 .1.3.9 Emotional replication 
5.1.3.10 Summary 
5.2 Subjects 
5.2.1 Child sex offenders 
5.2.2 Community control group 
5.3 Procedures . 
5.3.1 Child sex offenders 
5.3.2 Community control group 




6.1.1 Community control group 
6.1.2 Child sex offenders 






























6.2.1 Reliability 89 
6.2.1.1 Internal consistency 89 
6.2.1.2 Inter-rater reliability 91 
6.2.2 Demographic influences 92 
6.2.2.1 Age 92 
6.2.2.2 Other demographics 93 
6.3 Emotional A..pperception Test results (II) 94 
6.3.1 Section 1. Relating to the stages involved in 
the offence chain 94 
6.3.2 Implications of offence chain results 95 
6.3.3 Section 2. Concerning the extent of empathy 
deficits in the child sex offender 96 
6.3.4 Section 3. Explanatmy hypotheses based on 
empathy reconceptualisation 98 
Chapter Seven: Discussion 
7.3 Methodological 104 
7.3.1 Importance of reliability 104 
7.3.2 Reliability over time 104 
7.3.3 Internal reliability 105 
7.3.4 Validity 106 
7.4 Empathy across the offence chain 108 
7.5 The extent of empathy deficits in child sex offenders 109 
7.5.1 EAT consistency with recent research 110 
7.5.2 EAT inconsistencies with recent research 111 
7.6 Empathy deficits in terms of the empathic process 112 
7.6.1 Emotional awareness 113 
7.6.2 Perspective taking 115 
7.6.3 Emotional replication 117 
7.6.4 Inconsistencies 118 
,., ,., 
Conclusions 121 I. I 
Chapter Eight: Limitations and their resolutions 
8.1 General limitations 
8.1.1 Sex offenders as subjects 
8.1.2 Sample size 
8.2 Emotional Apperception Test weaknesses 
8.2.1 Length of the EAT 
8.2.2 Open-ended formats 
8.2.3 Subjectivity of the criteria 
Chapter Nine: Future research suggestions 
9.1 Research implications 
9.1.1 The manifestation of victim specific empathy 
deficits in sex offenders 
9.1.2 Empathy deficiencies manifested preceding 
and during the sexual encounter 
9.1.3 Empathy deficits manifested after the 
sexual encounter 
9.1.4 The effects of similarity (situational specificity) 
9.1.5 Introducing a descriptive model of 
victim-specific empathy deficits for future 
research 
9.2 Methodological considerations 
9.2.1 EAT design 
9.2.2 Demand characteristics 
9.2.3 Physiological measures in conjunction with 
the EAT? 





The Emotional Reactivity Index 


























Coding instruction sheet 




List of Tables 
Table 1. The perspective taking criteria for section B of the 
Emotional Apperception Test generated by the expert 
Sample 
Table 2. Sample of independent rater scoring with expert generated 
criteria (Question 7) 
Table 3. Section B internal consistency properties 
Table 4. Section A internal consistency properties 
Table 5. The relationship of age and emotional awareness, 
perspective taking, and emotional replication abilities 
across each of the situational categories (Child sex offenders 
and non-off enders) 
Table 6. Mean total empathy scores across the different situational 
Categories 
Table 7. Mean child sex offender emotional awareness, perspective 
taking, and emotional replication scores in each situational 
category 
Table 8. Mean non-offender emotional awareness, perspective taking, 
and emotional replication scores in each situational category 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Child sex offender emotional awareness, perspective taking, 









other sexual abuse victims, and general situations 103 
Figure 2. A descriptive model of the factors that may manifest 
victim-specific empathy deficits, during and after an 
offence situation 13 3 
ix 
X 
List of Appendices 
Appendix A. The Emotional reactivity Index and information sheet 153 
Appendix B. The Emotional Apperception Test (includes information 
sheet and consent form) 171 
Appendix C. Emotional Apperception Test instruction sheet 187 
Appendix D. Guidelines for LEAS scoring 189 
Introduction Overview 
The introduction consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of 
empathy by looking at its various definitions and related constructs. For instance, 
empathy has been conceptualised as either a cognitive, affective, or 
multidimensional phenomenon, and is commonly confused with sympathy and 
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· projection. The chapter concludes by introducing a new definition that conceives of 
empathy a four-stage sequential multicomponent phenomenon. 
Chapter 2 examines the literature that suggests that a lack of empathy is a critical 
characteristic of the sex offender. It reviews etiological theory, treatment program 
design, and the existing literature relating to empathy in sex offenders. Also 
reviewed, is the applicability of the new definition of empathy to sex offender 
empathy deficits. Finally, this chapter queries whether sex offender empathic 
deficits are a general personality trait as commonly assumed, or more circumscribed 
towards victims of sexual abuse, or are specific to the sex offender's own victim(s). 
Chapter 3 details how empathy has been measured, pa1iicularly in sex offenders. 
· It suggests that the inconsistent findings regarding the empathic capabilities of the 
sex offender· are due, in part, because the tests have measured different definitions of 
empathy. These tests have also assessed a generalised dispositional empathy by 
means of self-report and have ignored situational factors important to sexual 
offending. Finally, the chapter suggests that the use of competency based 
instruments may help circumvent these problems. 
Chapter 4 presents a summary of the important points contained in the preceding 
chapters, and details the aims of the current study. This was to create a new 
competency based measure that could assess victim-specific empathy, specifically in 
terms of the four-stage empathy model. 
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Chapter 1 
The concept of empathy 
The term 'empathy' derives from the Greek word empatheia, which implies an active 
appreciation of another person s feeling experience. 
(Astin, 1967, p.57) 
Empathy in its broadest sense refers to the affective responsiveness of an individual 
to the emotions of another person. The shared feeling that results when observing 
another person's emotional state, such as pain, sorrow, and happiness are all feelings 
that may represent the concept of empathy. The behaviour that follows empathic or 
vicarious feelings is also important. Typically, individuals who have a high 
· empathic ability are those who share the feelings of others and frequently and 
appropriately respond to these feelings. 
Empathy can exert profound influences in human interactions. It is thought to 
mediate and regulate various interpersonal behaviours and is implicated in a number 
of important culturally valued social behaviours, such as altruism, general prosocial 
· behaviour, social relationships, and the regulation of aggressive behaviours (Deutsch 
& Madle, 19.75; Feshbach, 1975; Moore, 1990; Rogers, 1975). Moreover, empathy 
is considered an important concept in developmental (Hoffman, 1984), social (Davis, 
1983a), personality (Feshbach, 1975), and clinical psychology (Goldstein & 
Michaels, 1985). 
Theorists have assumed that empathy has a crucial role in the mediation of prosocial 
behaviour a:tid altruism (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). Generally, the vicarious 
experiencing of an affective response of a distressed person and some awareness of 
their viewpoint, leads to voluntary behaviour from the observer intended to benefit 
the observed person (Davis, 1994). This may include improving the welfare of the 
other person by either reducing or terminating negative and/or increasing positive 
emotional states for that person. Presumably, this is an empathic response is elicited 
due to altruiStic purposes rather than for self-interest or egotistical reasons 
(Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). 
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It is also suggested that empathy is functionally important in the reduction and 
inhibition of aggressive or antisocial actions towards others (Davis, 1994; Feshbach, 
1978; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988; Moore, 1990). In short, individuals who 
understand and vicariously experience the negative emotional responses of others 
that occur because of their own aversive or aggressive behaviour may be less 
inclined to continue their aggression, or aggress in future interactions. 
Conceptual Definitions 
It is evident, in part because of its wide-ranging application, that the 
conceptualisation of empathy has been confused. The salient conceptual problem 
with the empathy literature is that the term has been used to denote a wide array of 
emotional responses and behaviours. There has been so little agreement among 
investigators regarding the definition of this phenomenon that the development of 
any coherent view has been difficult to achieve (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Moore, 
1990). Furthermore, empathy has often been confused with other similar and/or 
related constructs such as sympathy and projection. This lack of any coherent 
definition has greatly impeded the empirical investigation of empathy, particularly 
· the investigation of altruism and behavioural regulation (Moore, 1990). 
Traditionally, the definitional focus of empathy has been unidimensional and has 
alluded to either of two distinctly separate phenomena. Empathy has been seen as 
either a cognitive phenomenon analogous to cognitive role taking or perspective 
taking ( e.g., Deutsch & Madle, 1975), or as an affective phenomenon referring to the 
vicarious matching of another's emotional state (e.g., Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 
1984). Subsequently, the empirical investigation of empathy has been substantially 
impeded by these difficulties of definition. However, recently it is realised that 
empathy is best considered a multidimensional phenomenon that incorporates 
(among others) both cognitive and affective processes (Davis, 1980; 1983a; 
Marshall, Hudson, Jones, & Fernandez, 1995). 
Related Constructs 
In order to define empathy, it is important to differentiate it from what it is not. 
Partly through the conceptual confusion surrounding empathy and partly through the 
similarity of related constructs, empathy often appears to overlap or be confused 
with various emotional responses, such as sympathy and projection. For instance, 
empathy is often used interchangeably with sympathy (Goldstein & Michaels, 1985), 
whereas empathy and projection have often been confused at least at an operational 
level (Feshbach, 1975). In order to further enhance the meaning of empathy, it is 
important to differentiate it from these related constructs. 
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Firstly, a sympathetic emotional reaction implies an understanding of the emotional 
state of another person. Sympathy is 'feeling for someone', and refers to feelings of 
son-ow for another, or in other words feeling concerned for another person by way of 
projection (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). This concept centres on the elements of 
condolence, pity, and compassion and is characterised by 'feeling' for another person. 
Differences between empathy and sympathy occur in terms of their content, their 
constituent processes, and their interpersonal consequences (Goldstein & Michael, 
1985). A sympathetic response contains elements of pity and condolence, which do 
not characterise an empathic response. Broadly speaking, in terms of the constituent 
processes, sympathy is a heightened attention to one's own feelings, whereas with 
empathy the focus of attention is on the feelings of another (Katz, 1963). The 
sympathetic individual focuses on how he/she would feel in the situation, 
understanding but not necessarily experiencing the affect of the other person. The 
interpersonal consequences of these two constructs differ also. Characteristically, a 
sympathetic individual being preoccupied with his or her own feelings, is less able to 
respond appropriately to the other person, whereas an empathic response 
encompasses more interpersonal responsiveness (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). 
· The second related construct, projection, is the cognitive process of ascribing ones 
own attitudes, thoughts, beliefs, and values to another (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). 
Projection differs from empathy, as it is a cognitive process that does not necessarily 
involve affect and also due to the direction of the process involved. Projection is the 
attributing of feelings from the self to another, whereas empathy involves the 
experiencing of someone else's feelings and thoughts. The direction of the process is 
from the self to the other in projection, and from the other to the self in empathy 
(Goldstein & Michael, 1985). Conceptually, projection is different from empathy, 
however because these concepts are easily confused projection is particularly 
important when empathy is measured (see Strayer, 1987, for a detailed discussion). 
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A Cognitive perspective of empathy 
From a cognitive perspective, empathy consists of the ability to understand another 
person's feelings and being able to take that person's perspective in consort with the 
situational context (Cronbach, 1955). The processes essential to an empathic 
response are cognitive and crucially impact on the subsequent affective reactions to 
the empathic response (Mead, 1934; Deutsch & Madle, 1975; Kohler, 1929). The 
cognitive definition of empathy suggests that it is the ability to conceptualise other 
people's feelings, thoughts, and intentions that encompasses empathic ability. 
Empathic responding is therefore unlikely before the achievement of non-egocentric 
thought. Specifically, this cognitive ability requires an awareness of the person's 
internal states on a moment to moment basis, rather than simply a knowledge of 
more stable and enduring characteristics, such as a person's personality, traits, and 
opinions (Ickes, 1993). 
The ability to assume the perspective of another person has often been seen as the 
most important cognitive skill involved in empathy (Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 
1982). A number of cognitive processes contribute to the ability to take a 
perspective other than one's own. Some are simple, requiring little cognitive effort, 
whereas others, such as role taking, require a greater deliberate cognitive effort. 
Role taking involves a deliberate act of imagining oneself in another's place, so that 
the stimuli impinging on someone else could be impinging on oneself (Stotland, 
1969). This mental representation is often thought of as being essential in empathic 
individuals (Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1982; Mead, 1934), however it is now 
evident that role taking is not always necessary to an empathic response (Eisenberg 
& Strayer, 1987). For example, an individual may discern the other person's state 
and empathise without actually consciously taking the other person's role. 
Other more simple cognitive skills evident in accurate perspective taking are 
symbolic association, classical conditioning, and direct association (Hoffman, 1982). 
Each of these skills relates to the individuals past experiences. Symbolic association 
involves the _association between cues that symbolically indicate another's feelings 
and the observer's own past experiences. The distress cues of the other person evoke 
empathy in the observer not because of their physical or expressive properties but 
because they symbolically indicate the victims'feelings (Eisenberg, 1982). For 
example, empathy can be elicited through seeing a picture of a person, or reading a 
letter from the person, in an emotional situation. Classical conditioning also relates 
to the elicitation of empathic feelings, due to the past experiences. For example, 
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direct classical conditioning of empathy may result from the experience of observing 
the distress of another person at the same time that one is having a direct experience 
of distress. The result is that distress cues from others become conditioned stimuli 
that evoke feelings of distress in the self. 
Another cognitive process is the direct association between another's emotional cues 
and the potential empathiser's memmies of past experiences in which a similar 
emotion was evoked (Hoffman, 1982). The emotional cues may include their facial 
· expressions, voice, posture, or any other situational cue that is reminiscent of past 
experiences.· For example, a girl who sees another child cut his or herself and cry, 
and then cries herself. The sight of the blood, the crying, or any other cue that 
reminds the girl of her own experiences of pain will evoke an empathic response 
(from Humphrey, 1922, in Hoffman, 1982). These simple cognitive modes of 
empathic arousal only require that the observer has had similar past experiences to 
the situation. 
The Affective perspective of empathy 
Affective definitions of empathy focus on the affective reactions of one person in 
response to the experiences of another (Goldstein & Michaels, 1985). This 
perspective suggests that empathy is the involuntary experiencing of another's 
emotional state where the reactive affect experienced is more appropriate to the other 
person's situation than to one's own situation (Hoffman, 1982). Furthermore, there 
should be an accurate discernible self-other differentiation in terms of the emotion 
experienced. 
The involuntary experiencing of affect that is more appropriate to someone else's 
situation distinguishes empathy from a direct emotional arousal to environmental 
cues. These cues that elicit an (affective) empathic response may be expressive cues 
that directly resonate the other's feelings, or those which convey the impact of the 
external events on the other (Hoffman, 1982). This definition is obviously 
incompatible with the cognitive definition as empathy may be evoked with no 
discernible cognitive processing (Feshbach, 1975). In other words, the affective 
definition of empathy does not require the person develop any real understanding of 
the other's emotional state in order to empathise. This understanding may occur after 
the empathic response, which is affective. 
Earlier affect focused empathy definitions assumed that the empathic individual's 
emotional response paralleled that of the other person (Feshbach, 1978; Stotland, 
1969). However, Hoffman (1982, 1984) defined a vicarious emotional response as 
any emotional response that is more appropriate to someone else's situation than to 
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· ones own. This means that any response diffusely congruent to the other person's 
emotion can be construed to be an empathic response (see Eisenberg & Strayer, 
1987; Hoffman, 1984). Davis (1994) employed a narrower definition, dividing 
affective outcomes of the empathic individual into two forms; parallel and reactive 
emotional responses. A parallel outcome was one that reflected the person's 
emotional state (empathic), whereas reactive affective responses differ in some sense 
· from that of the other person but are still appropriate ( emotional arousal) (Davis, 
1983b, 1994). 
The process versus content argument 
Additional confusion exists within the empathy literature as to whether empathy 
· should be considered in content or process terms (Strayer, 1987). An empathic 
process refers to the underlying operations of empathy that result in an empathic 
response, whereas the content is the empathic outcome of this process. Essentially, 
within the cognitive-affective dichotomy, vicarious emotional responding is the main 
criterion of whether empathy has occurred. Conversely, as with any emotion, 
cognitive aspects will determine how affect is experienced and interpreted (Hoffman, 
1975). Therefore the process by which empathy occurs can be seen as cognitive, 
whereas the content would be the affective responding (Feshbach, 1975). This is, 
however, rather a simplistic statement as emotion itself can be seen as a process 
(Strongman, 1992). Hence this argument is an additional source of confusion for 
empathy researchers. 
Viewed in this way, it can be seen that part of the definitional confusion regarding 
empathy has· resulted from the study of different perspectives of empathy, where 
these perspectives are each addressing different parts of a larger phenomenon 
(Davis, 1994). In fact, measures of empathy have shown discernible cognitive and 
affective differences in individuals when the same situation is being evaluated 
(Strayer, 1987). Hoffman (1984) and Eisenberg and Strayer (1987) described 
. empathy processes in terms of the degree and extent of cognitive processing required 
for their operation. However; processes other than cognitive may activate empathic 
responding. For example, recognition of the other person's emotion, the 
communication of empathy, or in fact the decision as to whether or not to act with 
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empathy, may all be processes that operate to produce feelings and behaviour 
perceptible as empathy (Davis, 1994). This emphasises the need for a 
multidimensional approach to empathy that incorporates the cognitive, affective, and 
other (i.e., behavioural) elements of empathy, which are seen as interacting processes 
and each being independently necessary for an empathic response . 
. A Multidimensional approach to empathy 
Recently, it has been suggested that empathy is best conceptualised as a 
multidimensional construct, consisting of both cognitive and emotional components 
(Davis, 1980,1983a, 1983b; Deutsch & Madle, 1975; Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 
1978; Iannotti, 1975). According to this approach, an empathic response consists of 
a set of explicit components related in that they all concern responsiveness to others 
but are also clearly discriminative from each other. Multidimensional definitions of 
empathy range from a dichotomous concept that involves only cognitive and 
affective components (e.g., Feshbach, 1975; Hoffman, 1982), to four or five-
component models that incorporate a wide range of behaviours and processes (e.g., 
Davis, 1980; Keefe, 1976). Accordingly, a multidimensional perspective refers to 
. the processes involved in ail empathic response. The components involved either 
interact or act in a sequential fashion to produce a response recognisable as empathy. 
Mulitdimensional definitions of empathy to a large degree circumvent the problems 
associated with unidimensional definitions. For example, affective definitions fail to 
explain individual differences, such as why one person would experience more 
. affective arousal to stimuli than another similar individual, or why some situations 
and/or people evoke more empathy than others. The cognitive processes, by which 
the individual was empathetically aroused, such as direct association, can provide an 
adequate explanation whereas a purely affective definition of empathy would not. 
Similarly, a vicarious emotional response is widely believed to be essential to 
empathy, but within cognitive definitions of the construct this is not required 
. (Deutsch & Madle, 1975). Furthermore, a purely cognitive approach to the 
definition of empathy fails to account for any motivation and the behaviour of acting 
on this knowledge (i.e., the content of an empathic response). 
By viewing empathy as a multifaceted singular construct, there is no need to identify 
different kinds of empathy. For example cognitive role taking (Mead, 1934) and 
. affective empathy (Aronfreed, 1968) have often been thought of as separate and 
different categories of empathy. It is now believed that these two empathic 
processes are explicit and distinct but act together to produce a singular concept of 
empathy. Some multidimensional frameworks conceptualise empathy as being 
primarily cognitive (e.g., Keefe, 1976), whereas others emphasise the affective 
component (e.g., Feshbach, 1975). However, these theoretical frameworks all 
emphasise that empathy consists of a number of processes that act together to some 
extent. 
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There are three major multidimensional models of empathy, by Feshbach (1975), 
Hoffman (1982), and Davis (1980). Feshbach's is a three-factor model consisting of 
two distinctly cognitive components and one affective component. The first step in 
being empathic is to discriminate the emotional state of another person. For 
example, to empathise with an emotion such as sadness, the individual must be able 
to identify the emotional cues that distinguish sadness from other emotional states. 
The next factor is the cognitive ability of the individual to assume the perspective 
and role of the other. Finally, the third factor is the ability to experience the exact 
emotion that the other person is experiencing. F eshbach considers that these three 
factors encompass an empathic response. 
Hoffman's (1975, 1982) developmental model posits that empathy can be viewed as 
an affective-cognitive synthesis, where empathy is primarily an affective response. 
Hoffman attempts to provide a framework where the capacity to react emotionally 
towards others, together with different levels of cognitive abilities produce empathy. 
Hoffman suggests that there are six basic modes that produce an affective reaction to 
the experiences of another person (Davis, 1994). Each of these modes can be seen as 
different levels of information processing, all of which are cognitive processes. 
Hoffman believes these modes are consistent with n01mal cognitive-development, 
· therefore in adulthood all modes are used to process the relevant situational 
information and emotional states being observed. 
The most influential multidimensional model is that posited by Davis (1980, 1983a, 
1983b). Davis views empathy as consisting of four clearly discriminative constructs 
that each represent some aspect of the global construct of empathy, and are each 
· essential to an empathic response. These disparate constructs are (1) perspective 
taking, (2) fantasy, (3) empathic concern, and (4) personal distress. Davis (1983a) 
identified three of the four constructs as being aspects theoretically important in 
previous empathy research. Fantasy, the only construct not examined in past 
empathy research, has been shown to affect emotional reactions towards others and 
subsequent altruistic behaviour (Stotland, 1969). Therefore all of Davis' constructs 
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that together represent a global construct of empathy have clear theoretical links with 
empathy (Davis, 1983a, 1983b ) . 
. For Davis, perspective taking involves the tendency to spontaneously adopt the 
psychological point of view of others. Fantasy reflects the tendency to imaginatively 
transpose oneself into fictitious situations and is an affective construct. Personal 
distress concerns the inclination to experience distress and trepidation in response to 
distress in others. Finally, empathic concern reflects the tendency to experience 
feelings of sympathy and compassion for another person. Davis (1983a, 1994) 
contends that individuals may differ in their ability in each of these four essential 
constructs. Individuals high in empathic ability may have higher levels of each of 
these constructs. Conversely, if an individual lacked the capability to show empathic 
concern for others, it is reasonable to assume that this individual may lack global 
empathy. 
A reconceptualisation of empathy 
Marshall, Hudson, Jones, and Fernandez (1995) have attempted to arrive at a 
heuristically optimal way of defining the complex concept of empathy. They see 
empathy as a multicomponent phenomenon, each component of which is essential to 
an empathic response. They outline a sequential four-stage information processing 
. model that is dependent upon at least some of the characteristics of the observed 
person. In this sense, empathy is defined as a process, whereby the components 
involved act in a sequential fashion to produce a response recognisable as empathy. 
The four stages in the model are: (1) recognition of the emotional state of the 
observed person, (2) viewing the environment from the other person's perspective, 
(3) experiencing the same emotional state as the observed person; and (4) the 
decision to respond, or not, in an appropriate way that usually reduces or terminates 
the cause of the observed person' distress. 
(1) Emotional Recognition 
The emotional recognition stage requires that the observer is able to accurately 
discriminate the emotional state of the observed person. This is a critical first stage 
of the empathy process in which the observer uses overt behavioural cues (postural, 
facial, verbal, and tonal) and indirect situational cues to assess the emotional state of 
the observed person. The ability to recognise expressed emotion is thought to be 
critical to the ability to respond with empathy to the emotional distress of others 
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(Hudson, M<,trshall, Wales, McDonald, Bakker, & McLean, 1993; Marshall et al., 
1995). Therefore, those individuals who are lacking in empathic ability, relative to 
others, may be unable to accurately discern emotions that would evoke empathic 
arousal, such as fear, disgust, and anger. Presumably any individual who lacks 
ability to accurately recognise affect in another person will be unable to adequately 
progress through the remaining stages in the empathy model. Therefore the observer 
may continue any behaviour that was being effected without inhibition. 
Emotion recognition has been largely ignored in empathy literature to date. The 
exceptions being Feshbach (1975, 1978), Lane and Schwartz (1987) and Miller and 
Eisenberg (1988) who each stressed the importance of emotional awareness and 
accurate emotion perception as prerequisites for empathy. Feshbach (1975) 
proposed that empathy is a three component process, whereby the ability to identify 
and discriminate the perspective and role of another person is the necessary first step 
in empathising. Lane and Schwartz (1987) in proposing a cognitive-developmental 
theory of emotional awareness, emphasise the importance of the ability to recognise 
emotion in the self and others, in accurate empathic responding. Miller and 
Eisenberg (1988) suggest that a lack of empathic ability may be in part a 
consequence of an inability to identify another person's feelings, especially in 
distressful situations. 
It is apparent that the ability to accurately discern the emotional state of another 
person is a skill that not everyone has in abundance (see Izard, 1971). Feshbach 
(1987) and Miller and Eisenberg (1988) have attempted to assess the emotional 
recognition abilities of empathic and unempathic individuals. They found that 
empathic subjects were more skilled at accurately recognising the emotional states of 
others than were nonempathic subjects. This supports the supposition that to 
empathise with another individual it is necessary to first recognise the other 
individual's emotional state. 
(2) Perspective-taking 
The second stage in the empathy model involves the cognitive process of taking the 
perspective of the observed person and viewing the world as they do. This reflects 
the ability to put oneself in the observed person's place, or the related but different 
ability to role-take. This non-egocentrical cognitive reasoning is a prerequisite for 
an empathic response. The individual must be able to cognitively recognise, 
understand and essentially espouse the other person's perspective, in terms of both 
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emotion and behaviour. The individual must be able to do this from overt 
, behavioural and indirect cues presented within the situational context. These 
thoughts and feelings may be interpreted from behavioural (e.g., verbal, facial) and 
situation cues. Furthermore, interpersonal cues such as the observer's knowledge of 
the person may be important to their understanding of the other person's viewpoint. 
Marshall et al. (1995) identified the notion of similarity as being of key impmiance 
. to the perspective-taking abilities of an individual. Presumably, the extent to which 
the observer-is similar to the observed person will impact upon the perspective 
taking ability of the observer. The greater the degree of similarity between the two 
individual's then the easier it would be to take the perspective of the other person. 
This similarity is dependent upon the observer, but it may include gender and age, or 
even attitudes and opinions. However, it is necessary that this similarity is 
discernible to the observer (Davis, 1994). The issue of similarity seems plausible 
largely because of the aggression literature, where it has been found that similarity 
between the aggressor and the victim arouses empathy for the victim and thus 
reduces aggression directed towards the victim (Bandura, 1973; Bandura, 
Underwood, & Fromson, 1975). 
, The perspective-taking stage emphasises the cognitive element of empathy. 
Marshall et al. (1995) presumably mean for this stage to incorporate all the cognitive 
processes that may make up an empathic response, for example symbolic and direct 
association as well as role-taking (see Hoffman, 1982). It is not necessary that the 
highly cognitive process of role taking be undertaken to take another's perspective 
(Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). Therefore the process by which the individual takes 
. the perspective of the other person may be through other cognitive skills, such as 
direct association, and symbolic association either individually or collectively. 
However, intuitively an individual must be able to take the perspective of the other 
person, and put oneself in the observed person's place and see the world as they do in 
order to progress to the next stage and experience the person's emotional state . 
. (3) Emotional Replication 
The third stage, emotional replication, is the experiencing of a vicarious emotional 
response that is the same ( or nearly the same) as the emotional experience of the 
observed person (Marshall, O'Sullivan, & Fernandez, 1996). The vicarious 
emotional replication is an involuntary response to the emotional state of the other 
. person. Moreover, it is necessarily appropriate to the observed person's situation 
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rather than to the observer's own and it is essential that there is an accurate self-other 
discrimination of the emotion experienced. 
• To accurately replicate the emotional state of the observed person, the individual 
must first be· able to recognise and identify the emotional state ( stage 1 ), and be able 
to adopt the perspective of that person (stage 2). However as Marshall et al. (1995, 
1996) noted, it is also important that the observer has the emotional repertoire that 
will enable an accurate replication of the observed state. If a person has a full 
emotional repertoire and can readily identify his/her own emotional states, then it is 
· likely that the individual w1ll be able to replicate observed emotions (Lane & 
Schwartz, 1987; Izard, 1971; Ekman & Oster, 1979). 
Marshall, O'Sullivan, and Fernandez (1996) note that this vicarious emotional 
response need only be similar to the observed person's emotional state. This is a 
potential difficulty for the measurement of an empathic response. Feshbach's (1975) 
. model requires the emotional replication to be identical to the observed person's 
emotional state. Conversely, Hoffman's (1982) model only requires that there be a 
fairly close match between the emotional states. 
( 4) Response Decision 
. To this point in the empathic process, the individual has recognised the emotional 
state of the other person, taken his/her perspective, and has experienced a similar, if 
not identical, emotional state as the observed person. The concluding stage of this 
process, response decision, concerns the observer's decision whether to respond, or 
not, in an appropriate manner that reduces or terminates the cause of the other's 
distress (Marshall et al., 1995). An appropriate manner in this sense refers to 
socially desirable and/or socially competent responding. For example, when the 
victim is distressed through the actions of the observer, and the situation has elicited 
empathic feelings within the observer, an appropriate response would be to attempt 
to terminate, or at least reduce, the victim's distress no matter how self-gratifying it 
may be. Research indicates that, at least within the aggression literature, these 
empathic feelings elicited will most probably inhibit instrumental and emotional 
. aggression (Feshbach, 1978, 1987; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). 
It is likely that various extraneous factors impinge upon the decision as to whether to 
act in an appropriate manner. These factors act as inhibitors to an empathic 
response. For example, stress, alcohol and drug use, and physiological arousal such 
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as sexual arousal and/or negative affect all may act, either together or independently, 
to cause the individual to ignore or simply suspend feelings of empathic concern. 
Situational factors may also influence the decision whether to act empathetically. 
For example, an individual may act differently in group situations compared to when 
they are alone. Furthermore, it may be that causal attributions and cognitively 
. distorted patterns of thinking may influence the decision to act empathetically or not. 
The response of the distressed person is probably also impmiant to this stage. If the 
observer is the aggressor and the victim is reacting in a passive or non-reactive 
manner, this may serve to reinforce the aggressive behaviour. Perhaps viewing the 
distress of the other person has reinforcing prope1iies, and in this case it is unlikely 
that empathic feelings will inhibit this behaviour (Bandura, 1973). However this is 
sadistic behaviour and reflects other deficits as well as empathic. In summary, it is 
quite evident that many varying factors may influence the decision to act 
empathetically or not on the basis of the observer's feelings. 
Difficulties at any stage may cause lack of empathy 
Marshall et al. have postulated this reconceptualisation of empathy as a framework 
from which detailed theoretical and empirical explanation of a confused concept 
might evolve. The primary advantage of such a framework is that empathy is 
conceptualised as an unfolding process dependent on an individual's abilities in a 
variety of skills. Presumably, if an individual lacked the ability to act with empathy, 
. this may be due to difficulties at any one, or all, of these stages. Moreover, if an 
individual was to deliberately suspend his/her empathic capabilities, then this too 
could take place at one or all stages. A further strength of this framework is that 
ability in each stage is dependent on the skill in the preceding stage. This sequential 
process will help identify fundamental deficits in the unempathic individual. For 
example, an individual who lacked competency in recognising his/her own and other 
. people's emotions, would presumably be restricted in his ability to cognitively 
understand, interpret and feel the feelings of the observed person. For these reasons, 
this framework directs research to each of the components rather than to empathy as 
a whole entity. 
This information processing framework for empathy is applicable to various groups 
. of individuals, who are presumably deficient in their ability to experience empathic 
feelings that.would inhibit their deviant behaviours. For instance, individuals who 
aggress towards others may be deficient in one or more stages of this 
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reconceptualisation of empathy (this is presuming that empathy is a causal factor, or 
its absence maintains offending). In essence, if they were to show a greater 
awareness of the other's viewpoint they might reduce their aggressive behaviour(s). 
For example, groups such as violent individuals, aggressive parents, aggressive 
children, and sex offenders all may either be devoid of empathic ability or are able to 
suspend this ability in order to aggress. 
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Chapter 2 
Empathy deficits in sexual offending 
The concept of empathy has aroused considerable interest in the sex offender 
literature. This interest seems to be based primarily on the plausible assumption that 
. victim empathy should inhibit and reduce the development and maintenance of 
offending behaviour. Presumably, if the sex offender is able to recognise, 
comprehend and experience the distress and harm inflicted upon his victim, then this 
would inhibit the current sexual offending and further similar behaviours. 
Sex offenders are clearly a heterogeneous group, but a common factor in their 
off ending does appear to be a lack of empathy for their victims (Marshall, Hudson, 
Jones, & Fernandez, 1995). This is reflected in the etiological theories proposed to 
account for sexual offending and in the design of treatment programmes for sex 
offenders. However, there is conjecture as to the true extent of sex offender 
empathic deficits. Recently, it is suggested that rather than being generally 
unempathic individuals, sex offenders are selectively unempathic towards their own 
. victim, and/or other (potential) victims of sexual abuse. It is also suggested that the 
empathy model (Marshall, Hudson, Jones, & Fernandez, 1995) provides a better 
understanding, and means of assessment, of the empathic capabilities of the sex 
offender. 
Theory 
One of the most salient aspects of sexual offending is the heterogeneity involved. 
This is evident in sexual offender offence patterns and the disparate range of factors 
identified as being important in the onset, development, and maintenance of sexual 
offending. In order to account for sexual offending and to facilitate assessment and 
treatment of the sexual offender, comprehensive etiological theory is needed . 
. Etiological theory aims to specify causal factors and mechanisms to explain known 
facts and empirical findings of a certain behaviour (Hooker, 19 8 7). In the past two 
decades a number of theories and models have been developed that aim at en_hancing 
our understanding of sexual offenders (Marshall, 1996). 
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· Etiological theories proposed to account for sexual offending can be traditionally 
classified info psychodynamic, behavioural, feminist, sociobiological and social 
cognitive categories. Marshall and Barbaree (1990) noted that adherence to these 
narrow perspectives has been detrimental to the development of adequate etiological 
theory for sexual offending due to the disparity of factors involved. It seems 
unlikely that a behaviour as complex as sex offending can be fully explained by 
· single factor theories. Consequently, multivariate or integrated theories have 
provided the· most promising attempts at explaining sexual offending. However, it 
seems there is still a sense of theoretical confusion in terms of the importance of the 
factors involved in sexual offending, although recently much is being done to 
address this (see Hudson & Ward, 1995; Marshall, 1996). 
· Integrated theories have been developed to incorporate the large number of factors 
that are evident in sexual offending (e.g., Marshall & Barbaree, 1990; Malamuth, 
1986; Williams & Finklehor, 1990). These diverse factors are often based on 
psychological, biological, or sociological processes and are best seen as functionally 
interdependent (Marshall & Barbaree, 1990). It has become clear that a tangible 
understanding of sex offending can only be attained when all the disparate factors 
· that assume a role in the facilitation of sex offending are seen as functioning together 
to produce the inappropriate sexual behaviour. Indeed, it is apparent that the wide 
range of integrative theories proposed to account for sexual offending are, in effect, 
theoretical frameworks. These frameworks provide a set of constructs to guide 
model building and empirical research, rather than being true etiological theories that 
clearly describe the causal factors and their relationships with each other (Hudson & 
· Ward, 1995; Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). 
Marshall and Barbaree (1990) for instance, developed an integrated theoretical 
framework of sexual offending. They suggest that sexual aggression is multiply 
determined and place an emphasis on distal factors such as biological, 
developmental and sociocultural influences that result in a vulnerability to offend. 
- Transitory situational factors such as alcohol, negative affect, and sexual arousal 
may serve to lessen inhibiting controls and interact with the existing vulnerabilities, 
leading to sexual aggressive behaviour. As an example of another multivariate 
framework, Hall and Hirschman's (1991) quadripartite model which specifically 
addresses rape, describes four motivational precursors to sexual offending; sexual 
arousal, cognitive appraisal, affective dysfunction; and personality traits. Each of 
. these factors interacts with the others, being more or less important depending on the 
typology of the offender. This view suggests that these various precursors act 
together to increase the probability of sexually aggressive behaviour. 
Recently, it has been suggested that although single factor theories are unlikely to 
adequately explain the complex nature of sexual offending, they can, nevertheless, 
expand our understanding of each of the factors in broader more comprehensive 
multivariate theories (Ward, Hudson, Marshall, & Siegert, 1995). Whereas broad 
theories attempt to determine all the causal factors involved, single factor theories 
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· tend to detail the mechanisms and processes underlying a particular factor involved 
in sexual offending. For example, attachment theory has been proposed as one such 
middle level theoretical framework that attempts to elucidate intimacy and 
relationship difficulties in sex offenders (Marshall, 1989, 1993; Ward, Hudson, 
Marshall, & Siegert, 1995). 
· Empathy: An important factor in multivariate theories 
The various multivariate theories, and frameworks, developed to account for the 
occmTence of sexual offending, all acknowledge the existence of disparate factors 
that may function interdependently to facilitate sexual offending. One such factor is 
empathy, or a lack of it. Indeed, theorists have often noted the important role a lack 
· of empathy plays in the facilitation and maintenance of sexually aggressive 
behaviour (e·.g., Becker, Skinner, & Abel, 1983; Hall & Hirschman, 1991; Hildebran 
& Pithers, 1989; Hobson, Bolard, & Jamieson, 1985; Malamuth, 1988; Marshall & 
Barbaree, 1990; Williams & Finklehor, 1990). Empathy is considered to contribute 
to the prevention or termination of harmful behaviours, by acting as an inhibitor 
facilitating self-control and prosocial behaviour. A high level of empathy may 
· therefore act to prevent the expression of (sexual) aggression. This is consistent with 
the more general notion that empathy and aggression are antagonistic responses 
(Tangney, 1990). 
In classical aggression literature, empathy is thought to contribute to the inhibition of 
aggressive behaviour (see Davis, 1994 for review). From a cognitive perspective, 
· the ability to adopt the perspective of others, particularly within a potential conflict 
situation, leads to a greater understanding of, and tolerance for, the other person. 
Conversely from an affective perspective, observing the victim of one's own 
aggression (especially pain and distress cues) leads to a sharing of the victims' 
distress. Being understanding of the other person's perspective and experiencing 
vicarious distress, arguably is to experience empathy, which presumably (with 
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exceptions) leads to a reduction or termination of the aggressive behaviour 
(Feshbach, 1978; Iannotti, 1978). Indeed, empirical research supports this notion, 
that being unable to feel empathy towards an individual or group is likely to increase 
the probability of engaging in aggressive behaviour towards that individual or group 
· (Bandura, 1973; Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Feshbach, 1978; Iannotti, 
1978). 
Within the sexual offending literature, various theorists have noted the importance of 
empathy as an inhibitor to sexual aggression. It is suggested that sexual offenders 
lack the ability to respond empathetically to the distress of others, more specifically 
· their victims. For instance, in their theoretical framework, Marshall and Barbaree 
(1990) propose that sex offenders are emotionally indifferent to events distressing to 
others, and therefore are unable to develop empathy as an inhibitory control over 
(sexual) aggression. Hall & Hirschman (1991) suggest that there is a reciprocal 
relationship between negative affect states and normal inhibitions such as empathy 
that prevent offending behaviour. The more concern and sensitivity the offender has 
for the victim, the stronger will be the emotional inhibitory processes. 
Similarly, Barbaree, Marshall, and Lanthier (1979) suggest that recognition of the 
victim's distress inhibits sexual arousal in offenders. This suggests that offenders are 
not necessarily aroused by the use of force but rather fail to inhibit their sexual 
arousal and erection because of less empathic ability. Barbaree and Marshall ( 1991) 
· believe empathy may act as an inhibitor of sexual arousal to sexual aggression cues 
such as nonconsent and violence. The observer's emotional response to these cues 
reduces arousal by evoking an empathic response (Malamuth & Check, 1983). 
Malamuth (1981, 1986) suggests that if a man is high in what he termed a hostility 
trait, the suffering of a victim during a sexually aggressive or deviant act would not 
inhibit the man's sexual arousal, and may even reinforce it. Hostility then blocks 
· inhibitory factors such as the individual's empathic capabilities. Finklehor and 
Lewis (1988) suggest that a general inability to empathise with children is one of 
three aspects of masculine socialisation that lead to sexual off ending against 
children. Also, sociologists Scully and Marolla (1984) proposed that empathy 
facilitates social control by encouraging self-control. Specifically, synesic role 
taking ( from awareness of the victims' feelings and behaviour) and reflexive 
· emotions (e.g., embarrassment for oneself) produce empathic feelings. These 
empathic feelings function as a mechanism for controlling one's own behaviour, and 
facilitate social control (Scully, 1988). 
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· Attachment theory may be especially important in respect to a lack of empathy in 
sex offenders as caregiver and child attachment, and early childhood experiences are 
recognised as being essential in the development of empathic abilities in adulthood 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Feshbach, 1987; Hoffman, 1982; Strayer, 1987). It is 
apparent that secure early attachment between the child and caregivers appears to be 
a major antecedent of early interest in others, and is seen as a necessary precondition 
· for the development of empathy (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977). Furthermore, 
empathy deficits in sex offenders may be, at least partly, a function of the intimacy 
and interpersonal difficulties that impact on the etiology and maintenance of their 
deviant sexual behaviour (Ainsworth, 1972; Bowlby, 1966; Marshall, 1989; Ward, 
Hudson, Marshall, & Siegert, 1995; Ward, Hudson, & McConnack, 1996). 
In summary, sexual offending is best explained by multivariate theoretical 
frameworks that incorporate a wide range of disparate factors, each thought to be 
important in leading up to, and maintaining the aversive behaviour. A common 
factor in these broad frameworks is that sex offenders manifest a lack of empathy. 
Within these theories, empathy functions as an inhibitor of sexual offending, 
predominantly because of the awareness it generated in the offender of the distress 
- and harm caused to the other person. This is consistent with the general aggression 
literature, which suggests that empathy and aggressive behaviour are antagonistic 
responses. It is also suggested that attachment theory may provide an important 
single level framework with which these empathy deficits may be explained. 
A lack of empathy in sex offenders: Empirical research 
Theory is of course a guide to conceptual and empirical research and is important in 
the development of adequate assessment and treatment programmes. Therefore it is 
not surprising that empathy has recently emerged as an essential factor for which 
empirical data needs to be generated. Subsequently, there been a rise in the number 
of empirical studies investigating the empathic abilities of sex offenders. There is 
- still, however, little in the way of adequate empirical data with which to assess these 
empathic abilities. Researchers have attempted to investigate rapist and child sex 
offender empathy using a variety of different instruments, and in a variety of 
contexts. These studies have revealed a wide a1Tay of different findings. 
Lisak and Ivan (1995) used a general affect oriented empathy measure and found 
- that compared to non-sexually aggressive men, self-reported rapists manifested a 
lower capacity for empathy, both in terms of emotional recognition and empathic 
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content. Rice, Chaplin, Harris, and Coutts (1994) also measured empathy in rapists. 
They presented audiotaped narrations of a male-female interaction that involves 
categories of rape with victim enjoyment, rape with victim suffering, and consenting 
sexual and nonsexual interactions. Overall, across all categories the rapists 
displayed less general empathic ability than nonrapists did and deviant sexual 
arousal was reportedly inversely related to self-reported empathy. Likewise, 
Chaplin, Rice, and Harris (1995) measured the empathic abilities of child molesters 
by presenting audio-visual scenarios with a similar array of categories to Rice et al. 
(1994). Offenders reported less empathy towards the victim scenarios than did non-
. offenders, however this was only evident on the cognitive measure (Hogan's 
Empathy Scale, Hogan, 1969) and not the affective measure (Questionnaire Measure 
of Emotional Empathy, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). 
Scully (1988) examined rapists' perspectives of their own and the victim's responses 
to their rape experience by conducting large open-ended interviews with 114 
convicted rapists. They concluded that the rapists expressed virtually no or very 
little empathic feelings towards their victims and the empathic feelings of these men 
were so weak or non-existent that empathy was an unreliable mechanism of self-
control. In a related study, Hamilton and Lee (1990) investigated the propensity to 
rape in students by varying knowledge given to the respondents about the effects of 
rape. Generally, the greater the knowledge about rape consequences, the greater 
· awareness of victim suffering, the less propensity to rape was reported. Although 
not acknowledged by Hamilton and Lee, empathic arousal was probably facilitated 
by the awareness of harm to the victim. Therefore, sex offenders who are not aware 
of the distress and harm caused to the victim, or who are able to distort the 
consequences of their offending behaviour are unlikely to show empathy. 
Marshall, Jones, Hudson, and McDonald (1993) also investigated the empathic 
abilities of 92 incarcerated and 20 community based child sex offenders using a 
generalised multidimensional empathy scale (Interpersonal Reactivity Index, Davis, 
1983a). They found that compared with the incarcerated offenders the community 
based child molesters were deficient in general empathy. Furthermore, when these 
results were compared with earlier normative scores on the empathy scale (i.e., 
· Salter, 1988), there was no significant differences between these groups. 
Interestingly, the empathy deficits of the community based child sex offenders were 
not so low as to suggest real problems v1ith empathy. 
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Marshall, Fernandez, Lightbody, and O'Sullivan (1994) developed a person-specific 
measure of empathy for child molesters based on a suggestion by Hudson et al. 
(1993) that empathy deficits may be victim-specific, or at least specific to children. 
They administered the measure to 29 incarcerated child sex offenders and 36 
community non-offenders .. They found that the child molesters were equally able to 
emphasise with general situations involving a child, were less empathic toward a 
child who had been sexually abused by someone else and extremely unempathic 
towards their own victim(s). Later, Marshall, O'Sullivan, and Fernandez (1996) used 
the same person-specific measure, finding similar results lending credence to the 
victim-specific nature of child sex offender empathy deficits. 
Other studies have not revealed any significant empathy deficits in sex offenders. 
For example, Langevin, Wright, and Handy (1988) administered a battery of tests to 
a group of 98 exhibitionists, incest offenders, pedophiles, and rapists. They used a 
general empathy measure (QMEE, Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) to investigate 
whether these groups differed in terms of the their empathic capabilities. They 
found that the empathy measure was unable to distinguish between the groups and 
also between violent and non-violent offenders. Moreover, the scores of sex 
offenders on the measure used did not differ from the normative control group of 
university students provided with the empathy measure. However, they did 
significantly discern that deniers of their offences considered themselves more 
empathic than admitters. Hayashino, Wurtele, and Klebe (1995) likewise 
investigated the empathic abilities of 43 incarcerated incestuous and extrafamilial 
· child molesters, using a multidimensional scale assessing cognitive and affective 
empathy components (adapted from IRI, Davis, 1983a). They found that, contrary to 
expectations, the child molesters were no less empathic than their control groups 
consisting of incarcerated nonsexual offenders and individuals from the community. 
Moreover, there was no discernible difference in empathy between the incestuous 
and extrafamilial child molesters. 
In summary, several studies have examined the empathic abilities of sex offenders. 
These studies have used a variety of empathy measures and have found quite 
disparate results. On the whole it is apparent that sex offenders are deficient in their 
ability to empathise, therefore justifying the assumption that empathy is an important 
factor in sex offending. However, these findings have not been consistent, 
· particularly as the measures used have varied between studies. More recently, 
person-specific measures have consistently found marked victim-specific empathic 
deficits in child molesters. Even with the inconsistencies in the measurement of sex 
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offender empathy, it is clear that empathy deficits are an impmiant factor to target in 
the assessment and treatment of the sex offender. 
Treatment of the sex offender and empathy 
Treatment of the sex offender is judiciously based upon the etiological theory 
proposed to explain the development and maintenance of the offending behaviour. 
For this reason, contemporary therapeutic interventions for sex offenders are 
invariably integrated and multimodal in nature (Marshall, Jones, Ward, Johnston, & 
Barbaree, 1991). With the increased emphasis on cognitive behavioural approaches 
and relapse prevention interventions, treatment of the sex offender addresses a board 
range of areas where deficiencies are thought to be found. Treatment programmes 
for sex offenders commonly address the offender's deviant sexual arousal, cognitive 
distortions, empathy deficits, social skills deficits and incorporate a relapse 
prevention component (Marshall, Hudson, & Ward, 1992; Pithers, Martin, & 
Cumming, 1989). 
It is frequently suggested that empathy training is an essential target in the effective 
treatment of sex offenders (Longo, 1983; Maletzky, 1991; Marshall, 1993). Indeed 
it has been found to be the most commonly used modality in sex offender treatment 
programmes (Pithers, 1994). Knopp, Freeman-Longo, and Stevenson (1992) in their 
. survey of North American sex offender treatment programmes report that 94% of 
treatment programmes employ empathy training. Furthermore, empathy training is 
emphasised with both rapists ( e.g., Marshall, 1993) and child molesters ( e.g., Pithers, 
1994), with different age groups, such as juvenile offenders (Sapp & Vaughn, 1990), 
and with different modalities of therapy, for example group therapy and individual 
therapy (O'Donohue & Letourneau, 1993). 
Empathy training specifically targets the offender's lack of empathy towards their 
victim(s), and their inability or refusal to understand the effects on their victim of the 
sexual abuse (Hudson, Marshall, Ward, Johnston, & Jones, 1995). Presumably, 
enhancing sex offender empathy for victims of sexual abuse will inhibit further 
offending as the offender can no longer be unaware of the victim's distress and can 
see the effects of his behaviour as being harmful. Indeed in aggression literature, 
enhancing empathy has been demonstrated to replace acts of aggression with non-
violence (Feshbach, 1978; Iannoti, 1978), so seemingly with sexual aggression, 
enhancement of sex offender empathy should inhibit further offending. It is thought 
that establishing victim empathy also provides motivation for further behaviour 
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change and maintenance of relapse prevention. Furthermore, empathy training has 
been shown to significantly enhance other components of training, such as cognitive 
restructuring and behavioural reconditioning (addressing deviant sexual arousal) 
(Hildebran & Pithers, 1989). In fact, relapse prevention training programmes are 
commonly administered only after empathy is addressed first. Presumably, victim 
empathy enables the offender to emotionally motivate himself, as he is no longer 
unaware of the victim harm. 
It is important to recognise that the definition of empathy is of obvious importance to 
the treatment modality employed. A multimodal definition assumes a practical 
importance in that there are several potential areas of change (i.e., cognitive, 
affective, behavioural) in an empathy treatment programme rather than one (Pithers, 
1994). However it is not evident as to how researchers have defined empathy in 
most treatment programmes. For example, Pithers (1994) and Hildebran and Pithers 
· (1989) view empathy as multidimensional and employ Davis' four-factor definition. 
Hudson, Marshall, Ward, Johnston, and Jones (1995) suggest that empathy is 
multimodal in nature, and have designed the treatment component of the Kia 
Marama Sexual Treatment programme as such. Whilst more recently, Marshall et al. 
(1996) have detailed their empathy treatment component in terms of the 
reconceptualisation of empathy (Marshall et al., 1995). 
Several researchers have provided descriptions of their empathy enhancing 
components from their overall treatment programmes. For example, Marshall and 
Barbaree (1990) emphasise the enhancement of sex offenders' intimacy, thereby 
reducing emotional loneliness, while targeting empathy deficits and rationalisations 
that reduce their empathic capabilities. In order to acquire or reinstate this ability, 
. offenders are required to describe the impact of their actions on the victim in terms 
of immediate, post-abuse, and long-term consequences. Several additional tasks are 
also used such as writing an account from their own victim's perspective of the 
distress suffered both immediately and after the offence and the ongoing effects of 
this abuse (Hudson, Marshall, Ward, Johnston, & Jones, 1995). Marshall, 
O'Sullivan, and Fernandez (1996) emphasise the need to administer three segments 
. for their empathy component. In accordance with their reconceptualisation of 
empathy (Marshall et al., 1995), they attempt to facilitate emotional expression, 
awareness of victim harm, and victim empathy in sex offenders. The emotional 
expression segment encourages identification and expression of feelings, which are 
often limited in sex offenders. The following victim harm segment is aimed at 
identifying the harm, short-term and long-term, inflicted upon victims of sexual 
· abuse. Thirdly, victim empathy is targeted with the offender being required to 
explicitly express empathic feelings towards his victim(s). 
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Even though it is clear that empathy is a critical component in most cognitive 
behavioural treatment programmes, very little has been done in terms of assessing its 
effectiveness. Pithers (1994) reported clear gains in empathic ability and decreases 
in the endorsement of cognitive distortions, as a result of empathy training. 
However Pithers did not isolate the effects of the empathy component, but rather he 
determined the effects on empathy from the whole treatment programme. Marshall 
et al. (1996) found that child sex offenders showed, as a result of the empathy 
component, clear improvements in their ability to empathise with their victims. 
Using a person-specific measure of empathy, they also found that empathy was 
· improved with respect to the offender's own victim(s) and other potential victims of 
sexual abuse. 
In summary, empathy is seen as an essential element of the effective treatment 
programme for sex offenders. It seems evident that given an adequate conception of 
empathy so that essential processes in empathy are identified ( e.g., see model, 
· Marshall et al., 1995), and an adequate measure of the concept, significant 
improvements can be made in this essential treatment component. However, Hudson 
et al. (1995) reflect that there is no guarantee that these empathic enhancements will 
bring about empathy in all sex offenders, nor do they guarantee that when empathic 
arousal is induced, it will endure. Furthermore, as Marshall et al. (1995, 1996) have 
noted, the exact nature of empathy deficits in sex offenders is as yet unknown. To 
. accurately assess and enhance empathy in the sex offender it is essential that the true 
extent and nature of sex offender empathic abilities are known. 
The reconceptualisation of empathy and sex offending 
The study of empathy deficits in sex offenders has been hindered by the lack of an 
. adequate model of empathy to guide understanding and empirical research. 
Empathy has been defined in such generic terms that its assessment and subsequent 
treatment design has been hampered (Marshall et al., 1995; Pithers, 1994). Given 
the importance of empathy in the theories proposed to account for sexual offending, 
the next step is to create a model with which empathy can be optimally assessed. 
This is an essential and necessary step to take, especially given the conceptual 
. difficulties with which empathy is described. As it is likely that empathy is best 
conceived to be of a multicomponent nature, it is imperative that each of these 
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components is assessed in sex offenders to identify the specific deficits at each level. 
It could be that only one component of empathy is lacking, or is suspended by sex 
offenders, or it may be that offenders are inept at each level. 
The four-stage sequential model of empathy conceived by Marshall, Hudson, Jones, 
& Fernandez (1995) enables an adequate examination of sex offender empathic 
abilities, specifically in terms of the four stages of empathy. Marshall et al. believe 
that empathy is best conceived as an information processing model where adequate 
interpretation of each stage is necessary for progression to the next. It is suggested 
that sex offenders could have difficulties at any one or all of these stages, either 
through inability or by being able to suspend their responding to the situation 
(Marshall, O'Sullivan, & Fernandez, 1996). The four stages that lead to an empathic 
response are (I) emotional recognition, (2) perspective taking, (3) emotional 
replication, and (4) response decision. 
(1) Emotional recognition 
· The initial stage suggests that a sex offender must first be aware of, and able to 
adequately recognise the emotional state(s) of the victim. Without an adequate 
recognition of a distressed person's emotion states, it is unlikely that the remaining 
stages of empathy will unfold (Marshall et al., 1995, 1996). Therefore if the sex 
offender has difficulties at the first stage, then it is unlikely that he will have the 
capacity to be empathic. 
Several studies have examined sex offender abilities in the first stage of this model. 
Lisak and Ivan (1995) suggested that sex offenders manifest a lower capacity for 
reading the emotional expression of others. They found, using the Facial Affect 
Recognition test (Ekman & Oster, 1979), that compared to a control group, rapists 
made more errors when identifying facial affect. Similarly, Hudson, Marshall, 
· Wales, McDonald, Bakker, & McLean (1993), also used the FAR and found that 
child sex offender's, compared to other offenders and a community control group, 
were the least accurate at identifying emotions. In particular, the child molesters had 
specific problems confusing fear and surprise, and also anger and disgust. Contrary 
to their expectations, however these relative deficits were to children and adults 
suggesting a general inability to recognise facial affect. 
Lipton, McDonel, and McFall (1987) used a newly developed Test of Reading 
Affective Cues (TRAC) to assess the cue reading accuracy of adults. They presented 
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a series of videotaped vignettes depicting heterosexual couples interacting to 
· incarcerated violent and non-violent rapists, and non-violent nonrapists. They found 
that rapists were significantly deficient at identifying ( or misconstrued) primary 
affective cues from women. In particular, rapists were most clearly deficient when 
negative mood states were involved, especially in first date situations. Malamuth 
and Brown (1994) also used videos that depicted women responding to men in 
different ways. They showed these to a general sample of males and found that self-
reported sexually aggressive men lacked the ability to accurately decode women's 
affect. These men confused friendly behaviour as seductive and assertive behaviour 
as possibly hostile. Furthermore, McDonel and McFall (1991) found that difficulty 
identifying women's negative affect correlated highly with the self-reported 
likelihood of sexually coercive behaviour. 
Clearly, sex offenders may have information processing deficits at this first stage 
that cause them to misconstrue emotional cues. Rapists, child molesters, and 
sexually aggressive males from the general population have all been found to 
possess deficits at this stage, so that the affect of women and children is often 
confused. Therefore, sex offenders, relative to others, may be unable to accurately 
discern emotions that would evoke empathic arousal, such as fear, disgust, and 
· anger. Presumably any individual who lacks an ability to accurately recognise affect 
in another person, will be unable to adequately progress through the remaining 
stages in the empathy model. Indeed, studies that have investigated perspective-
taking abilities of sex offenders have found substantial deficits. 
(2) Perspective taking 
Perspective taking concerns the ability to appreciate the viewpoint of the other 
person, in order to fully comprehend the emotions observed in the preceding stage. 
Of the four stages in this model, the perspective-taking stage has been the most 
amenable to investigation with sex offenders. A number of studies have found that 
sex offenders have been unable to accurately take the perspective of their victims, 
· and/or women and children. 
Hanson and Scott (1995) for example, developed the Empathy for Women Test and 
the Child Empathy Test to examine perspective taking abilities of both rapists and 
child molesters respectively. The offenders read vignettes that described various 
interpersonal situations involving either an adult woman or a child with another 
· person. These vignettes ranged in abusiveness from positive (nonharmful) to 
negative ( clearly harmful). The sex offenders were required to anticipate how the 
individual in question was most likely to feel. The child empathy measure did not 
discriminate between sexual offenders and non-offenders, but child molesters did 
have offence specific perspective taking deficits. For example, incest offenders 
made more errors with incest vignettes. Both child molesters and rapists had 
difficulty taking the perspective of adult women. 
Marshall et al. (1994) devised the Victim Empathy Measure, a self-report 
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. questionnaire, one aspect of which was designed to measure child molester 
perspective-taking ability. The measure consisted of three scales intended to assess 
empathic feelings towards a child accident victim, a child victim of sexual abuse, 
and the off enders' own victim( s). They administered the test to incarcerated child 
sex offenders and a demographically matched group of non-offenders. The child sex 
offenders, relative to non-offenders, were less able to take the perspective of other 
. victims of sexual abuse, and markedly deficient at discerning the perspective of their 
own victim. 
Scully (1988) analysed the perceptions of self and victim held by incarcerated 
rapists. Specifically, Scully examined the ability of the offenders to view their 
offending behaviour from the victim's perspective, and their own feelings about their 
, behaviour. The majority ofthese men reported some degree of awareness of their 
victims' perspective, usually stating that had they been the victim, they would have 
felt powerless. Similarly, Phelen (1995) looked at incestuous fathers and their 
ability to accurately perceive the sexual encounter from the perspective of their 
daughter. These fathers were unable to cognitively interpret the encounter in a 
similar way to their daughters. For example, they thought their daughters had 
, enjoyed the experience, initiated it, and they were entitled to sex with their siblings. 
In complete dissimilarity the daughters did not find the sexual encounter pleasurable. 
The inability of sex offenders to see things from their victims' perspective may be 
facilitated by a number of factors. It may be that the lack of similarity between the 
victim and the offender may affect the adopting of another's perspective . 
. Presumably the greater the similarity between the sex offender and his victim(s), 
then the greater the ability to perceive events from the victim's perspective (Marshall 
et al., 1995). This would occur because greater similarity between the offender and 
his victim would allow the sex offender to more readily place himself into the 
victim's position, and perceive the situation from the other's viewpoint. Marshall et 
al. (1995) suggest that sex offenders who aggress towards one group of victim, either 
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women or children or both, may be deficient at taking the role of the victims 
because, at least to the offender, women and children are different from themselves. 
It is suggested that perspective taking deficits are facilitated by the cognitive 
distortions that maintain sexual offending (Hayashino et al., 1995; Ward, Hudson, & 
Marshall, 1995; Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 1996). Cognitive distortions 
refer to the self-serving beliefs held by sex offenders that serve to minimise, justify, 
rationalise, and to deny their behaviour (Abel et al., 1989; Stermac & Segal, 1989). 
Beliefs that function to minimise the harm to the victim may induce the 
misinterpretations with regard to the perspective taking abilities of the sex offender. 
The offender misinterprets the viewpoint of the victim in an expectancy-consistent 
manner (Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 1996), often misinterpreting 
nonsexual behaviour as sexual and harmful behaviour as nonharmful. For instance, 
Stermac and Segal (1989) suggest that child molesters see sexual contact with 
children as being socially acceptable and not harmful to the child, whereas rapists 
are more likely to believe traditional sex-role beliefs, that women are responsible for 
rape (Marolla & Scully, 1988). Therefore deficits at this stage maybe manifest 
because of the cognitive distortions held by the offender. In this sense distorted 
thinking may facilitate empathic deficits . 
. Abel et al. (1989) suggest that perspective taking deficits are part of the sex 
offenders rationalisations that permit them to continue offending, or to justify their 
behaviour. Cognitive distortions then may in part arise because of the offenders 
inability to take the perspective of the victim (Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 
1996). Perspective taking deficits therefore follow offending rather than precede 
them (Marshall et al., 1995). Moreover, child molesters justified their behaviour by 
. seeing the child as responsible for the sexual contact (Murphy, 1990). This certainly 
suggests that sex offenders were either unable, or suspended their ability to, take the 
perspective of the victim. 
Clearly sex offenders have significant perspective taking deficits. These deficits are 
significantly evident towards their own victim(s). There are a number of factors that 
. may influence the offenders' ability to see things from their victim's perspective. 
Similarity between the offender and his victim and the cognitive distortions that 
justify, minimise, and rationalise offending behaviour may be important to the 
perspective taking abilities of the sex offender. As sex offenders clearly manifest 
perspective taking deficits, it is unlikely that they will be able to adequately replicate 
the emotion of the distressed victim. 
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(3) Emotional replication 
To this point in the empathy model, the offender has been able to recognise the 
emotional state of the victim, and be able to see the situation from the victim's 
perspective. The third stage of the model involves the evocation of an emotional 
response that replicates, or nearly replicates, the emotional state of the victim. It is 
necessary that this emotional response is readily identifiable as being more 
appropriate to the victim's situation rather than the offenders. Otherwise, the 
offender could be simply be projecting an emotion that he assumes is appropriate 
when in fact he may be inaccurate. On the other hand the offender may be 
sympathetically aroused, feeling compassion but without self-other differentiation of 
this emotional state. Of all the stages in the empathy model, this stage has been the 
subject to the least research. 
Clearly, to adequately replicate the emotional state of the victim, the sex offender 
must be capable of experiencing that emotion. He must have an emotional repertoire 
that includes the appropriate emotions, which enable him to replicate the observed 
state (Marshall et al., 1995; Marshall, 1996). It is often suggested that sex offenders 
may have a limited range of emotional states, or at the least difficulties in correctly 
labelling their own emotions (Groth, 1979; Marshall et al., 1995; Marshall et al., 
1996). Sex offenders are often portrayed as experiencing only negative emotions 
such as anger and hostility in rapists, and emotions associated with low self-esteem 
in child sex offenders (Hillbrand, Foster, & Hirt, 1990; Scully, 1988). Imp01iantly, 
· if the sex offender lacks the required emotional range then presumably he will be 
unable to adequately replicate the emotional state of the victim. Indeed a sex 
offender who has only a limited emotional range may be unable to recognise the 
victims emotional state in the first place (stage 1) (Marshall et al., 1995). 
A number of researchers have referred to the restricted emotional abilities of sex 
· offenders. Hildebran and Pithers (1989) advocate that sex offenders tend to be 
emotionally underdeveloped, that is, they lack the ability to recognise certain 
emotional states. Marshall et al. (1996) maintain that sex offenders generally have 
difficulty describing and identifying their own feelings and that this impedes their 
ability to empathise. Furthermore, Ward, Hudson, and Marshall (1995) suggest that 
during the offence cycle, the sex offender may focus on more proximal goals and 
· thoughts. This results in a lack of emotion, particularly in terms ofrecognition and 
express10n. 
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There is a small range of studies that have examined the emotional repertoire of the 
sex offender and these have been for the most part based on interviews. Scully 
(1988) for example, reported that the majority of rapists in her study were 
'emotionally flat', and experienced only a limited range of emotions. Typically 
· anger, hate and power were the most frequent emotions experienced by the rapists 
during and immediately after the rape. Ce1iainly none of these rapists experienced 
the emotions that their victims did at the time of the sexual encounter. A small 
number of rapists in her sample did, however, report feeling guilt or shame 
immediately after the rape. This is, though, a sympathetic reaction more appropriate 
to the rapist's own self-awareness rather than a replication of the victim's feelings. 
( 4) Response decision 
The final stage involves the decision whether to respond in an appropriate manner 
that will reduce or eliminate the distress induced in the victim. Included in this stage 
is the formulation and delivery of the empathic response (Ward, Hudson, Johnston, 
· & Marshall, 1996). The offender at this stage may have adequately progressed 
through the first three stages of the empathy model, but he must choose, while 
sometimes under the influence of various disinhibitory factors, whether he will 
suspend or ignore his empathic capabilities in order to continue the offending 
behaviour. 
· This decision is at least partly mitigated by various factors that may or may not be 
present in the offending situation. For example, Marshall and Barbaree (1990) 
suggest that transitory situational factors may act as disinhibitors for sexual 
offenders in conjunction with other vulnerabilities. In this sense, these disinhibiting 
factors may impact on the sex offender's decision on whether or not to act on his 
empathic feelings. Sex offenders commonly report that alcohol (Barbaree, Marshall, 
· Yates, & Lightfoot, 1983), negative affect such as anger (Rada, 1978; Yates, 
Barbaree, & ·Marshall, 19 84 ), and ( anticipated) sexual arousal (Malamuth, Haber, & 
Feshbach, 1980) purposely or inadvertently function as disinhibitors in their 
offences. These factors may or may not be present in each sexual offence, but if 
present they may act to inhibit empathic responding by the sex offender. 
· One mechanism that might assist in inhibiting empathic feelings is self-talk. Porter 
and Critelli (1994) investigated the disinhibitory-inhibitory valence of self-talk in 
sexually and nonsexually aggressive men. They found that inhibitory self-talk was 
related to low levels of sexual aggression whereas sexually aggressive men by 
contrast appear to employ self-talk that is more disinhibiting. Porter and Critelli 
suggest that self-talk may serve as a behavioural suppresser in nonsexually 
aggressive men, which activates inhibition once sexually aggressive cues are 
perceived. 
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To summarise, sex offenders may have difficulties at one, or any, or all of the stages 
in this reconceptualisation. Importantly, because the model is an unfolding process, 
difficulties at the early stages will deter accurate responses at following stages. If, 
for example, sex offenders are unable to adequately recognise arid discriminate the 
emotional states of their victims, then they will be unlikely to accurately take the 
victim's perspective, and furthermore will be unlikely to experience a vicarious 
emotional response. In this case, there will be little, or no empathic feelings to act 
upon. Therefore the offender is likely to continue his offending behaviour. 
The identification of distinct steps in the empathic process is meaningful in terms of 
offender assessment and treatment. Assessment should focus on recognising 
deficiencies in each stage of the model. These difficulties at certain stages will 
, formulate and guide treatment design and implementation. Treatment is, of course, 
based on theory and to this end empathy is vitally important in the treatment of the 
offender. The reconceptualisation proposed by Marshall, Hudson, Jones, and 
Fernandez (1995) enables a multidimensional approach to empathy, which will 
better encompass individual and offence type differences. Now, it is necessary to 
develop assessment that will enable clinicians to measure these individual and 
· typology differences, specifically in terms of the stages of the empathy process. 
Generalised empathy deficits 
Clearly sex offenders may be deficient in their capacity to experience empathy, but 
what is not so clear is the extent of the empathy deficits. Is it that sex offenders 
· cannot feel empathic towards anyone, so that their empathic deficits are of a 
generalised nature? This would suggest that their deficits are a global personality 
trait that would manifest across different persons, situations and times. Or, is it that 
sex offenders are specifically unempathic towards selective individuals, such as 
those who may be subject to (potential) sexual abuse, children for example in the 
case of child molesters. Even more circumscribed, the deficits may be selective only 
, towards their own victim(s). This issue is pertinent to the assessment and treatment 
of the sex offender. If empathy deficits exist it is essential to accurately identify the 
extent of these deficits if proper assessment procedures and adequate treatment 
components aimed at identifying and enhancing empathic capacities are to be 
· developed. 
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Most theorists (Becker, Skinner, & Abel, 1983; Marshall & Barbaree, 1989; 
Williams & Finklehor, 1990) seem to have suggested that sex offenders are deficient 
in a generalised empathy that would manifest toward all people, across all situations, 
and is stable over time. This suggests that sex offenders are globally unempathic 
individuals lacking in the ability to empathise with anyone in any situation. 
Obviously this means they are unempathic towards everyone, adults and children 
alike. This generalised incapacity for empathy towards anyone then, is one of 
several critical etiological factors that precedes and indeed maintains sexual 
offending. By virtue of its global nature, this deficit seemingly exists in the sex 
offender's disposition, therefore allowing sex offenders to be grouped together as 
unempathic individuals. 
Marshall and Barbaree (1989, 1990) suggest that negative childhood learning 
experiences, particularly insecure attachment bonds with caregivers, may lead to the 
development of emotional indifference, which in turn leads to an inability to 
empathise with others. Presumably it is this emotional indifference to events which 
· would be distressing to others that facilitates and maintains empathy deficits of a 
general nature. Williams and Finklehor (1990) report that incestuous fathers tend 
have difficulty experiencing general empathy, and that this is due to their low 
involvement in the child caretaking of their family. This avoidance of childcare and 
nurturing activities has not allowed an adequate development of empathy 
capabilities. 
Similarly Langevin, Wright, and Handy (1988) note that child sexual offenders must, 
in general, lack global empathy, while Heath (1985), and Wickes and Madigan 
(1985), both note that victims usually report that incest child sexual offenders are 
generally unempathic individuals. Presumably, the victims were able to report on 
the offender's overall nonsexual behaviours as well but this is not specified. It is, 
. however important to note that the abuse may have affected the child's judgement of 
the father's general empathic ability. Berkowitz (1983) also noted that incest 
offenders often reveal a lack of generalised empathy on their Thermatic 
Apperception Test (TAT) responses. Furthermore, the Hypermasculinity Inventory 
(HI; Sir kin, 1984) generally predicts low empathy in studies of nonsexual aggression 
(e.g., Smeaton & Byrne, 1987), however Mosher and Anderson (1986) found that HI 
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is highly correlated with self-reported likelihood of raping. Therefore, they presume 
that those who would rape show a lack of generalised empathy. 
Until recently, it seems that sex offender treatment programmes have largely focused 
on enhancing generalised empathy capabilities in sex offenders (Marshall, Hudson, 
Jones, & Fernandez, 1995). For example, McFarlane (1983), Jenkins-Hall (1989), 
and Williams and Finklehor (1990) have all emphasised that what should be targeted 
in the empathy component of sex offenders treatment programmes is a deficit in 
general empathy. They attempt to enhance the offender's empathic capabilities in 
terms of a board, non-specific treatment approach that includes persons other than 
those sexually abused or assaulted. For instance, McFarlane (1983) notes the need to 
enhance the offender's basic empathy to those who share his or her world, while 
Jenkins-Hall (1989) notes that sex offenders have a failure of empathy, which 
presumably implies that this deficit is global. 
Yet intuitively, to function adequately in interpersonal situations, sex offenders 
would be able to show at least minimal empathic ability in certain situations. 
Indeed, Hoffman (1982) notes that the capacity to empathise is present in almost all 
adults. This suggests that the ability to feel empathic is present in most individuals, 
except perhaps for those deemed psychopathic, and/or who suffer from an Antisocial 
. Personality Disorder (Hare; 1985). Psychopathy refers to a blatant disregard for the 
interests and. concerns of others and a tendency to readily violate social doctrines and 
do so with minimal feelings of empathy or guilt (Hare, 1985). There are sex 
offenders who score highly on psychopathy measures, particularly those who 
commit violent and sadistically deviant offences (Serin, 1994 in Marshall et al., 
1995). These individuals would feel little if any empathy towards anyone. 
However, impo1iantly the incidence of psychopathy in sex offenders is low in 
comparison to other offender groups (Hare, 1991). Ifsex offenders do in fact have 
the capacity to be empathic in general situations, their inability to respond 
empathetically is likely to be selective in some sense, perhaps to children, and is 
likely to be an ability to suspend empathic capabilities rather than an actual deficit. 
Specific empathy deficits 
Sex offenders may have more circumscribed empathy deficits restricted to either a 
class of (potential) victims such as children, or perhaps only towards their own 
victim(s) (Abel et al., 1989; Hanson & Scott, 1995; Hayashino et al., 1995; Hudson 
et al., 1993; Marshall et al., 1995; Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). Rather than 
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being, in general, deficient in their empathic capabilities, sex offenders could be 
unempathic only towards their own victims, or other (potential) victims of sexual 
abuse. They are either devoid of the capability to empathise towards these 
individuals, or are able to suspend this capacity in order to continue offending. This 
reasoning has emanated, in part, from the work on cognitive distortions (Ward, 
Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 1996), cognitive deconstruction (Ward, Hudson, & 
Marshall, 1995), and the descriptive models of the sex offender offence chain (Ward, 
Louden, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). 
The circumscribed nature of empathy deficits in sex offenders is reflected in the self-
serving cognitive distortions that serve to minimise, deny, and justify their offending 
(Marshall, 1996). For example, sex offenders often observe but distort the distress 
· of their victim and the subsequent consequences of their abuse (Abel, Becker, & 
Cunningham-Rathner, 1984; Marshall & Barbaree, 1990). In particular sex 
offenders appear to believe that their offences were socially acceptable and did not 
harm the victim. Passivity or frightened compliance is seen as further confirmatory 
evidence that the victim is not haimed (Murphy, 1990). In fact, commonly the 
victim is seen as enjoying the abuse. Furthermore, it is evident that sex offenders are 
· only distorted in their thinking towards potential victims such as children or women 
and that thes·e distorted beliefs appear to increase as offending continues (Abel et al., 
1984, 1989). These rationalisations allow the sex offender to be selectively 
unempathic and protect themselves from self-blame, and consequent negative self-
attributions such as lowered self-esteem by shifting responsibility to external causes 
(Hudson, Marshall, Ward, Johnston, & Jones, 1995). In this sense, empathic deficits 
· of the sex offender are limited in scope and extent to the victim, and/or potential 
victims ( e.g.; children). 
Sex offenders also characteristically fail to consider the long-term consequences of 
their actions, instead focusing on more proximal short-term gratification. As a 
consequence they are unlikely to comprehend the distress of the victim, which is a 
· prerequisite for an empathic response (Marshall et al., 1995). However, some 
offenders may be remorseful afterwards. hnportantly, this posits that one's ability to 
be empathic is selectively deferred or non-existent whilst engaged in the offending 
process, therefore empathy can be suspended rather than being absent. Ward, 
Hudson, and Marshall (1995) in their middle-level theoretical explanation of 
cognitive distortions and affective deficits, propose that sex offenders do this by 
· entering a cognitively deconstructed state, which when taken in context with other 
risk factors and vulnerabilities (see Marshall & Barbaree, 1990) both primes and 
perpetuates offending behaviour. 
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Cognitive deconstruction (Baumeister, 1991) refers to the narrowing of ones 
awareness (e.g., avoiding feelings of guilt) to lower levels of meaning in order to 
escape from the negative implications of self-awareness ( e.g., guilt). The offender's 
self-focus shifts to his proximal goals and physiological sensations such as sexual 
arousal. Obviously sex is a particularly effective means ofreducing self-awareness, 
as the offender can focus on mere bodily sensations such as the anticipated pleasure 
of orgasm, with little or no direct control over his behaviour (Gilun & Connor, 1989; 
Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). The sex offender is able to disregard any 
meaningful thought such as the wider implications of the offending behaviour, like 
the physical, psychological, and emotional harm inflicted upon the victim. This 
suggests that empathic capacities are suspended during the offence chain leading to, 
and during, an offence due to the focus on lower level attention rather than higher 
levels of meaning (feelings of guilt and distress). This focus on proximal goals 
specific to the process of offending implies a victim-specific empathy deficit or the 
suspension of empathy rather than a broadly based personality defect or trait (Ward, 
Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). 
Due to our increasing knowledge regarding the mechanisms underlying empathic 
deficits in sex offenders, treatment programmes that incorporate an empathy 
component are becoming more focused on enhancing specific empathic abilities. 
Rather than simply aiming to increase empathy in the sex offender, programmes are 
more than ever targeting victim-specific empathy deficiencies. For example, Groth, 
· Long, and Mcfadin (1982) clearly maintained that empathy towards their own 
victim(s) needs to be installed in sex offenders. Rosen and Hall (1992) also identify 
"increasing victim empathy" as part of their treatment programme. Similarly 
Hildebran and Pithers (1989) and Pithers (1994) believe that enhancing victim-
specific empathy is an essential first step in their relapse prevention oriented 
treatment. Jenkins-Hall (1989) view the enhancement of empathy towards sexual 
· abuse victims is an essential component of effective treatment programmes. Clearly 
contemporary treatment of the sex offender is increasingly addressing specific 
empathy deficiencies rather than more global deficiencies. 
The suggestion that empathy deficits in sex offenders are limited in scope to their 
own victims, or perhaps also to other (potential) victims is exemplified in recent 
· research. For example Scully (1988) examined the perceptions of incarcerated 
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rapists of their self and victims after their offending. Over half these rapists 
indicated that they felt nothing at all for their victim, suggesting that these men 
lacked victim-specific empathy. Hanson and Scott (1995) examined the perspective-
taking abilities of child molesters and based on their findings suggest that empathy 
deficits are most likely to be specific situational characteristics. Similarly 
Hayashino, Wmiele, and Klebe (1995) suggest that child molesters do not differ 
. from nonoffenders in their general empathy abilities, but rather child molesters are 
deficient in their empathy for children. Similarly, Bennett (1985, in Williams & 
Finklehor, 1990) found that incestuous fathers were empathic towards their wives, 
but not their daughters. 
Marshall, Fernandez, Lightbody, and O'Sullivan (1994) using a new measure 
specifically examined the extent of empathy deficits in child sex offenders. They 
presented three different contextual scenarios each representing children in harmful 
circumstances to offenders and nonoffenders. One scenario involved a child 
automobile accident victim, another a victim of child sexual abuse, while the third 
was the off enders own victim. They found that child sex off enders relative to 
nonoffenders, were less able to discern the emotional state of sexual abuse victims 
. and were as accurate at discerning the accident victim's emotions. Significantly and 
most importantly, these offenders were clearly deficient at identifying the emotional 
state of their own victim. This clearly suggests that these child sex offenders lacked 
the ability to empathise with their own victim(s) and to an extent other victims of 
sexual abuse. Furthermore, Marshall, O'Sullivan, & Fernandez (1996) used the same 
measure to assess the empathy abilities of incarcerated child molesters both before 
. and after treatment. They too, found that the child sex offenders displayed a 
profound lack of empathy towards their own victims relative to the children in other 
circumstances. 
It seems apparent that a lack of victim-specific empathy may be more reflective of 
the true nature of this characteristic feature of sex offenders. The cognitive 
. distortions that facilitate and maintain a lack of empathy indicate the victim-specific 
nature of this phenomenon, whilst recent theory (e.g., Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 
1995) also maintains that sex offenders manifest a specific lack of empathy towards 
either sexual assault victims or only towards their own victim. This is extremely 
important for the assessment and treatment of the sex offender as it may now be 
possible to target the distinct areas where these deficiencies manifest. 
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· Victim-specific empathy across the offence chain 
It is possible that cognitive distortions and the failure to consider long-term 
consequences by means of cognitive deconstruction, are two mechanisms that may 
facilitate victim-specific empathy deficits. These mechanisms are both dynamic and 
fluctuate throughout the offence cycle of the sexual offender (Ward, Hudson, & 
Marshall, 1995; Ward, Louden, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). Intuitively, 
investigating the temporal stability or instability of empathic ability within the 
offence chain (Pithers, Martin, & Cumming, 1989; Ward, Louden, Hudson, & 
Marshall, 1995) is likely to provide a fuller picture of these empathy deficiencies. 
The question therefore, is whether or not empathy deficits in sex offenders are stable 
over time, specifically during the offence chain? 
Sex offender empathy deficits are almost certainly predominantly specific to their 
own victim. It is necessary to examine the temporal permanence of empathy 
towards the victim. Theorists in the past have tended to focus on invariance in 
empathic behaviour only within the constructs of stable personality traits, whereas it 
is likely that situational and temporal variables may account for a large proportion of 
· unreliable results (see Homblow, 1980). This may be another important reason 
behind the lack of validity and reliability in generalised measures of empathy, 
particularly in sex offenders where numerous factors appear to conciliate sexual 
aggression. Generalised measures have not taken into account the varying affective 
and cognitive states of the sex offender during different stages of his offending 
behaviour, but rather treat empathy as a stable global trait fixed over time. However, 
· temporal factors may also dete1mine, to some extent, whether or not a sex offender is 
likely to respond with empathy to the distress of his victim. To examine temporal 
factors more closely it is necessary to consider the changing cognitive and affective 
states during the offence chain (Ward, Louden, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995) of the 
sex offender. 
· The offence chain refers to a descriptive model of the sequence of cognitive, 
affective, and behavioural events that form a series of steps leading up to, during and 
following an offending situation (Pithers, Martin, & Cumming, 1989; Ward, Louden, 
Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). Ward, Louden, Hudson, and Marshall (1995) using a 
qualitative approach, identified nine stages that described the temporal process of an 
offence against a child. At each of these stages, the behavioural and cognitive 
· responses made by the offender to events, persons or situations, and his own self-
evaluations determine whether or not he will proceed through the sequence of events 
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leading to an offence. The nine stages identified are (in order) background factors, 
. distal planning, contact with victim, cognitive restructuring, proximal planning, 
sexual offence, cognitive restructuring, future resolutions, and finally background 
factors again. The beginning and ending of the chain signify the cyclic nature of 
sexually abusive behaviour. 
Dysfunctional cognitions are likely to facilitate and manifest empathy deficiencies in 
sex offenders (Marshall, 1996; Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995; Marshall et al., 
1995). Cognitive distortions (Abel et al., 1989) emerge dynamically throughout the 
offence chain and together with sexual arousal and affective states, may differ to 
varying degrees at different stages of the offence chain. The beliefs, interpretations, 
and attitudes that are closely associated with these distortions will vary also (Ward, 
Louden, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). Subsequently, empathy towards the victim is 
also likely to be dynamic, due to its functional closeness to the cognitive distortions 
prevalent at any given time (Ward et al., 1995). In this sense, victim empathy may 
not be a stable trait, but rather it may be transitory and reliant on the thinking 
patterns of the offender at any given time. 
In general, the sexual offender may have the empathic capacity necessary to 
. empathise with his potential victim(s). Intuitively, even particularly aggressive child 
molesters would need to show some general empathy capabilities early in their 
offending cycle, particularly when endeavouring to "groom" their potential victims. 
At this stage, a proximal goal of the child sex offender is to gain the trust and 
confidence of the child. Displaying empathy would certainly aid in this goal. 
Indeed, Marshall and Barbaree (1990) suggest that nonsexual contact with the victim 
. often includes displaying empathy and other positive emotions in order to gain the 
trust or friendship of the child. The offender justifies (to himself) this undue 
attention towards the child by evaluating the child as needy, or if the offender 
experiences negative affect because of his behaviour (i.e., apprehension, guilt), he 
will attempt to .deny or avoid these feelings. However, from this stage onwards, 
sexual arousal, fluctuating mood states and a focus on proximal self-serving goals 
act to block the awareness of the victims feelings and the wrongfulness of the 
offending be_haviours. Subsequently cognitive distortions change dynamically at this 
point. A change in the perception of the relationship of the child from nonsexual to 
sexual terms also takes place. 
The offender at this stage, may use one of three different seduction foci (Ward, 
Louden, Hudson, & Marshall., 1995), which affect the nature of the offence. A self-
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focus involves egocentric planning where the offender is only concerned about his 
own needs, perceives the victim as an object who is solely there for the offender's 
satisfaction. Obviously, empathy for the victim would be totally suspended, 
probably by means of cognitive deconstruction (Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 199 5). 
· A victim-focus is where the offender thinks the victim's needs are the most 
important. Here, the offender perceives the victim as the initiator, deriving all the 
pleasure, and believes the sexual behaviour to be part of a mutual caring relationship. 
A mutual-focus is associated with mutual satisfaction where the victim is viewed as 
willing and enjoying the sexual behaviour. Again, the cognitive distortions evident 
in these two seduction processes suspend awareness of victim distress and empathic 
feelings. 
Following the offence, there are further dynamic changes in offender dysfunction 
thinking and empathic ability. Those who judged their behaviour negatively tend to 
feel guilt and remorseful and self-blame. They tend to now acknowledge that their 
prior thinking was wrong or incorrect, and their perception of their relationship with 
the victim changes. In other words they elicit some empathy towards the victim and 
expect not to offend again. However, Ward and his colleagues (1995) suggest that 
these men may begin to enter the offending cycle because of the abstinence violation 
effect (Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1994). As a consequence of their own negative 
evaluations these offenders feel worthless, depressed and again slip into offending 
behaviour in order to lift their mood. Those offenders who judged their behaviour in 
· a more positive way, either by minimising or blaming the victim and other cognitive 
distortions, continued to show no remorse ( empathy) for their victims and are likely 
to continue offending in the future. 
It is suggested that empathy towards the victim may fluctuate over the course of the 
offence chain. This is due to the dynamics of the cognitive distortions, sexual 
. arousal and fluctuating mood states that influence and maintain the offending 
behaviour. In this sense, empathy is suspended unconsciously in order to evaluate 
oneself in a positive manner and to enable a continuance of a focus on rewarding 
sexual behaviour. However, the empathic abilities of sex offenders have not been 
assessed at different stages of the offence cycle . 
. Sex offending and a la:ck of empathy summary 
Sex offenders are thought to suffer from deficits in their capacity to experience 
empathy, and this is considered important in the development, onset, and particularly 
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- maintenance of their sexual offending. It is therefore no surprise that empathy is 
commonly seen as a critical factor in the multivariate theories proposed to account 
for sexual offending. It is also the most used modality in comprehensive sexual 
offender treatment programmes. Given the importance of this concept, the study of 
empathy has recently gained in interest. Recently, a new model of the empathic 
process has been proposed that offers an improved understanding and optimal way to 
- treat the empathy deficits in the sex offender. Specifically, these empathy deficits 
shown by sex offenders are now commonly assumed to be more circumscribed than 
first thought. It is now suggested that empathy deficits are victim-specific or at least 
specific to other victims of sexual aggression and are dynamic over the child 
molester's offence cycle. 
Chapter 3 
The Measurement of Empathy 
Measuring Empathy 
The difficulties inherent in defining and conceptualising empathy have led 
to a wide variety of measurement procedures that have been used across 
many contexts. Empathy has been used to describe a wide variety of 
phenomena, from the cognitive ability to perceive and interpret someone 
else's affect, to the vicarious matching of another's emotional state (Moore, 
1990). There has been so little agreement among researchers regarding the 
definition of empathy that the development of any coherent instrument of 
measure has been difficult to achieve (Eisenberg & Farbes, 1990). Clearly 
the definition utilised in research dictates, in essence, the nature of the 
measurement instrument. 
Measures of empathy have endeavoured to identify empathic abilities in a 
wide range of different people in quite different circumstances (Marshall, 
Hudson, Jones, & Fernandez, 1995). Empathy tests have therefore largely 
measured general empathic abilities implying that empathy is a trait, and 
generalised to all contexts (Marshall et al., 1993). As it has been shown that 
empathy is more likely to be situation/person specific and the assessment 
methods have usually relied on self-report which is subject to substantial 
bias (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987), it is perhaps understandable that 
empathy has been a very difficult phenomenon to measure in sex offenders. 
In their review of the available literature Chlopan, McCain, Carbonell, and 
Hagen (1985) noted that many different types of self-report measures have 
been used. The choice of an empathy measure has depended on the 
researcher's definition of empathy and the population being assessed. Adult 
Empathy has been assessed by means of self-report of reactions in 
experimental situations (Batson, 1986; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; 
Fultz et al., 1985), 'other-report' of empathy where one person rates another 
person's empathy (Strayer, 1983), facial/gesture indices (Eisenberg & 
Carroll, 1983; Eisenberg &.Miller, 1987), physiological indices (Epstein, 
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1975), and experimental induction (Coke et al., 1978; Davis, 1983b, Fultz 
et al., 1985). 
The most commonly utilised mode of measuring empathy across all 
· populations has been pencil and paper self-report questionnaires, probably 
because of ease of administration. These self-report questionnaires are 
invariably diverse in content and global in nature, so as to be of use to a 
number of populations. Moreover, they are designed to reflect a perspective 
of empathy thought by the individual researcher to encompass the important 
elements of an empathic response. Measures of empathy have assessed 
either cognitive or affective empathic abilities, or have measured a 
combination of the two. Nevertheless, there tends to be a consistent and 
positive association (although only moderate) between these questionnaire 
measures of empathy and prosocial behaviour (Chlopan et al., 1985; 
Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Strayer, 1987). 
· Measures of cognitive empathy 
From a cognitive perspective, empathy consists of being able to understand 
and predict the emotions of others and a willingness and ability to put 
oneself in another's perspective (role taking) (Strayer, 1987). Clearly, 
acquiring the capacity to understand another's viewpoint is an important, 
· perhaps essential prerequisite for an empathic response. Initially most 
measures of ·empathy were devised to assess the cognitive ability of an 
individual to put oneself into the observed person's place and observe the 
world as they do (Hornblow, 1980; Strayer, 1987). Cognitive empathy 
measures assess an individuals awareness and understanding of a target 
individual's emotional state and have also focused on role taking, emotional 
. discrimination, and the ability to put oneself into the shoes of another in 
order to see the world as they do. 
The most enduring and popular cognitive measure of empathy is the Hogan 
Empathy Scale (Hogan, 1969) (Davis, 1994). According to Hogan's 
conception of empathy, those who are more empathic should be more 
. socially aware and caring about the feelings of others. The 64-item scale 
assesses role-taking cognitive skills, based on normative composites of high 
and low empathy groups taken from MMPI responding. The Hogan 
Empathy Scale has been shown to be moderately satisfactory in terms of its 
43 
· reliability and validity (Chlopan, McCain, Carbonell, & Hagen, 1985). 
However contrary to Chlopan et al., Cross and Sharpley (1982) obtained 
low reliability estimates. Perhaps more importantly the internal consistency 
was poor. Similarly Johnson, Cheek, and Smither (1983) found that the 
measure contained four factors: social self-confidence, even-temperedness, 
sensitivity, and nonconformity. Only one (sensitivity) of which would 
· measure what empathy appears to encompass. In fact several researchers 
have similar validity concerns, and have implied that the use of the Hogan 
Empathy Scale has but a tenuous value in assessing empathic ability, 
especially in (sexually) aggressive individuals (Bush, 1990; Hornblow, 
1980; Marshall et al., 1995; Pithers, Martin, & Cumming, 1989). 
Nevertheless, Hogan's Empathy Scale has been repeatedly used in the 
measurement of empathy in sex offenders with mixed results. Chaplin, 
Rice, and Harris (1995) used Hogan's'Empathy Scale in conjunction with 
an affective scale to assess the empathic abilities of child sex offenders. 
They found that child sex offenders furnished significantly lower scores 
(were less empathic) than community controls. Importantly these offenders 
· were based in the community and not incarcerated. Likewise, Rice, 
Chaplin, Harris, and Coutts (1994) also used two measures of empathy, 
including Hogan's measure. They found that rapists self-reported less 
empathy than nonrapists. Moreover, they found that phallometric deviance 
scores were significantly negatively correlated with self-reported empathy. 
Impmi~ntly however, Rice et al. (1994) also reported that a substantial 
· number of the rapists met the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality 
Disorder and exceeded the criteria on Hare's Psychopathy Checklist (Hare, 
1985). 
Conversely, Marshall and Marie (1994) found no significant differences 
between child molesters and community controls on the Hogan Empathy 
· Scale. Likewise, Seto (1992) did not find significant differences between 
rapists and a· control group using Hogan's scale. Initially, there were 
reported differences on the Hogan Empathy Scale but Seto controlled for 
the significance of education, and these differences dissipated. It is worth 
noting that Seto's population of rapists were randomly selected from a 
general prison population and presumedly were unlikely to be psychopathic 
· (Serin, 1994). Importantly, the empathy scores of the sex offenders in the 
above three studies were all within the range of the normative scores 
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provided by Hogan (1969, 1975). 
The Hogan Empathy Scale appears to be of dubious value to the assessment 
of empathy in sex offenders. Moreover this measure assesses only a 
cognitive, role-taking empaJhic ability of the sex offender, whilst ignoring 
the affective content of empathy. Subsequently, its only recent use in the 
area of sexual offending has been as a cohort to other affective measures 
(Marshall et al., 1995). 
Affective measures of empathy 
From an affective perspective, empathy is defined as an individual's 
vicarious emotional response to perceived emotional experiences of others 
(Goldstein & Michaels, 1985). Consequently instruments that measure this 
aspect of empathy have emphasised the emotional reactions of the 
individual to the observed experiences of another person or persons. 
Affective approaches focus on the individual's conscious experience of 
· emotions. Essentially these instruments measure the ability of the 
respondent to experience, or at least report, a vicarious ( or appropriate) 
emotional response. In particular they measure the experience of perceived 
sharing of feelings, at least at the basic affect level (pleasant-unpleasant), to 
the perceived emotional experiences of others. This approach contrasts with 
cognitive approaches that focus on social role taking, in particular the 
· willingness and ability to put oneself in another's place. 
The most utilised measure of affective empathy has been the Questionnaire 
Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972). 
Mehrabian and Epstein developed this 33-item scale after noting what they 
felt was a lack of an adequate measure of emotional empathy. The 
· respondent is required to answer each question on a 9-point scale that 
ranges from (-4) very strong disagreement to (4) very strong agreement. 
Sixteen items require agreement and the remaining seventeen items requires 
disagreement to be scored as a successful empathic response, so that the 
total empathy score is the result of summing up the item responses. 
Mehrabian and Epstein selected their items from a large pool on the basis of 
· (a) an insignificant correlation with a measure of social desirability (Social 
Desirability Scale, Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), (b) a significant .01 
correlation with the total scale score, and ( c) content validity based on a 
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factor analysis of the total item pool. 
Chlopan et al. (1985) have reported that the Questionnaire Measure of 
Emotional Empathy has adequate reliability and validity, although it 
. measures self-reported empathic arousal and possibly even a general 
tendency to be emotionally aroused in various situations, which is not 
empathic arousal. Even though it is the most widely used affective 
measure, numerous studies have failed to support the validity of this 
measure. For example, Hoppe and Singer (1976), contrary to Mehrabian 
and Epstein (1972) failed to find any valid differences between aggressive 
and nonaggressive individuals. Langevin et al. (1988) found the QMEE to 
have a poor internal consistency (alpha= .59), while Dillard and Hunter 
(1989) reviewed the use of the QMEE and found it to be construct invalid. 
Bryant (1982) has reported low sh01i-term reliability, where children were 
re-tested after one month. Furthermore, Bryant (1982) also found a 
negative relationship between the QMEE and helping or prosocial 
. behaviour, concluding that the QMEE did not have satisfactory validity. All 
of these researchers advised against the further use of the QMEE. 
Again, even though there has been a prevailing reproach to the use of this 
instrument, it has been commonly used to investigate presumed empathy 
deficits in sex offenders. Lisak and Ivan (1995) investigated the empathic 
. abilities of a large sample of students, who were categorised as sexually 
nonaggressive, sexually coercive, sexually aggressive, or combined 
aggressive. Using the QMEE they found that compared to nonaggressive 
men, sexually aggressive men scored lower on the scale, therefore 
manifesting less empathy. However, this was only when the sexually 
coercive and sexually aggressive males were combined (increasing the 
. sample size from 16 to 49) to make the combined aggressive category. 
Therefore the initial results were weak. 
Langevin et al. (1988) used the QMEE to assess the empathic abilities of 98 
sexual offenders, consisting of incest offenders, extrafamilial offenders, 
rapists, and exhibitionists. They found no significant difference between 
these offenders and nonoffending males from the community. Moreover, 
against expectations they also found no differences between offender type. 
For example, they had predicted that rapists would be less empathic than 
child molesters, but there was no evidence to support this. There was also 
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no significant correlation between empathy and the offender's history of 
violence. However, they did find that admitters (of their offending 
behaviour) reported greater empathy than those who denied their sexual 
offending. 
Rice et al. (1994) and Chaplin et al. (1995) both used the QMEE in 
conjunction with Hogan's more cognitive oriented measure. Rice et al. 
found no significant self-reported empathic differences between rapists and 
nomapists using the Mehrabian and Epstein's measure. Likewise, Chaplin 
et al. were not able to find any significant differences between community 
based child molesters and community based controls using the QMEE. 
· Marshall and Marie ( 1994) also found no differences between child 
molesters and nonoffenders using the QMEE. Furthermore, Seto (1992) 
again failed to find any discrimination between rapists and community 
controls. It seems that apart from Lisak and Ivan (1995), there have been no 
significant findings between sex offenders and nonsexual offenders on the 
QMEE. Furthermore, in both the Rice et al. (1994) and Seto (1992) studies, 
· the sex offender scores were again well within the nmmative scores 
provided by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972). Importantly, although not 
noted, the respondents in Lisak and Ivan's study also all scored within the 
QMEE normative range. 
The use of cognitive and affective measures together has emphasised the 
· importance of both cognitive processes and the experiencing of vicarious 
affect in empathy. Using only one conceptual perspective to assess 
empathy has proved largely umeliable. Recently, having illustrated the 
problems with unitary measures, it has been suggested that empathy is best 
considered a multidimensional phenomenon and that measures should 
encompass both cognitive and affective elements. 
Multidimensional measures of empathy 
Multidimensional measures of empathy treat empathy as a multifaceted 
process that involves different components acting together in some way to 
produce an empathic response. These measures may assess each of these 
· components separately or together as a total empathy response, thus these 
measures are able to circumvent the overt problems of unidimensional 
measures. For example, cognitive measures assess a discretely cognitive 
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element of empathy and in doing so they fail to consider and measure 
emotional processes that may either assist or independently lead to an 
empathic response. The same is true for affective measures, however they 
ignore the cognitive processing necessary to interpret the emotional state of 
another person. Conversely, multidimensional measures seek to provide a 
. comprehensive assessment of the cognitive and affective empathic abilities 
of the respondent. 
The most widely used multidimensional measure is the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983a) which treats empathy as a set of 
separate related components, each of which provide measures of 
dispositional empathic tendencies (Davis, 1994). The IRI comprises of four 
components, which according to Davis together constitute a global concept 
of empathy. These four components are; perspective taking (PT), fantasy 
(FS), empathic concern (EC), and personal distress (PD). Each component 
consists of seven items. Respondents are required to indicate the degree to 
which each item describes them by responding on a five-point scale ranging 
. from O ( does not describe me very well), to 4 ( describes me very well). 
Responses on each subscale are separately summed, with some items being 
reversed. A subscale score for each component will range from Oto 28, and 
a total empathy score from Oto 112. 
Davis (1983a, 1983b) has shown the IRI to be related to both the Hogan 
. Empathy Scale and the QMEE. For example, the perspective taking 
(cognitive) scale significantly correlates with the Hogan scale (r = .42), 
whereas the fantasy and empathic concern components both were 
significantly related to the QMEE (r = .56 and r = .63). These relations are 
consistent with the multidimensional notion that empathy can be assessed in 
both cognitive and affective terms. Davis (1980, 1983a) has also found 
. significant relationships among the IRI subscales. Furthermore, he provided 
data showing the subscales to be reliable and stable across repeated 
administrations, reporting test-retest reliability ranging from .62 to .71 
among the subscales, and internal consistency coefficients ranging from . 71 
to .77. Davis (1983a, 1994) took these findings to show that the IRI 
subscales constitute valid measures of four facets of a global empathy. 
These findings are congruent with a multidimensional approach to empathy. 
Due to the ineffectiveness of unidimensional empathy measures, several 
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studies have attempted to measure a multidimensional concept of empathy 
in sex offenders using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Hayashino et al. 
(1995) examined cognitive distortions and general empathy in child sex 
offenders. They acknowledged the multidimensional nature of empathy but 
used only the perspective-taking and empathic concern components of the 
IRI, as they were concerned primarily with affective and cognitive elements 
of empathy. Hayashino et al. issued the IRI to extrafamilial and incestuous 
child molesters, rapists, incarcerated nonsexual offenders, and a community 
control group. They found no significant differences between any of the 
offender and control groups. Furthe1more, they failed to find any 
significant differences between the incestuous and extrafamilial child 
molester groups. Contrary to expectations there was also no significant 
correlation between levels of distorted thinking and empathic ability. 
Marshall, Jones, Hudson, and McDonald (1993) also suggested that the IRI 
was the only available empathy measure that adequately examined the 
complex nature of empathy. They examined the generalised empathic 
abilities of incarcerated and outpatient child molesters, and a community 
control group. They found initially that incarcerated child molesters did not 
differ significantly, as measured by the IRI, from available normative data 
(from Salter, 1988). However, in their second study Marshall et al. found 
that community-based child molesters were significantly deficient on the 
IRI total score compared to matched community controls. Furthermore, the 
child molesters scored less on the fantasy subscale. They concluded that the 
outpatient child molesters were the only group to show a generalised 
empathy deficit, however their scores were not overtly low. Pithers (1994) 
also have used the IRI to assess sex offender empathic abilities, testing the 
efficacy of a_ specialised treatment programme aimed at enhancing empathy. 
He obtained pre- and post-treatment scores on the IRI from a group of 
convicted rapists and pedophiles. Post treatment scores on the IRI were 
significantly improved as a result of treatment. 
Contrary to expectations, it seems that the IRI, consistent with the other 
unidimensional measures of empathy, has not provided an adequate 
measure of sex offender empathic abilities. When there have been 
significant findings, often ( a notable exception being Pithers ), these are not 
clinically remarkable in terms of their significance. Cognitive, affective, 
and multidimensional measures of empathy have all failed to clearly find 
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empathy deficits in sex offenders. It appears the measurement devises have 
been unable to accurately assess empathy in the sex offender and are not 
indicative of the true empathic abilities of the respondents. 
Instrument significance 
Notably, in the majority of studies that have measured empathy in sex 
offenders, the results have been significantly within the normative data 
provided either by a control group or by the original measure. Or, when sex 
offenders have shown lower empathy scores relative to a control group, 
these deficits are not substantial by clinical standards (Marshall et al., 
1995). Sex offender scores on both the Hogan Empathy Scale (Hogan, 
1969) and the Questionnaire of Emotional Empathy (Mehrabian & Epstein, 
1972) are more often than not very similar to the scores provided by the 
original validation of the scale. For example, the sex offender scores in 
both the Rice et al. (1990, 1994) and Seto (1992) studies were very similar 
to the normative data of both the HES and QMEE scales with both rapists 
and child sex offenders. 
The insignificance of sex offender empathy deficits are even more evident 
in the studies that have used the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 
1983a). Marshall et al. (1993), Pithers (1994), Salter (1988), and Bush 
(1990) all found that sex offender total scores on the IRI were within the 
range of the normative scores provided by Davis (1983a). This was also 
evident in each of the subscales. For example, Hayashino, Wurtele, and 
Klebe (1995), Marshall et al. (1993), and Bush (1990) all found that sex 
offender scores on perspective taking and empathic concern subscales, in 
· particular, were not discernible from the normative population provided by 
Davis (1983a). 
Evidently, existing empathy measures have failed to adequately differentiate 
sex offenders from their normative populations. These empathy measures 
have been used with moderate success with other populations, notably with 
· children (see Chlopan et al., 1985 for a review). Hence the inability to find 
significant differences between clearly low empathy exhibiting individuals 
(sex offenders) and individuals who are presumably empathic (com_munity 
controls) may be due to the nature of the sex offender empathic deficits. 
The empathy measures are obviously not measuring the true empathic skill 
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in question. Individuals who score highly on these dispositional empathy 
measures may very well sexually offend in a fashion devoid of empathy. 
Clearly this failure is due to the nature of sex offender empathic deficits, in 
particular the issue of victim-specific deficiencies. The sex offender may be 
globally empathic, but specifically unempathic towards his victim(s). 
· Dispositiona_l measures of empathy do not access this person or situational 
specificity. 
Problematic in terms of generality 
Recently, it has become apparent that empathy deficits in sex offenders may 
be more victim-specific than has been thought in the past, and that 
measuring a more circumscribed empathic ability in sex offenders would _be 
beneficial to the assessment and treatment of the off ender (Marshall, 
Hudson, Jones, & Fernandez, 1995). If empathy deficits in sex offenders 
are victim specific, or at the least class (i.e., women or children) specific, 
this explains the inability of empathy measures to find significant 
· differences between the sex offender and normal individuals. The measures 
utilised with sex offenders have reflected the belief that empathy is a trait-
like disposition that is consistent across persons, situations, and time 
(Chlopan et al., 1985; Marshall et al., 1995). This assumes that sex 
offenders are generally unempathic individuals. However as is now 
evident, sex offenders may_only lack empathy towards their (potential) 
· victims, or at a given time, rather than towards everyone. 
Empathy measures have been used with a variety of individuals, in a variety 
of situations, for a variety of reasons. This is due to the large range of 
different populations assessed by the same test. These measures have 
traditionally viewed empathy as a personality trait that is assumed to be 
· displayed across most, if not all, situations and towards most, if not all, 
persons (Homblow, 1980). This is reflected by the extent to which very few 
measures are specific to either person or context. Most empathy measures 
do not allow for any situational specificity and view empathy as an enduring 
disposition unmodified by context, when in fact situational or temporal 
factors may influence the formulation of an empathic response. For 
· instance, respondents are supposed to rate the extent to which the statement 
"Seeing people cry upsets me" (QMEE, Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972) and 
"I tend to lose control in emergencies" (IRI, Davis, 1983a) describes them. 
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Obviously, these statements are very generalised and do not involve 
situational, temporal, or personal variables that are important in determining 
empathic responding. 
The assumption that empathic abilities are task- and situation- specific has 
important implications for the measurement of empathy in the sex offender. 
Rather than attempting to assess empathic ability at a global, generalised 
level, with all-purpose measures, the focus should be on assessing a sex 
offender's profile of empathic skills across a limited number of well-defined 
empathy evoking situations (Marshall et al., 1995, 1996). A lack of 
empathy towards the victims of sexual aggression is patently more 
reflective of the most likely and relevant empathic abilities of sex offenders. 
In summary, the inability to find empathy deficits in sex offenders may be 
due to the concept of empathy being confused, and subsequent 
measurements being too global to identify tangible empathy deficits. From 
the literature, it seems apparent that sex offenders may be generally 
empathic individuals who are able to suspend this capacity, or are 
selectively devoid of empathy when in an offending situation. Therefore in 
order to obtain more meaningful data about sex offender empathy, measures 
must incorporate situational, temporal, and person specifics. 
Specific empathy measures 
The notion that empathy measures need to be specific to circumstance is not 
· altogether new in the sex offender literature. However, the victim specific 
measures generated have been for subjects other than the offender and have 
been used to determine the role of observer empathy in mediating appraisals 
of rape. For instance, Deitz, Blackwell, Daley, and Bentley (1982) 
constructed the Rape Empathy Scale to measure subjects' empathy toward a 
rape victim and a rapist in heterosexual rape situations. They presented 
· subjects with 20 paired statements taken from a review of societal attitudes 
and myths towards rape. Each statement represented extreme empathy 
towards either the rapist or the victim, and the respondents were required to 
indicate which statement they preferred and the degree to which they 
preferred that statement over the other. 
· Subjects were presented with the scale after reading hypothetical rape 
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scenarios in which the situation, victim behaviour and attractiveness of the 
victim were varied. Deitz, Blackwell, Daley, and Bentley (1982) and 
Wiener, Wiener, and Grisso (1989) both found that Rape Empathy scores 
were predictive of social perceptions towards the rape victim and rapist and 
that women have more victim empathy than men. Furthermore, Wiener, 
Wiener, and Grisso fou._rid that scores on the Rape Empathy Scale influenced 
their processing of information given by witnesses in a rape trial. 
Scully (1988) used semi-structured interviews to examine incarcerated 
rapists' perceptions of their own and their victims' responses to their 
sexually aggressive behaviour. It was found that 58% of admitting rapists 
evidenced some awareness of the victim's perspective, and while 54% felt 
nothing for their victim, it was commonly thought that the victim would 
have felt ashamed and disgusted. The majority ofrapists reported feeling 
no feelings themselves while raping the woman. Subsequently, Scully 
reported that rapist empathy for their victims was virtually non-existent, or 
was able to be suppressed easily. 
More recently, sex offender empathy research has focused on empathic 
deficiencies toward particular individuals and in specific situations. 
Marshall, Fernandez, Lightbody, and O'Sullivan (1994) have developed the 
· Victim Empathy Measure to assess the victim-specific nature of empathy 
deficits in child sex offenders. The measure was designed to assess the 
empathic abilities of child sex offenders in three contexts: (1) Towards 
children in general, (2) toward children who have been victims of sexual 
abuse, and (3) towards the offenders' own victims. 
It was also intended to assess the perspective taking and emotional 
replication empathic capabilities of the offender. For each context, the 
offender is required to indicate on a scale from O to 10, the degree (0 = not 
at all, 10 = very much) to which the child is experiencing each of 31 
emotional and behavioural responses (positive and negative). The offender 
then has to indicate, using the same scale (0 to 10), his own emotional 
response to each context using 20 emotional responses. The Victim 
Empathy Measure produces two scores for each child context, the offenders 
appraisal of what he thought the child was feeling and experiencing and an 
estimate of what he himself felt when thinking about the child in each 
situation. Together, the measure involves 50 items for each of the three 
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scales producing a highest possible score of 500, with higher scores 
reflecting greater empathy. Marshall et al. (1994) have shown that the 
internal consistency of the measure (ranging from .79 to .94), and its test-
retest reliability were satisfactory (r = .64 to .83). 
Marshall et al. also provided support for the validity of the Victim Empathy 
Scale. They examined the empathic abilities of sixty-five men, including 29 
incarcerated child molesters, and 36 community males that formed a control 
group. They found that child molesters, compared to the control group, 
were substantially less able to identify the emotional state of victims of 
sexual abuse, although they were relatively accurate at discerning the 
emotions experienced by the accident victim. Importantly they were 
markedly deficient at discerning the emotions that their own victim 
experienced. The child molesters were also unable to accurately experience 
the emotions felt by their own victims however they did this adequately 
with the other two child contexts. These results suggest that child molesters 
are clearly deficient in empathy towards their own victim(s) and moderately 
· deficient in empathy toward children who had been sexually abused, 
relative to non-offenders. Importantly, the child molesters did not differ 
significantly from nonoffenders in terms of their empathy for children in 
general (an accident victim). 
Marshall, O'Sullivan, and Fernandez (1996) further added support for the 
use of the Victim Empathy Scale as an assessment of the true nature and 
extent of empathy deficits in child molesters. They examined the pre- and 
post- treatment scores of twenty-nine incarcerated child molesters at a 
minimal security institution. The pre-treatment scores of the child molesters 
were lower than the non-offender control group in the earlier study 
(Marshall et al., 1994) on the measures assessing empathy towards their 
· own victim( s) and other victims of sexual abuse. However the offenders' 
scores on the generalised child scale did not differ at either pre- or post-
treatment evaluations. It was found that at pre-treatment assessment the 
child molesters displayed markedly lower empathy towards their own 
victim, relative to other victims of child sexual abuse. Furthermore, the 
only empathy to significantly improve with training was the empathy 
· towards the offenders own victim(s). However the empathy component of 
their programme is victim based in that it concentrates on enhancing 
empathy towards victims of sexual abuse, with particular emphasis on their 
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own victim(s). 
The Victim Empathy Scale (Marshall et al., 1994) provides a clear 
indication that empathy deficits in child sex offenders are predominantly 
specific towards their own victims, and that assessment and treatment of the 
sex offender should concentrate on measuring empathy towards victims of 
sexual abuse rather than generalised empathy situations. Marshall et al. 
(1994, 1995, 1996) have suggested that this measure circumvents the 
generality problems that have plagued sex offender empathy research to 
date, but may still be methodologically beset by the problems of self-report. 
Problematic in terms of reliance on self-report 
The incongruous notion that sex offenders lack empathy towards everyone, 
in all situations, and the use of global empathy measures has seemingly 
obscured real empathy deficits in sex offenders. It is also possible that the 
inconsistent findings to date may in part be a function of methodological 
weaknesses, in patiicular the tendency to rely on self-report as the means of 
assessing empathic abilities. 
Self-report questionnaires are generally broad-based personality assessment 
instruments in which the respondents are asked to indicate from lists of 
characteristics and traits the ones that are, or to what degree are, self-
descriptive. Respondents are also often required to indicate which, of a 
variety of behaviours or feelings in imaginary situations and hypothetical 
choices, are characteristic of oneself. Essentially in an empathy self-report 
instrument, individuals are required to repoti their own skill or ability in 
terms of an empathic response. These self-reports are typically obtained by 
giving respondents a rating questionnaire containing a series of contextual 
adjectives describing possible cognitive/emotional responses to a situation. 
Respondents are simply asked to rate the degree to which they experience, 
or are experiencing, each emotion or thought on unidirectional likert scales. 
The response required often ranges from "not at all" to "extremely", so that 
the respondent has to quantify his/her implicit feelings or emotions in te1ms 
of the adjectives implied by the instrument. 
Several theorists have noted the problematic nature of self-report as a means 
· of assessing empathic abilities (Batson, Fultz, & Shoenrade, 1987; Chlopan 
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et al., 1985; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Goldstein & Michaels, 1985; Ickes, 
1993; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonette, & Garcia, 1990; Lane & Schwarz, 1990). 
It has consistently been found that self-report measures of empathic skills 
have been disappointingly poor predictors of actual empathic ability (Ickes, 
Stinson, Bissonette, & Garcia, 1990), especially when respondent behaviour 
has subsequently been tested, or observed, and found to be different from 
that reported (see Ickes, 1993). Similarly, researchers in the sex offender 
area have long deemed self-report a dubious means for gathering data 
(Marshall, 1996), especially when the offenders are incarcerated or in a 
position where socially favourable responses will serve to aid their 
assessment or sentence options. 
Evidently, sex offender empathy measures that use self-report scales may be 
fundamentally flawed. Simply, a sex offender may self-report himself as 
being empathic, when in fact he is not. Johnston and Ward (1996) suggest 
that sex offenders may use short cut heuristics, perceived expectancies and 
beliefs, or well-learned behavioural scripts. In so doing, they are likely to 
incorrectly label their empathic abilities. For example, sex offenders are 
likely use confirmatory biases and use different sets of mental heuristics, 
which tend to over-estimate their abilities (this phenomenon is not only 
done by sex offenders, we all do this). Secondly, sex offenders are subject 
to the social _desirability biases so prevalent in incarcerated offenders 
(Hanson & Scott, 1995). Self-report questionnaires, in particular are thus 
likely to be poor predictors of empathic ability in sex offenders, and 
accordingly suffer from several fundamental problems. 
The first and most fundamental problem with empathy self-report measures 
· is that responding is influenced by salient demand characteristics. The 
usual approach to the assessment of empathy is to describe affect-evoking 
circumstances, hypothetical situations and choices, and have the subject rate 
the degree to which they experience or perceive the choices to be 
descriptive of themselves (Batson, 1987). Such an approach although 
useful in many contexts, fails to capture the variability between individuals 
· in both the ability to monitor internal states as well as the organisational 
complexity of the experience (Lane et al., 1990). Respondent's feelings are 
in a sense determined and restricted to the emotional descriptors listed in the 
scale. For example, where the respondent has to quantify the degree to 
which he or she experiences the emotion in question on an ordinal scale the 
56 
degree of differentiation and intensity of the emotion is determined by the 
measure (Johnson & Ward, 1996). This questions whether individuals who 
achieve identical scores on a self-report measure might report very different 
experiences if they could express themselves verbally, or by using different 
adjectives that those provided by the measure. 
Further problems exist due to the obligatory assumptions when self-report 
scales are used. Firstly, it is assumed that the respondent must know what 
they are actually feeling, and secondly that they will communicate these 
feelings (Batson, 1987). It has been suggested that, in general, people lack 
knowledge regarding their own empathic abilities, tending to overestimate 
their level of empathic skills (Ickes, 1993; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonette, & 
Garcia, 1990; Marangori et al., 1993). For an everyday example, most 
motorists, even those in hospital for a car accident believe themselves to be 
more skilled than the average driver (Guerin, 1994; Svenson, 1981). 
Moreover, it seems likely that some respondents, even if they are 
experiencing some distinct phenomena such as a basic emotion, may lack 
the appropriate verbal ability to label this. For example, individuals who 
suffer from alexithymia (Taylor, 1985), who are unable to identify and 
describe feelings and bodily sensations, are unlikely to adequately 
communicate their empathic ability through self-report. 
Ickes (1993) suggests that people may be unreliable judges of their own 
empathic ability due to several egocentric reasons. It is possible that 
individuals rarely seek explicit feedback about their accuracy in inferring 
other people's thoughts and feelings. For example, rarely would a child 
molester ask about the victim's feelings or thoughts, but he would rather 
infer that the sexual encounter was enjoyable for the victim. Moreover, the 
feedback the individual does receive may be misleading (i.e., passivity and 
· compliance on the part of the victim confirms the sex offenders belief that 
enjoyment was mutual), or the thoughts and feelings of the other person 
may be implicit and covert, further serving to reinforce the inaccurate self-
perceptions. Individuals may also judge their empathic ability from 
situations involving their closest friends or family. This is obviously 
different from their empathy with strangers. Strayer (1987) simply suggests 
that to the degree that individuals are egocentric, their empathic ability may 
be impaired. Furthermore, sex offenders are subject to a series of self-
serving biases that lead to a likely over-estimation of their own skill level, 
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particularly in te1ms of their empathic abilities (Marshall, Hudson, & Ward, 
1995). 
The second assumption made by researchers adhering to self-report is that 
the respondent will disclose their true feelings and thoughts. Respondents 
may not want to cornmunicate their true feelings and behaviours. Instead, 
through various self-presentation biases (Thomas & Fletcher, 1996) some 
individuals may want to present themselves in a more favourable manner, 
such as being more empathic, caring and receptive to others. Sex offenders 
may not report accurately on empathy measures because of either, or both, 
of these reasons. It has been suggested that empathy scales may in fact 
reveal more about how respondents wish to see themselves, and to be seen 
by others, than about how respondents actually react perceptually and 
emotionally when confronted by an empathy provoking situation (Batson, 
Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Fultz et al., 1985). These self-presentation 
biases are likely to account for a substantial proportion of unreliable and 
non- valid sex offender responses to self-report empathy measures. 
It is well documented that sex offenders have a propensity to succumb to 
strong socially desirable responses, often due to the pressure to generate 
acceptable explanations for their actions to aid in their sentencing and 
parole (see Marshall, 1996). More often than not, the sex offender will 
attempt to provide answers that are evidently required in order to portray 
himself as favourably as possible. For instance, a sex offender in an 
assessment context will commonly discern the content of questionnaires and 
answer in a manner that he expects will be a favourable ( correct) response. 
A sex offender who is asked by questionnaire to report how he thinks his 
victim now feels, is likely to assign sadness and anger to the victim, as these 
are the responses that he assumes the therapist ( or parole officer) wants to 
hear. The offender may not truly feel this way (Hanson & Scott, 1995; 
Marshall & Barbaree, 1989). Empathy self-report ratings can therefore be 
· seen more as a subjective measure of what the respondent wishes conveyed 
to the researcher, rather than the objective assessment needed to measure 
empathy. 
,.., 1 1 1 ~ t.. . . k d bl . 1 . . ;::;ucn a iarge aegree 01 suujeCtivity uas prove pro iemat1c, resu tmg m 
ratings obtained by processes other than empathy, such as stereotyping and 
· self serving biases (Batson, 1987; Ickes, 1993; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, 
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& Garcia, 1990; Thomas & Fletcher, 1996). This may one of the primary 
reasons that there is a general lack of valid self-report measures of sex 
offender empathy developed to date (for a review, see Chlopan, McCain, 
Carbonell, & Hagen, 1985). Although individuals may differ reliably in 
their ability to accurately interpret the thoughts and feelings of others, they 
may have little insight regarding their own level of empathic skill (Ickes, 
1993). Furthermore, self-reports are particularly vulnerable to self-
presentation biases where the respondent seeks to present himself in the 
most favourable context. What is clear from the use of self-report is that 
there cannot .be assumed an equivalence between self-reported empathic 
ability, and the perspective a person adopts or that person's emotional 
response when actually confronted with an affect-laden situation where 
someone is in distress. 
Competency-based designs 
Researchers face the challenge of how to assess empathy in a way that is 
devoid of the identified problems of self-report. One promising method has 
been to have sexual offenders read and interpret vignettes or descriptions of 
sexual interactions between adults and children or adults males and adult 
females (Hanson & Scott, 1995; Lipton, McDonel, & McFall, 1987; 
Stermac & Segal, 1990). This approach enables the measure to focus on 
empathic ability toward particular people or in specific situations. It also 
presents information from with which the respondent has to interpret in 
order to show his true empathic ability (social information processing). 
Given that empathy can be seen as a multicomponent concept with four 
distinct sequential steps (Marshall et al., 1995), and that empathy deficits 
are almost certainly victim-, or at least class-specific, social information 
processing is a critical ability enabling empathic responding. The individual 
must be able to adequately process incoming social information ( e.g., 
stimulus vignettes), in order to recognise the emotional state of the victim, 
take the victim's perspectiv~, and replicate that emotion in an appropriate 
· empathic manner. The way a sex offender processes the incoming 
information from his victim is critical to his ability to feel empathy toward 
the child or woman. Competency-based measures of empathy must assess 
the sexual off enders' competence at processing this information. 
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Competency is a general evaluative term that reflects a judgement, on the 
basis of certain criteria, that an individual's performance on some task is 
adequate (McFall, 1982). To show empathic ability on a competency-based 
measure the offender must show empathic ability at each of the stages of 
. empathy to a competent level. This type of measure must provide explicit 
heuristics as.criteria with which to judge whether the offenders'responding 
is to be labelled competent. Therefore a competency-based measure 
requires a level of difficulty to be associated with each of the items in the 
measure. In other words, a competency-based measure is built on difficult 
items with which the respondents' performance at interpreting the item is 
evaluated to be adequate, relative to the implicit and explicit criteria. 
Hanson and Scott (1995) have suggested that the use of skill or 
competency-based measures where the respondent has to interpret scenarios 
is more likely to identify empathy deficits, rather than simply disclosure 
differences, which are subject to over-estimations of ability. This is because 
the respondent has to show some level of skill to interpret the scenario 
correctly. Accordingly, they recently created The Child Empathy Test 
which consisted of a series of vignettes, arrayed in terms of their 
abusiveness, where the respondent has to rate how the child would most 
likely feel in each situation. The items ranged from clearly abusive to 
clearly nonabusive, however most were ambiguous so that the respondent 
had to weigh up the various factors involved that might have influenced 
how the child might have felt. Essentially, this measure assessed the 
perspective taking ability of child molesters. 
Hanson and Scott found that the Child Empathy Test did not significantly 
differentiate between sex offenders and nonoffenders, however the incest 
offenders did make more errors on incest items than the other sexual 
offenders. They concluded that the competency based design of the Child 
Empathy Test did show significant value as a future means of assessing the 
competency of sex offenders in terms of their perspective taking abilities. 
Future effort is needed to design reliable and valid competency based 
measures of empathy that assess competency at interpreting empathetically 
arousing situations. 
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. Ambiguity as index of difficulty 
To design a measure of empathy where respondent competency is assessed 
on the basis of explicit criteria, the items must be difficult and require a 
certain level of skill to respond in a competent fashion. The presentation of 
various scenarios where the respondent has to interpret the affect of the 
individual in question is a promising new method of empathy assessment 
(Hanson & Scott, 1995). Each scenario must therefore be, to some extent, 
difficult to interpret. 
One way of establishing difficulty is to present ambiguous scenarios. 
Ambiguity, it is suggested, may serve as a particularly useful research tool 
as it shows the level of information processing by the respondent (Johnston 
& Ward, 1996). Ambiguous scenarios are open to two or more 
interpretations, depending on the cognitive operations (such as stereotyping) 
of the respondent. How an ambiguous situation is interpreted will indicate 
the respondent's beliefs and processing skills. A very ambiguous vignette 
will be difficult to interpret conectly, whereas an easy vignette will be 
rather explicit. Ambiguity in this sense is equivalent to difficulty. The 
more ambiguous an item, the more difficult it is to interpret conectly as 
respondents'will rely on mental short cuts (Johnston & Ward, 1996) to 
interpret the situation. These mental short cuts will often indicate 
dysfunctional beliefs and heuristics. A test based on ambiguous vignettes 
would therefore allow discrimination of the varying abilities at recognising 
and interpreting the affect within each vignette. 
Stereotyping, whereby the sex offender harbours relatively fixed over-
generalisations, beliefs and attitudes about a social group or class is one 
such short cut processing available to the sexual offender. For example, the 
way in which child molesters characterise children as welcoming sexual 
contact and enjoying the sexual behaviour is indicative of stereotypical 
information processing. These stereotypes and other mental heuristics such 
as the use of well-learned sexual behaviour patterns (Johnston & Ward, 
1996) guide information processing and judgement and decisions in an 
expectancy consistent manner, facilitating low empathic responding 
(Marshall, Ward, & Hudson, 1995). 
· Sex offenders may interpret circumstances in a manner consistent with that 
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expected of their stereotypical beliefs, such as the interpretation of a child 
who is sitting so that his or her underwear is exposed, as an indication of 
sexual intent. Stereotypical bias is especially prevalent in ambiguous 
. behaviours so that sex offenders often incorrectly process innocent, but 
particularly ambiguous behaviours, in a stereotypical manner consistent 
with their expectations (Johnston & Ward, 1996). Therefore in an 
ambiguous situation it is more likely the sex offender will interpret events 
incorrectly, such as the belief that a child enjoyed being sexually abused . 
. Given the inadequacy of self-report, the use of vignettes where ambiguous 
information is given will presumably activate the dysfunctional cognitive 
operations that function, at least in part, to suspend any empathy for the 
victim. Therefore, in order to circumvent the self-presentation biases and 
the over-estimates of a respondent's own ability, a measure whereby the 
respondent has to interpret an ambiguous situation, and describe emotional 
. states in his or her own words (thus accessing implicit thoughts and 
feelings), should pmiray a true indication of the social information 
processing skills of the individual. 
So, in order to assess the empathy, in a way that attempts to circumvent the 
bias associated with self-report it is necessary to use affect-laden vignettes 
involving persons in various circumstances that will evoke empathy from 
the respondent. Given that ambiguity facilitates higher level thinking and 
discrimination ( due to ambiguity being equivalent to difficulty) these 
vignettes should be ambiguous in the sense that various factors must be 
perceived and interpreted in order to understand the situation in the vignette. 
To access the various skills involved in the empathic process, varying 
questions could be asked of each vignette that attempt to evaluate skill level 
in each component of empathy. 
For example, a single question could examine only perspective taking or the 
respondent's emotional replication. Moreover, rather than having the 
respondent simply rate his skill level, it is imperative to ask the respondent 
to make explicit his or her implicit thoughts and feelings to fully access the 
empathic ability, in an open-ended question format. This requires the 
respondent to access implicit thoughts, articulating these, rather than simply 
being prompted by scales. The respondent has to show the skill to 
recognise the affect and verbalise this. Essentially then, the sex offender 
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has to demonstrate his skill and ability, at recognising emotions, perspective 
taking, and emotional replication to adequately complete the vignettes. This 
is of course the nature of empathy as termed by Marshall et al. (1995), that 
flexibility and skill is needed to understand and interpret incoming social 
information. Adequate processing of this information leads to an empathic 






Empathy in sex offenders - a summary 
Theorists have often noted the importance of empathy deficits in the etiology and 
treatment of the sex offender, particularly in the development and maintenance of 
offending behaviour. Sex offenders are commonly thought to be either deficient in 
their capacity to experience empathy or able to suspend these empathic capabilities 
to offend. There is, however, confusion regarding the concept of empathy, its 
measurement, and the extent to which past findings are indicative of the true nature 
and extent of empathic deficits in the sex offender. Amelioration of this confusion is 
necessary to allow accurate assessment of the empathic deficiencies of the sex 
offender. 
The initial source of confusion is the definition of empathy. Empathy has been 
- defined as a cognitive process where an understanding of another's affective state is 
sufficient to be empathic and an affective phenomenon where sharing the observed 
persons affective experience is necessary to be termed empathic. It has also been 
defined as multidimensional which suggests that a combination of cognitive and 
affective processes determine empathic responding. Recently, it has been suggested 
that empathy can be conceptualised as a sequential social information processing 
-model. This model contains four stages necessary for an empathic response. They 
are emotional recognition, perspective taking, emotional replication, and response 
decision. 
Another source of confusion pertinent to the assessment and treatment of the sex 
offender is the exact nature, and the extent of, empathy deficiencies. Traditionally 
, sex offender empathy deficits were assumed to be generalised, suggesting that these 
deficits are a global personality trait that manifests across different persons, 
situations, and times. This is reflected in the majority of measures of empathy that 
are non-specific as to person or context. Recently, it has been argued that sex 
offender empathy deficits are almost certainly specific to the offending situation, 
rather than global deficiencies in empathic competence. For instance, it has been 
shown that child sex offender empathy deficits are victim specific, and to a certain 
extent class specific (e.g., other victims of child sexual abuse) . 
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. Confusion also exists with the measurement of empathy, particularly in respect to 
sex offenders. This is not surprising given that there are different definitions of 
empathy and it seems that instruments have been designed to measure different 
aspects of the same phenomenon. Some instruments measure the cognitive 
processes involved, whereas others measure the experiencing of emotion appropriate 
to the observed person. Still others measure a combination of cognitive and 
. affective processes. It is apparent that when used with sex offenders, these measures 
are fundamentally flawed in that they examine global empathic abilities and they 
rely on problematic respondent self-report as a means for measuring emotional 
reactions. Recently, it has been suggested that the use of competency based 
measures to assess empathy can alleviate some of the problems associated with self-
report instruments. Here the respondent has to show an ability to recognise and 
interpret the emotions involved in ambiguous situations and respond adequately in · 
order to be deemed competent in this task. 
In order to ameliorate the problems identifying the true extent of empathic 
deficiencies in the sex offender, it is necessary to combine the recent findings that, 
( 1) empathy can be assessed as an information processing model with distinct stages 
. each necessary to an empathic response, that (2) child sex offender empathy deficits 
are likely to be victim-specific, and that (3) competency based instruments may be 
the most effective means of assessing true empathic abilities. This combination may 
prove to be the best method for assessing empathy in the sex offender. 
The Aim of this study 
The current study has constructed a new measure to examine the empathic abilities 
of men who sexually offend against children. The measure was developed as a 
competency based test where respondents had to read and interpret written vignettes 
that were ambiguous, which depicted social interactions involving children and 
adults, and determine the most likely emotional state(s) experienced by the person in 
question. They were asked to detail how they, themselves, felt in response to 
reading the emotionally arousing vignette. Child sex offender respondents were also 
required to describe their most recent sexual encounter with a child and identify the 
emotional state(s) involved, on the part of the child and themselves. An appropriate 
criterion and coding sheet was created to establish respondent competency at these 
empathy-related tasks. 
66 
This measure will evaluate social information processing skills, specifically the 
respondent's ability at each of the first three stages of the four-stage unfolding model 
. of empathy. These abilities are; the awareness of the emotional state of the observed 
person, the ability to view the world from the observed person's perspective, and the 
extent to which the respondent experiences the same ( or nearly the same) emotional 
state as the observed person. Child sex offenders may have difficulties at any one or 
all of these stages. 
The measure will also assess whether child sex offenders are deficient in (a) empathy 
restricted to their own victims, (b) empathy towards other victims of child sexual 
abuse, or, ( c) a global deficit, characterised by lowered empathy toward all people 
and situations. It is likely that the child sex offenders may have particular empathic 
skills deficits in one, two, or all of these environmental categories. However if there 
are no empathic deficiencies, it may be that child sex offenders are able to suspend 
. their empathic capabilities, by simply ignoring their empathy-oriented feelings. 
It is acknowledged that victim specific empathy deficits need not be stable. 
Behavioural, cognitive and affective states can change dynamically over the offence 
cycle. Empathic abilities may also change dynamically over these time frames. Two 
stages of the offence cycle appear particularly relevant to the empathic abilities of 
. the offender; the actual sexual offence, and immediately following the offence. 
Cognitive and affective states at these stages may alter affecting the empathic 
capacity of the offender. The measure will evaluate victim specific empathic 
abilities in terms of these two stages of the offence cycle. 
In summary, this study assesses the collective empathic abilities of a group of child 
. sex offenders, relative to a community control group. Moreover, the developed 
measure allows an accurate evaluation of the actual empathic capabilities of the child 
sex offender, both in terms of empathy as a social information processing model and 
the more circumscribed nature of empathy deficits. Due to its circumvention of 
problems traditionally associated with self-report, the measure has considerable 
promise for application in clinical settings to assess the empathic abilities of the 
individual child sex offender. It is hoped that the measure will substantiate the 
recent findings regarding the victim-specific nature of empathy deficits, validate the 
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use of a social information processing model of empathy to identify specific 
. difficulties, and prove the Worth of a competency based measure to assess empathy. 
Hypotheses for current study 
There are three types of hypotheses. Those based on the dynamics of empathy 
during the offence cycle, those based on recent research findings that used self-rep01i 
. questionnaires and found victim-specific empathy deficits in child sex offenders, and 
hypotheses based on a model of the empathic process that has yet to be assessed 
fully. 
Relating to empathy during the offence cycle 
Section 1. Relating to the stages involved in the offence chain 
(victim specific empathy) 
It is hypothesised that the empathic abilities of the child sex offender may differ over 
the two offence-specific stages of the offence cycle; the actual sexual encounter, and 
immediately following the sexual encounter. 
Hypothesis 1. 
There is a significant difference in the level of emotional awareness exhibited during 
the actual sexual encounter and immediately following the encounter. Specifically it 
is hypothesised that there will be a greater level of emotional awareness 
(recognition) exhibited immediately following the sexual encounter. 
Hypothesis 2. 
There is a significant difference in child sex offender perspective taking abilities 
between the actual sexual encounter and immediately following the encounter. 
Child sex offenders will be significantly more able to take the perspective of their 
victim immediately following the sexual encounter. 
Hypothesis J 
There is a significant difference in the amount of emotional replication shown during 
the actual sexual encounter and immediately following the sexual encounter. Child 
sex offenders will be significantly more able to replicate the emotion(s) of their 
victim immediately following the sexual encounter. 
Predictions based on recent sex offender and empathy research 
findings 
Section 2. Relating to the extent of empathic deficits 
Hypothesis 4. 
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It is predicted that the empathy deficits of child sex offenders will be limited to and 
more specifically directed to their own victim(s). 
Hypothesis 5. 
It is predicted that child sex offenders will be equally able to show empathy towards 
other (potentiaV victims of sexual abuse and other general empathy evoking 
situations. 
Hypothesis 6. 
It is predicted that child sex offenders and non-offenders will equally be able to show 
empathy towards other (potential) sexual abuse victims and general situations 
Exploratory hypotheses based on empathy model 
. Section 3. Relating to stages of empathic response 
Hypothesis 7. 
Levels of Emotional awareness are significantly d(fferent when the child sex offender 
is confronted with victim specific, non-specific sexual, and general everyday 
situations. Specifically, it is predicted that there will be lower levels of emotional 
awareness towards their own victim. 
Hypothesis 8. 
Perspective taldng ability is significantly different when the child sex offender is 
confronted with victim spec(fic, non-specific sexual, and general everyday situations. 
It is hypothesised that perspective taking abilities will be appreciatively deficient 
towards their own victim. 
Hypothesis 9. 
There is a significant difference in the ability of the child sex offender to experience 
the emotional state of another person when confronted with victim specific, non-
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· specific sexual, and general situations. It is expected that the emotional replication 





· Overview of the Emotional Apperception Test 
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The Emotional Apperception Test is a new competency based measure of empathy, 
constructed to assess the empathic abilities of men who sexually offend against 
children. The test consists of offence specific questions that assess empathic ability 
over four distinct stages of the offence cycle (section A), and twenty ambiguous 
vignettes that represent situations involving other (potential) victims of sexual abuse 
and more general emotion-evoking situations (section B). There are two open-
ended questions accompanying each vignette, which are designed to access the 
different information processing abilities necessary for an empathic response. 
The Emotional Apperception Test presents written vignettes that are designed to be 
evoke emotional arousal in the respondent. These vignettes are constructed to 
represent different situational contexts important in discerning the empathic 
difficulties in the child sex offender. Assessment of empathic ability is accessed 
through the respondent being required to recognise and interpret the emotional states 
elicited by the individuals within the vignettes, and recognising his own emotional 
state evoked by the vignettes. Empathic competency is judged on how similar 
respondents' recognition and interpretation of the vignettes are to an optimal highly 
empathic response defined by an expert sample. 
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PILOT STUDY - The Emotional Reactivity Index (see appendices 1) 
. Design 
A pilot study was constructed to develop the optimal emotion-evoking vignettes for 
section B. Vignettes consisted of: (a) child-adult sexual interactions that varied 
considerably in terms of the degree of harmfulness (non-specific sexual abuse), and 
(b) general everyday adult-adult, adult-child interactions (general). Most of the 
vignettes were ambiguous, and interpretation required consideration of the relative 
importance of various influencing factors. For example, the age, gender, and 
relationship of the two persons involved in each vignette were varied to encompass a 
wide assortment of situations. In each scenario, there were two individuals involved 
but the stories were constructed so that the perspective of only one individual was 
considered. The pilot study was therefore principally an exercise in perspective-
taking (stage 2 in the empathy model). 
The objective for the respondents' in The Emotional Reactivity Index was to give 
their best judgement as to how the individual in question was most likely feeling in 
. each situation. They were instructed to carefully consider the various factors 
involved in each situation. For example, respondents were made aware that the age, 
gender, and relationship of the individuals changed with each vignette. They were 
also instructed that there were no right or wrong answers and that what was required 
was their best judgement based on the factors involved in each situation. The 
. respondents were required to determine on an innocuous 7-point scale ranging from 
( 1) very haimful or upset, to (7) very good, happy, cheerful how the individual in 
question was most likely to feel in the given situation. This scale was modelled on 
the scale Hanson and Scott (1995) used in their Child Empathy Test. 
Twenty-five vignettes were generated for both the non-specific sexual abuse and 
general environmental categories. There were fifty vignettes in total, each randomly 
assigned a number from 1-50. From these vignettes, it was envisaged that the ten 
most ambiguous non-specific sexual abuse and general vignettes would be identified 
for inclusion in the Emotional Apperception Test. As ambiguity equates to 
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difficulty, the most ambiguous vignettes will be those that the respondents in the 
pilot study found the most difficult to interpret. Ambiguity was denoted by a large 
range of responses as to how the person in question was most likely feeling. For 
example, a range of 6 (1-7) signified that some individuals thought that the person 
was most likely feeling 'very good, happy, and cheerful', whereas others thought the 
person was 'very upset, unhappy, or scared'. 
Implementation and Evaluation 
The Emotional Reactivity Index was administered to 90 stage 1 University of 
Canterbury students who volunteered to participate. Five respondents either 
withdrew their participation or did not complete the questionnaire. These 
questionnaires were discarded. The 85 respondent's ranged in age from 17 to 52 
years of age, with a mean age of22.4 years (SD= 7.35). There were 32 males (38%) 
and 53 females (62%). 
Vignette ambiguity was found by examining the distributions of the cumulative 
responses to each question .. It was decided that the standard deviations of each 
vignette wo-qld adequately discern the variability of the responses to each vignette. 
For example, vignette 7 (non-specific sexual abuse) returned an average response of 
4.66, with a standard deviation of 1.55. This was the highest variance within the 
non-specific sexual abuse vignettes. Therefore, it is assumed that because this 
question provided the greatest dispersion ofresponses, it was the most difficult to 
· interpret. The ten vignettes that displayed the highest variances in each 
environmental category, were used to construct section B of the Emotional 
Apperception Test. 
Sources of Bias 
Respondent demographic details were examined in order to identify possible bias. 
Gender and age were two significant demographic details that could have affected 
the way in which subjects responded (Kline, 1986). Omitting any significant gender 
correlations was considered appropriate as females have responded significantly 
. more empathetically to disposition measures of empathy in the literature (Davis, 
1994). However, it is suggested that a substantial proportion of observed sex 
differences in these measures are due to self-presentation biases commonly 
presented due to sex-role norms (Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987). 
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It was also thought necessary to disregard any significant age correlations, as age has 
also been found to affect empathic responding (Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987). 
However, it seems that age has only been important in the development of empathy 
and Hoffman (1984) has argued that all adults should be endowed with the necessary 
• cognitive skills to adequateiy empathise with others. Still, it was felt that significant 
age and gender correlations were best omitted from the measure as to avoid all 
possible sources of bias. 
Five vignettes were significantly affected by the age of the respondents. One of 
these was a non-specific sexual abuse item, whereas four were from the general 
items. For example, the older the respondent, the more harmful vignette 14 was seen 
as being (r = - .22). Nine vignettes were significantly affected b·y the gender of the 
respondent, seven of these being non-specific sexual abuse vignettes. For example, 
females perceived vignette 32 as being significantly more harmful than males (r = 
-.44). Gender and age c01Telations were still significant when the extreme outliers 
( especially for age) were removed. It is also important to note that because of the 
large size of the sample in this analysis, correlations as low as .22 were significant, 
however all vignettes that were significantly affected by either age or gender were at 
this point removed from consideration. 
The Emotional Apperception Test (EAT) (see appendices 2) 
Structure 
The Emotional Apperception Test for sex offenders consists of twenty-four vignettes 
· in total. There are four vignettes based on the offenders' most recent offending 
behaviour (section A), and twenty vignettes that were created in the Emotional 
Reactivity Index, comprising of non-specific sexual abuse and general situations 
(section B). The respondent is required to answer two questions for each vignette. 
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In section A, the child sex offender is presented with four questions that correspond 
to various stages during his most recent sexual encounter with a child. The offender 
is asked to think about the events directly leading up to the sexual encounter, the 
actual sexual encounter, the events that immediately followed the encounter, and his 
current feelings towards the sexual encounter. Firstly, for each time period, the 
off ender is asked to describe, in his own words, the events that were taking place 
(creating the vignettes). This is to facilitate the offender's emotional arousal and act 
as a prompt as to the thoughts and feelings involved during the offence behaviour. 
The offender is required to judge how the child was most likely feeling at each of 
these times. The offender then describes his own feelings and thoughts at each time 
period. These descriptions are in an open-ended format, as to enable the child sex 
offender to make explicit his implicit feelings without the constriction of forced-
choice (Fife-Shaw, 1995). 
In section B, the offender is presented with the twenty ambiguous vignettes based on 
either general or non-specific sexual abuse emotion-evoking situations. These 
vignettes vary indiscriminately in that the age, gender, and the relationship of the 
two individuals is different in each vignette. Each vignette is essentially an 
ambiguous scenario requiring interpretation of the various factors involved. Again, 
· the offender is required to indicate how he thinks the individual in question is most 
likely feeling. The second question for each time period requires the offender to 
express how this makes him feel. 
Competency-based Design 
In order to circumvent the problems inherent in self-reported empathy measures, the 
Emotional Apperception Test assesses the empathic competency of the respondent in 
various empathy-evoking situations. The term, competency, is important to the 
design and development of the test. Competency is a general evaluative term that 
reflects a judgement that an individual's performance on some task is adequate, 
relative to c~rtain criteria (McFall, 1990). The two most meaningful components of 
competency in this case, are that an evaluation is made with reference to a set of 
explicit criteria and that evaluations are task-specific. The empathic skills at each 
stage are the specific abilities required to perform competently at the task. This 
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· implies that it is possible for an incompetent (unempathic) person to have some, but 
not all of the skills required for performing competently (empathetically). For 
example, an individual who is able to take another's perspective, but who is unable to 
experience a similar emotion in response, is unable to empathise with the observed 
person. Implicitly, an individual who performs competently (with empathy) has all 
· of the required skills to do so. 
To assess empathic competency, it is necessary to judge the respondent on a specific 
task. The task for the respondent in the Emotional Apperception Test is to interpret 
the information contained in the vignettes, and recognise and comprehend the 
emotional states involved. These emotional states relate to those elicited by the 
individuals in each vignette, and those evoked in the respondent after reading the 
vignette. The respondent has to make explicit, his internal thoughts and feelings 
otherwise inaccessible to others by means of an open-ended format. 
This is an important concept behind the competency-based design of the test. In 
comparison to likert scales or lists of adjectives, there is an unlimited domain of 
response alternatives. Rather than simply presenting the offender with a choice of 
responses, (which in a sense may create artificial forced choices) an open-ended 
competency based design requires the offender to show his ability in articulating 
what he is feeling or thinks the person in question is feeling. Scales simply do not 
· allow this. 
Criteria for distinguishing a competent response 
It is necessary for a competency-based test to establish an adequate and explicit set 
· of criteria, from which respondent competency can be ascertained. The criterion for 
discerning a competent response in the Emotional Apperception Test is based on the 
'highly empathic' or optimal response. The highly empathic answer becomes the 
standard against which the respondent is judged. A similar response indicates a high 
level of the empathic skill involved, whereas a dissimilar response indicates a low 
. level of empathic skill. 
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A sample of psychological "experts" created the highly empathic response. It was 
felt that this group of individuals would provide highly empathic judgements to the 
vignettes that would shape the optimal responses (criteria). Psychotherapists have 
long been considered highly empathic individuals. This is partly through their 
extensive training in dealing with and interpreting the thoughts and emotional states 
of a variety of people, and partly because of the traditional psychological belief that 
therapists need a high capacity for empathy (Rogers, 1951; Katz, 1963). Indeed, it 
has been found that therapists score highly on all empathy measures (see Davis, 
1994). For example, therapists have scored above the normative groups for the 
Hogan Empathy Scale (Hogan, 1969), the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional 
Empathy (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Davis, 1983a) (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). Because of the high empathic capacity 
shown on all empathy measures, it was felt that the assumption that psychological 
experts would provide highly empathic responses to construct the criteria was 
justified. 
Twenty-five psychological 'experts' were invited to participate. Collectively, they 
formed the Training Committee for the Clinical Psychology Diploma at the 
. University of Canterbury. They were invited to participate by post and sent Section 
B of the Emotional Apperception Test and an information sheet detailing the nature 
of the study. Responding was confidential and the experts were guaranteed complete 
anonymity. Twenty experts volunteered to participate, replying by post. The 
psychological 'expert' sample had a combined work experience of 149 years (mean= 
7.5 years) and worked in a variety of psychological fields, ranging from eating 
disorders, brain injury and rehabilitation, to forensic psychology. 
Section B. Non-specific sexual abuse and Generalised vignettes 
The cumulative responses of the 'expert' sample were used to construct the 
appropriate criteria for each vignette in section B. The expert sample provided a 
large list of emotional descriptors for each vignette. 'Experts' responded with 
various descriptions of thoughts and feelings, describing negative and positive affect. 
Moreover, statements often also acknowledged probable emotional responding, 
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bodily sensations and action. Importantly, only emotional descriptors were included 
in the criteria lists. 
In order to establish an optimal or highly empathic response, it was essential that the 
experts furnish a narrow range of emotional descriptors for each vignette. The 
salient assumption here is that 'experts' would be similarly highly empathic and 
respond appropriately so. Over all the experts responded similarly to all vignettes 
apart from vignette 9. Presumably, this vignette was so ambiguous as to even prove 
difficult for the highly empathic 'experts' to provide a narrow range of answers. 
Question 9 was subsequently dropped from the EAT. 
The first step in creating a workable criterion was to collapse the wide range of 
emotional descriptors into broad basic affect descriptors. The author and supervisor 
congruently categorised diffuse emotional descriptors from the extensive lists. For 
example, "puzzled, uncertain, surprised, bewildered" were categorised as 'confusion', 
while "scared, frightened, threatened, worried, anxious" were collapsed into a 
. boarder fearful' descriptor.· Broad categories of appropriate emotional descriptors 
were ascertained for each question and reflected either positive or negative 
emotional states. Table 1 shows the resulting perspective taking criteria table that 
was created by categorising expert responding into basic emotional descriptors. 
Table 1. 
The perspective taking criteria for section B of the Emotional Apperception 























Q8 Angry Relieved 












Q15 Disappointed Pleased 
Hurt 







Q19 Guilty Relieved 
Conflicted Pleased 




Section A. Offence specific vignettes 
There is no explicit criterion set for section A. It is necessary that independent raters 
congrnently assess the empathic competency of the respondent in terms of adequate 
recognition and interpretation of the probable emotional state(s) of the child victim. 
· An instruction sheet was created for both raters to endeavour to develop consistency 
(see appendices 3). 
Establishing a criterion for victim specific vignettes is problematic due to the 
individual nature of the offending situation and behaviour. Obviously, there is no 
existing vignette detailing the sexual behaviour with the child, from which the most 
likely child emotional state(s) could be judged. It was necessary then, to have each 
sex offender detail his most recent sexual encounter with a child. From this 
description, a vignette is created that the child sex offender interprets in terms of the 
emotional state(s) involved. This vignette however, is likely to be subject to the 
. child sex offender's bias representation of the events that took place. For example, 
the child sex offender may minimise the extent to which sexual offending took place, 
or he may apportion overestimated blame on other factors or persons. However, it is 
the recognition and interpretation of the affective states involved that are relevant to 
the Emotional Apperception Test. 
Measuring responses to the Emotional Apperception Test 
Three stages of the empathy model (Marshall et al., 199 5) were measured: ( 1) the 
respondent's level of emotional awareness, (2) their perspective taking ability, and 
(3)) their ability to replicate the emotional state of the individual in question (relative 
· to the standardised criteria developed using the expert sample). 
1. Level of Emotional Awareness 
The standardised structural criterion used in the Levels of Emotional Awareness 
. Scale (LEAS) (Lane & Schwartz, 1987; Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 
1990) was used in determining offender levels of emotional awareness (see 
appendices 4). The LEAS is based on a cognitive-developmental model of the 
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organisation of emotional experience. This model was created to provide an 
. organising framework for understanding individual differences in the experience and 
expression of emotion. Emotional awareness is a type of cognitive processing that 
can be arranged into five levels depending on ability. These five levels represent the 
level of emotional awareness based on cognitive interpretations of external 
information presented. The LEAS has high inter-rater reliabiiity (.84) and 
significantly correlates with other measures of emotion, for example negatively with 
the Marlowe_-Crown Scale (Crown & Marlowe, 1960), and positively with The 
Openness To Experience Inventory (Coan, 1972). The LEAS also shows high 
discriminant validity, correlating poorly with emotional quality scales, for example 
The Differential Emotions Scale (Izard, 1972). 
The LEAS can be used in a competency-based measure to assess the emotional 
ability of the respondent in terms of awareness of emotional states. Emotional 
awareness in this sense is a good measure of the ability of the respondent to 
recognise emotional states. The higher the cognitive ability to process incoming 
affect information and subsequent emotional awareness, the better the respondent is 
· at recognising emotions. 
Specifically, Lane and Schwarz (1987) propose that the experience of emotion can 
be organised into five distinct levels, which are reflected in the verbal descriptions of 
emotion. The first level of emotional awareness is the ability to describe bodily 
. sensations. If there is a conscious awareness of emotion only at this level, it is 
global undifferentiated arousal and consists of bodily sensations only. This level 
(score 0) is for non-emotion responses where the word "feel" is used to describe a 
thought rather than a feeling. Secondly, a score ofl reflects an awareness of 
physiological cues, for example, "I'd feel tired". 
The second level of emotional awareness consists of action tendencies and/or global 
hedonic states, where the awareness of another person as a separate individual is 
minimal. This level scores 2, consisting of words that are typically used to convey 
relatively undifferentiated emotion, for example, "I'd feel bad", or the use of the 
word feel to convey an action tendency, for example "I'd feel like banging his head 
· against the wall". The third level (score 3) consists of single emotions, whereby the 
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quality of emotion changes such that it becomes a psychological as well as somatic 
experience. Invariably, responses at this level involve the use of one word 
conveying typical, differentiated emotion (e.g., happy, sad, angry). The fourth level 
consists of blends of emotion where the individual is aware of concurrent opposing 
emotions, so that two or more level 3 words are used that convey greater emotional 
differentiation than either word alone. Level 4 (score of 4) involves the description 
of more complex and differentiated emotional states and is scored if the emotions for 
the self and other could be differentiated from one another. 
· An emotional awareness score is assigned to both questions for each vignette. The 
respondent is assigned a score of 0-4, according to the structured characteristics of 
each level (appendices 3), for the answer to the How is the person in question most 
likely feeling' (other), and the How does this make you feel' (self) questions. In 
addition, a third "total" score was given equal to the higher of these two scores, 
. except in cases where both other and self received Level 4 scores. Under these 
circumstances, a total score of 5 was given if the emotions for self and other could be 
differentiated from one other. Only results of the total scores were used in the EAT. 
2. Perspective Taking 
Perspective taking involves comprehending the situation involved within each 
vignette from the other person's perspective. Respondent descriptions of the 
emotion(s) most likely felt by the individual within each vignette were used to 
ascertain perspective taking skills. For instance the respondent was asked, 'How is 
Peter most likely to feel'? The respondent has to articulate his best judgement as to 
how the individual is most likely feeling, specifically in terms of his/her emotional 
state(s). It is the emotional content described by the respondent as being most 
applicable for the individual under the vignette circumstances, that is assessed as 
perspective taking content. 
· On the basis of empathic accuracy research rationale (Ickes, 1993; Ickes et al., 1990; 
Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995), the computation of perspective taking 
ability requires similarity judgements to be made by trained, independent raters. In 
section A, the raters compare the responses to each question and then subjectively 
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. judge whether the respondent has adequately taken the "most likely" perspective of 
the child. "Most likely", is defined upon the basis of the two independent raters 
agreeing on the child's probable emotional state at each of the offence stages. A 
semi-structured instruction sheet was provided for each rater detailing the rationale 
for perspective taking scoring (see appendices 3). In section B, the raters compute 
. perspective taking scores by comparing respondents' articulated responses to each 
question with the corresponding question criteria (see Table 1) and structured 
instructions (see appendices 3). The task of the independent raters is to compare the 
written content of each question with the corresponding criteria ( expert responding) 
that consisted of a series of emotional descriptors for each vignette based on the 
general mood (i.e., positive or negative). 
Modelled on a paradigm by Ickes (1993), the raters have to judge the similarity of 
each pair on a 3-point scale ranging from O (essentially different content) through 1 
(similar but not the same content) to 2 (essentially the same content). For an 
example of empathy accuracy judgement at all three levels of similarity, see Table 2. 
· This procedure has been used in several studies with high inter-rater reliability. In 
studies using six independent raters to make the similarity judgements, the internal 
consistency of the raters' judgements was high (.94 in the study by Ickes, Stinson, 
Bissonette, & Garcia, 1990, and .95 in the study by Stinson & Ickes, 1992). In a 
study using only four independent raters, the internal consistency was only slightly 
. lower at .85 (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1993). This suggests that 
perspective-taking can be measured reliably with the procedure described. 
A semi-structured instruction sheet was also created to aid in coding criteria, so that 
coding was in accord with the criteria table and the corresponding instruction sheet 
. (see appendices 3). Several guidelines were created that both explained and 
simplified certain areas of coding that could be confused. Firstly, and importantly, 
confusion is a cognitive state that is frequency mistakenly labelled as an emotion 
(see Strongman, 1992 for discussion). However it is also commonly assumed that 
victims of sexual aggression are often in a confused state, especially children or 
those that do not fully comprehend of the situation. Evidently, 'confusion' was 
identified b)' the 'expert' sample as being a particularly salient (affective) state in 
several vignettes. It was always however stated as being in conjunction with other 
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affect states such as fear or disgust. A response that only stated confusion as the 
most likely feeling of the person in question scored only a 1, whereas in comparison 
· if other emotional descriptors were also stated then a maximum score (2) was 
possible. 
Table 2 . 
. Sample of independent rater scoring with expert generated criteria (Question 7) 
Disappointed Happy and joyful 0 
Anxious but ok 1 
pissed off, hurt 2 
Another potential source of confusion for the independent raters was the combined 
affective states in the criteria table. For example, when both positive and negative 
emotions were identified by the 'expert' sample as being the most likely affective 
states. This signifies either different viewpoints taken depending on extraneous 
factors, or it signifies that a conflicted or combined emotional state was evident. The 
instruction sheet detailed the appropriate scoring for these combined affective states 
and other nebulous areas of coding. Also, for certain questions, the criteria table 
· labelled three or four appropriate emotional descriptors. For example, the criteria for 
Q7 lists three emotional states; disappointed, angry, hurt. A maximum score was 
given if one of these states was clearly identified. 
3. Emotional replication 
Emotional replication refers to the extent to which the respondent has shared the 
emotional experience of the individual observed. Respondent ability is accessed by 
asking the if they, themselves, feel any emotion in response to reading the vignette 
and labelling the individual's emotion. A high ability of emotional replication skill is 
shown when the respondents report that they feel the same or similar affect as the 
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expert criteria for each vignette. It is important to reiterate that the empathic 
process, as outlined by Marshall et al. (1995) is sequential. If the respondent is 
unable to adequately take the perspective of the individual in question, it is therefore 
unlikely that they can replicate the appropriate emotional state. 
An important consideration is the degree to which the emotion elicited by the 
respondent matches the observed individuals'. In other words, does the emotional 
replication have to be identical or merely similar in valance? Most empathy 
researchers now agree that the emotions reported for the self and the individual in 
the vignette need only be similar and not necessarily identical (Marshall et al., 1995; 
Strayer, 1987; Thompson, 1987). The EAT assesses the extent to which the 
emotional state indicated is merely similar to the criteria. 
To assess emotional replication skills in section A, the independent raters have to 
. assess the degree to which the offender felt in a similar manner as the child. This is 
based on the· offender's description of the emotional states that the child was most 
likely experiencing. The task of the independent raters in section B is to compare 
the written content of each question (i.e., How does this make you feel?) with the 
expert criteria (see table 2). So, the respondent has a score for the congruence 
. between the criteria labelling the appropriate perspective of the child in question, and 
his subsequent own affect state(s) in response to interpreting the vignette. Again, the 
raters have to judge the similarity of each pair on a 3-point scale ranging from 0 
( essentially different content) through 1 (similar but not the same content) to 2 
( essentially the same content) (Ickes, 1993) using the criteria established by the 
expert sample. 
Again, guidelines for emotional replication coding were detailed in the form of an 
instruction sheet (see appendix 3.). The most likely difficulty in coding was an 
appropriate emotional response to the situation that is not congruent with the 
perspective of the individual in question. Emotional replication refers to the ability 
· of the respondent to accurately express a similar emotion as that expressed by the 
individual in question. Rather than simply responding in an aroused state (such as 
anger or disgust), the respondent has to essentially reproduce the individual's affect. 
For instance, if the respondent identified confusion and disgust as the most likely 
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. affective states of the person in question, however the respondent himself felt angry 
and violent, then this is an example of emotional arousal rather than an empathic 
response. There is no adequate self-other differentiation shown in terms of the 
affective states. Consequently this response scored 0. 
Summary 
Three stages of the empathy model and an empathy total score are measured by the 
Emotional Apperception Test. The test can be coded according to the emotional 
awareness, perspective taking, and emotional replication criteria. Each respondent 
receives a score from 0-5 for their level of emotional awareness, a score from 0-2 for 
their level of perspective taking, and a score of 0-2 for their emotional replication, 
for each vignette. An empathy total is scored 0-4, based on the combined scores of 
the perspective taking and emotional replication scores. Obviously higher scores 
reflect a greater ability at each level. 
· Scores at each stage of the empathic process and a total score may be averaged to 
denote the respondent's respective score for each of the three environmental 
categories (victim specific [actual sexual encounter, immediately after encounter], 
non-specific sexual abuse, and general). This gives an impression of respondent 
ability at each stage of empathy, in comparison to the others. Thus, the Emotional 
. Apperception Test can identify specific empathy skill deficits in the child sex 
offender. It may also be used to compare the empathic abilities of the child sex 
offender with other populations, such as non-offenders or other offender types. 
Subjects 
Child Sex off enders 
Twenty-one incarcerated male child sex offenders were invited to participate in this 
study. All pa1iicipants were in the assessment phase of the Kia Marama Sex 
Offender Treatment Program (Hudson, Marshall, Ward, Johnston, & Jones 1995) at 
Rolleston Prison, Christchurch, or were awaiting entry into the program, and none 
had undergone sexual offending treatment before. Kia Marama is a specialised 
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psychological therapy unit occupying one of five separate units of Rolleston Prison. 
Sex offenders are accepted from prisons from the South Island and the lower half of 
. the North Island. 
The Kia Marama program is designed to reduce recidivism amongst men who have 
sexually offended against children (Hudson, Marshall, \Vard, Johnston, & Jones 
1995). The intake ofreferred offenders is based on Kia Marama criteria for 
· acceptance where: 
• The offender has committed one or more sexual offences against children or 
young persons under 16 years of age (e.g., indecent assault, sexual violation, 
incest). 
• The offender is fully informed about, and voluntarily consents to enter, the 
treatment program. Volunteers exhibiting varying degrees of denial are not 
excluded. 
• The term of imprisonment is of sufficient length to permit completion of the 8 
month program prior to the earliest possible release date. 
• The offender is not intellectually disabled, but has sufficient ability to 
comprehend and participate in the treatment program (literacy is not a 
requirement). 
• The offender is currently free of any major psychotic disorders. 
• The offender does not require maximum security containment. 
· A prospective subject pool was drafted based on the group composition update. Kia 
Marama currently housed 56 child sex offenders either undergoing or awaiting 
treatment. Thirty-one offenders were either awaiting or undergoing the initial 
assessment period of the treatment program. Each of these offenders was invited to 
participate. 
Community Control Group 
Twenty individuals volunteered to participate in this study. All participants 
volunteered on the basis of advertisements placed around the University of 
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_ Canterbury and at the Riccarton Branch (Christchurch) of the New Zealand 
Employment Service. The volunteers consisted of 7 who were currently employed, 
10 who were unemployed, and 3 were students seeking employment. 
Procedures 
Child Sex off enders 
All testing was conducted in an interview room within the Kia Marama Therapy Unit 
between 9 am and 4 pm. The offenders were individually summoned to the therapy 
unit between these hours. The researcher, a 24 year-old male post-graduate 
psychology student presented a standardised information sheet and consent form 
detailing the_ study, the tasks involved and the participants' rights, to each offender 
individually. It was stressed that participation was strictly voluntary and that 
participation could be withdrawn at any time. Moreover, it was clearly 
communicated that no benefits related to their incarceration or the prison process 
would be accrued by an offender for participation in this project and that prison 
· records would be made accessible to the researcher. Consent from each individual 
was obtained in writing. The researcher was present within the room to aid with test 
responding. This predominantly was in terms of spelling, questions regarding the 
test content, requests for a break and so forth. The EAT commonly took between 45 
minutes and 2 hours depending on the offender. 
Control Group 
All volunteers were given detailed information informing them of the nature of the· 
study and of their informed consent. Responding was carried out in an office at the 
University of Canterbury with the researcher present in the room. At completion, 
_ each volunteer was debriefed and paid $7 for their participation. 
Individual details 




The twenty community volunteers consisted of 7 men who were currently employed, 
9 who were unemployed, and 4 who were students seeking employment. Their mean 
age was 29.7 years (SD= 10.67, range 17-58 years). 
Child sex offenders 
Twenty incarcerated male child sex offenders volunteered to participate in this study. 
Their mean age was 41.9 years (SD =12, range 24-61 years). Eighteen identified 
themselves as Caucasian, two as being Maori. 
The twenty child sex offenders had been convicted of a variety of child sexual 
offences under the New Zealand Crimes Act, ranging from sexual violation and 
indecent assault, to inducing an indecent act. Their mean sentence length, excluding 
one off ender who was on preventative detention, was 4 .1 years ( SD = 1. 9, range 1 
. year 9 months to 8 years 6 inonths). The mean estimated number of victims was 2.1 
(SD= 2.05, range 1-8) and twelve of the men had offended against female children, 
six against male children, and two had offended against both female and male 
children. Nine men had offended against related children, ranging from their own 
daughter or son to their sister, while eleven had offended against unrelated children, 
only one of which was unknown to the offender. Victim ages ranged from 3 to 16 
years, and the degree of intrusion ranged from inappropriate touching to anal and/or 
vaginal intercourse. 
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Emotional Apperception Test results ( I ) 
· Reliability 
There were two measures of Emotional Apperception Test reliability. Two studies 
were conducted to examine the self-consistency of the items in the Emotional 
Apperception Test. Coefficient Alpha (Cronbach, 1971) and item-total con-elations 
· were the estimates of reliability performed to produce reliability scores. The first 
study of internal consistency used both child sex offenders and non-offenders, 
measuring section B of the EAT. The second study used only child sex offenders to 
test the internal reliability of section A. 
Internal consistency 
The first set of analyses examined the internal consistency of section B of the 
Emotional Apperception Test on the child sex offender (n=20) and non-offender 
(n=20) data. Only non-specific sexual and generalised situational categories were 
measured. Table 3 shows the internal reliability properties of each situational 
category as measured by Cronbach's Alpha and item-total con-elations. The Total for 
each empathy stage represents the combined total of the two situational categories; 
general and non-specific sexual. 
The internal reliability for emotional awareness was adequate, except for non-
specific sexual items where reliability was only moderate (alpha = .69) according to 
the minium stated satisfying figure of test reliability (Guildford, 1956; Kline, 1986) 
which is .70. None of the non-specific sexual items, if deleted, increased the overall 
reliability above .70. The item-total con-elations were only moderately satisfactory, 
showing that items generally correlated significantly with respect to the other items. 
· Items averaged .17, .26, and .3 6, which are ( apart from non-specific sexual items) 
over the specified ideal correlation level of .2 for average item-total correlations 
identified by Nunnally (1978). 
Table 3. Section B internal consistency properties 
Item-total correlations 
Situational 
category Alpha mean range 
Emotional awareness 
Generalised .86 .36 (.44 -.65) 
Non-specific sex .69 .17 (.10 -.56) 
Total .88 .26 (.24 -.72) 
Perspective-taking 
Generalised .72 .24 (.18 -.56) 
Non-specific sex .63 .17 (.20 -.45) 
Total .77 .18 (.12 -.55) 
Emotional replication 
Generalised .81 .26 (.29-.73) 
Non-specific sex .72 .23 (.19 -.61) 
Total .84 .21 (.17 -.65) 
The internal reliability for perspective-taking was again moderately satisfactory, 
yielding alpha's of .72 forthe generalised items, .77 for the combination of non-
specific sexual and generalised items, but only an alpha score of .63 for the non-
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. specific sexual items alone: None of these items, if deleted, increased the overall 
reliability above .70. Again, item-total correlations for the perspective-taking items 
were only satisfactory (means of .17, .18, and .24). 
Emotional replication items were consistent at .81 for the general items, .72 the non-
specific sexual items, and .84 for the combination of the two categories. Item-total 
correlations were similarly satisfactory (means of .26, .23, and .21), showing that 
emotional replication scoring of the items correlated significantly with the emotional 
replication total score. 
It was also necessary to investigate the reliability of the child sex offenders 
independent of the non-offenders to include the victim-specific questions in section 
A. Table 4 shows the internal reliability properties of the Emotional Apperception 
· Test including section A, which includes victim-specific items, using the child sex 
offenders only. 
Table 4. Section A internal consistency properties 
Item-total correlations 
Situational category Alpha average range 
Emotional awareness 
Total .88 .26 (.09 - .69) 
Perspective-taking 
Total .78 .15 (.13 - .53) 
Emotional replication 
Total .37 .03 (-.13 - .51) 
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The Total foi· each empathy stage represents four situational categories; general, 
non-specific sexual, the actual sexual encounter, and immediately following the 
encounter. The internal reliability for emotional awareness was .88 (no significant 
change), while the average item-total correlation was .26 (no change). Perspective-
. taking reliability was . 78 (a change of .01) and the average item-total correlation was 
.15 (a decrease of .03). The inclusion of the victim-specific questions did not appear 
to influence the internal reliability of emotional awareness and perspective-taking 
stages. However, the emotional replication internal reliability was very low, only 
.37 (a change of .47) for the child sex offenders. Similarly, the average item-total 
correlation significantly decreased from .21 to a low .03. This suggests that the 
victim-specific vignettes decreased the internal reliability of the emotional 
replication scoring markedly. 
Inter-rater reliability 
· The author and supervisor, acting as independent raters, both scored the Emotional 
Apperception Test. The inter-rater reliability was very high at .94. This suggests 
) 
, I 
that the EAT can be scored very consistently with the procedure previously 
described (see method). It also suggests that the two independent raters used 
· essentially the same criteria when judging the similarity between the subject's 




Table 5 displays the relationship of age to each of the environmental categories. The 
salient finding is that all correlations are inverted, signifying that the older the 
respondent the less empathic ability. However, there were only three significant 
relationships (see Table 5). At the emotional awareness stage, there was a 
significant negative correlation between age and generalised situations (r = -.35). 
The older the respondent the less emotional awareness shown in the generalised 
scenarios. There was also a significant relationship between age and non-specific 
situations at both perspective-taking (r = -.48) and emotional replication (r = -.49) 
stages. The older the respondent the less ability was shown in these respective 
stages. 
Due to the significance age effects, it was decided to conduct a further analysis of 
the data using age as a covariate. One way analyses of covariance (ANCOVA's) 
were performed on each of the following ten hypotheses to control for the 
significance of age. There were no significant differences in the outcomes for each 
of the hypotheses. Having age as a covarient did not significantly alter any of the 
following analyses of variance. 
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Table 5. The relationship of age and emotional awareness, 
perspective taking, and emotional replication abilities across 































Due to the significance age effects, it was decided to conduct a further analysis of 
the data using age as a covariate. One way analyses of covariance (ANCOVA's) 
· were performed on each of the following ten hypotheses to control for the 
significance of age. There were no significant differences in the outcomes for each 
of the hypotheses. Having age as a covarient did not significantly alter any of the 
following analyses of variance . 
. Other demographics 
Victim age, victim number, gender of victim, and relationship to the victim, were 
also tested in terms of their relationships with each of the empathic stages. There 
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. were no significant correlations with ability at any of the empathic stages or 
situational cateogories. However, as a precaution, despite the fact that correlational 
analyses did not reveal any significant relationships, all hypotheses were again tested 
using each of these demographic details as covariates. There were no significant 
differences in the outcomes for each of the hypotheses. The results were the same as 
those revealed by the each of the following analyses. 
Emotional Apperception Test results (II) 
Results are presented in three broad sections, the first consisting of hypotheses based 
on empathy within the offence cycle of the child sex offender. The second section is 
based on recent research findings concerning empathic deficiencies in child sex 
offenders relative to community control groups, while the third section consists of 
exploratory hypotheses based on the reconceptualised model of the empathic 
process. All data were subjected to repeated measures analyses of variance and post 
hoc multiple comparisons using the Tukey Test (Keppel, 1991). 
Section 1. Relating to the stages involved in the offence chain 
It is recognised that the empathic abilities of the child sex offender need not be stable 
over the offence chain, due to the dynamic nature of the affective and cognitive 
processes involved. The contention is that empathic abilities may be deficient during 
the actual offence relative to immediately after the offence. To test this notion, one 
way analyses of variance were perfo1med. 
Hypotheses 1. 
· There is a significant difference in the level of emotional awareness exhibited 
during the actual sexual encounter and immediately following the sexual 
encounter. Specifically, it is hypothesised that there will be a greater level of 
emotional awareness exhibited immediately following the sexual encounter . 
. For the actual sexual encounter the child sex offenders' obtained a mean emotional 
awareness of2.65 (SD= 1.46). A mean of3.2 (SD= 1.23) was obtained for 
emotional awareness immediately following the sexual encounter. There was no 
significant difference between the two groups, F (1, 19) = 2.26, n.s. 
Hypotheses 2. 
There is a significant difference in child sex offender perspective-taking abilities 
between the actual sexual encounter and immediately following the sexual 
encounter. Child sex offenders will be appreciatively more able to take the 
. perspective of the victim iliunediately following the sexual encounter. 
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The child sex offenders' obtained mean perspective-taking scores of 0.75 (SD= 0.91) 
for the actual sexual encounter and 0.75 (SD= 0.85) immediately following the 
sexual encounter. There was no significant difference between the two groups, F (1, 
19) = 0, n.s. 
Hypotheses 3. 
There is a significant difference in the amount of emotional replication shown 
during the actual sexual encounter and immediately following the sexual 
encounter. Child sex offenders will be significantly more able to replicate the 
emotional st.ate(s) of their victim(s) immediately following the sexual encounter. 
An emotional replication mean of 0.3 (SD= 0.73) was obtained by the child sex 
offenders' during the actual encounter and a mean of 0.35 (SD= 0.75) immediately 
following the sexual encounter. There was no significant difference between the two 
· groups, F (1, 19) = 0.11, n.s. 
Implications of offence chain results 
There were no significant differences in any of the stages of the empathic process for 
. the child sex offenders, between the actual sexual encounter and immediately 
following the sexual encounter with the child. The empathic abilities were therefore 
stable across these two stages of the empathic process. In future hypotheses, victim-
specific empathy will be refened to as 'during and immediately after the sexual 
encounter', however only the actual sexual encounter results will be referred to. 




· It is predicted that the empathy deficits of child sex offenders will be limited to and 
more spec~fically directed towards their own victim(s). 
The mean total (perspective-taking and emotional replication scores) empathy scores 
for the child sex offenders and non-offenders for each of the different situational 
categories are presented in table 6. A set of one way ANOV A's were performed on 
the total empathy scores for the two victim-specific categories ( actual sexual 
encounter and immediately following the encounter) in comparison to the total non-
specific sexual and total generalised variables . 
. Total empathy towards the child sex offenders' own most recent victim during, and 
immediately after, the actual encounter was compared to total empathy shown 
towards the non-specific sexual situations. There was a significant difference 
between groups, F (1, 19) = 50.56, p< .0001. 
Similarly, it was tested as to whether total empathy towards the child sex offenders' 
own victim during, and immediately after, the actual sexual encounter was 
significantly less than total empathy shown towards the generalised empathy 
evoking situations. There were significant differences between both groups, F (1, 
19) = 52.05, p< .00001, during and immediately after the sexual encounter. 
Offenders were significantly less able to show empathy towards their own victim 
· compared to generalised and non-specific sexual abuse situations. 
Table 6. Mean total empathy scores across the different situational 
categories 
Total empathy score averages 
Child sex offender Non-offenders 
Generalised 1.91 (.53) 2.55 (.76) 
Non-specific sexual 1.81 (.64) 2.71 (.55) 
Victim-specific-
Actual encounter 0.53 (.74) 
Immediately 0.55 (.72) 
after encounter 
Hypotheses 5: 
It is predicted that child sex, offenders will be equally able to show empathy 
towards otlu:r (potential) victims of sexual abuse and other general empathy 
evoking situations. 
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It was tested as to whether there was any difference in non-specific total empathy 
and generalised total empathy. There was no significant difference between the two 
· groups, F (1, 19) = 0.56, n.s. As predicted, child sex offenders were equally able to 
show empathy towards other potential victims of sexual abuse and general empathy 
evoking situations. 
Hypotheses 6. 
-It is predicted that child sex offenders and non-offenders will equally be able to 
show empathy towards other (potential) sex,ual abuse victims and general 
situations. 
Table 6 shows the mean total empathy scores for the child sex offenders and the non-
, offenders for non-specific sexual abuse and generalised categories. A set of one way 
ANOVA's were carried out to discern whether child sex offender TOTAL non-
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specific sexual abuse empathy (mean= 1.81, SD= .64) was significantly different 
from non-offender TOTAL non-specific sexual abuse (mean= 2. 71, SD =.55) 
· empathy. An ANOV A was similarly performed to test whether child sex offender 
TOTAL generalised empathy (mean= 1.91, SD= .53) was significantly different 
from non-offender TOTAL generalised empathy (mean= 2.55, SD =.76). 
Contrary to predictions, there was a significant difference between each group . 
. Child sex offenders displayed significantly less empathy towards the non-specific 
sexual abuse scenarios than did the non-offenders, F (1, 38) = 17.6, p< .001. 
Similarly, child sex offenders showed less empathy towards generalised scenarios 
than did non-offenders, F (1, 38) = 9.35, p< .01. 
Section 3. Exploratory hypotheses based on empathy 
reconceptualisation 
Empathy deficits in terms of the empathic process 
• Empathic deficits may be present at one, or all, of the stages needed for an empathic 
response. Child sex offenders may have difficulties in emotional awareness, taking 
the perspective of another person, or experiencing a similar emotion in response. 
Conversely, they may be deficient at all of these stages. However, they may have 
difficulties at a particular stage only in ce1iain situations, such as towards their own 
. victim, or other (potential) victims, or to everyone in most circumstances. It is 
contented that as empathy deficits are significantly directed towards the child sex 
offenders' own victim( s ), there may be empathy difficulties at a particular stage, or 
stages, only towards their own victims. Table 7 shows child sex offender mean 
scores for each stage of the empathic process across each of the situational 
categories. 
Table 7. Mean child sex offender emotional awareness, perspective taking, 
and emotional replication scores in each situational category 
Emotional Perspective Emotional 
awareness taking replication 
Generalised 2.95 (.61) 1.38 (.42) .55 (.20) 
Non-specific 2.72 (.55) 1.22 (.38) .60 (.40) 
sexual 
Victim-specific 
(actual) 2.65 (1.46) 0.75 (.91) .30 (.73) 
(immediately) 3.20 (1.24) 0.75 (.85) .35 (.75) 
Hypothesis 7. 
Levels of emotional awareness are significantly different when the child sex 
offender is confronted with victim-specific, non-specific sexual, or general 
everyday situations. Specifically, it is predicted that there will be lower levels of 
emotional awareness exhibited towards their own victim. 
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A one way ANOV A was performed to test whether the emotional awareness shown 
towards own victim during, and immediately after, the actual encounter, was 
significantly different from the emotional awareness shown towards non-specific 
sexual and generalised empathy situations. Table 7 displays the mean scores for 
emotional awareness across the different environmental situations. There were no 
significant differences between these situations, F (3, 57) = 1.66, n.s, indicating that 
there was no discrimination in the ability of the child sex offenders' to be aware of 
the emotional states of the different individuals. 
· Hypotheses 8. 
Perspective-taking ability is significantly different when the child sex ojJender is 
confronted with victim-specific, non-specific sexual or general everyday situations. 
. It is hypothesised that perspective-taking abilities will be significantly deficient 
towards thelr own victim. 
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It was necessary to determine whether perspective-taking abilities differed towards 
own victim during, and immediately after, the actual encounter, and non-specific 
sexual and generalised empathy situations. Figure l indicates the perspective-
taking means of the child sex offenders across the different environmental situations. 
The means obtained were 1.38 (SD= 0.42) for the general situations, 1.22 (SD= 
0.38) for the non-specific sexual situations, and 0.75 (SD= 0.91) for during, and 
immediately following, the sexual encounter. The differences between these means 
were highly significant, F (3, 57) = 6.73, p< .001. 
A post hoc comparison using the Tukey Test (Keppel, 1991) revealed a significant 
difference between perspective-taking scores towards the child sex offenders' own 
victim and perspective-taking scores towards the general situations (p<.01). The 
post hoc comparison showed no significant difference between own victim and non-
. specific perspective-taking scores. Similarly, non-specific perspective-taking scores 
did not differ significantly from general perspective-taking scores. Evidently, child 
sex offendersare markedly less able to take the perspective of their own victims, 
particularly in comparison with more generalised empathy situations . 
. Hypotheses 9. 
There is a significant difference in the ability of the child sex offender to 
experience the emotional state of another person when the child sex offender is 
confronted with victim-specific, non-specific sexual, or general everyday 
situations. It is expected that the emotional replication ability of the child sex 
offender is significantly lower towards his own victim 
A one way ANOV A was conducted to examine whether the emotional replication 
expressed was significantly different towards own victim during and immediately 
after the actual encounter, non-specific sexual situations, and generalised 
situations. The means obtained for the three situational categories were 0.30 (SD= 
0.74) for the actual sexual encounter, 0.60 (SD= 0.36) for the non-specific sexual 
abuse situations, and 0.55 (SD= 0.20) for the generalised situations. The group 
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difference was not significant, F (3, 57) = 1.63, n.s. Therefore, contrary to 
expectations, the child sex offenders were equally able to experience the emotions of 
the observed person across all environmental categories. 
Hypotheses 10. 
Child sex offenders will be less able to recognise emotional states, take another's 
perspective, and experience a vicarious emotional state, relative to non-offenders. 
· Table 8 shows the non-offender mean scores for each stage of the empathy process 
across non-specific sexual and generalised situations. 
Table 8. Mean non-offender emotional awareness, perspective taking, 
and emotional replication scores in each situational category 
Emotional Perspective Emotional 
awareness taking replication 
Generalised 3.30 (.75) 1.78 (.24) .86 (.67) 
Non-specific 2.72 (.53) 1.56 (.33) 1.18 (.47) 
sexual 
A one way ANOV A was performed to compare the emotional awareness abilities of 
the child sex offenders and the non-offenders. There was no significant difference 
between the two groups, for the generalised situations, F (1, 38) = 2.53, n .. s., or the 
non-specific sexual abuse situations, F(l, 38) = .00, n.s. There was no difference in 
the emotional awareness ability between child sex offenders and non-offenders. 
Similarly, a one way ANOV A was used to determine whether child sex offenders 
· were significantly less able to take the perspective of another person, relative to the 
non-offenders. The mean perspective-taking score obtained by the sex offenders for 
the non-specific sexual abuse situations was 1.22 (SD= .38) (see Table 7), whereas 
the mean for the non-offenders was 1.56 (SD= .33). For the generalised situations, 
the child sex offenders obtained a mean of 1.38 (SD= .42), the non-offenders a mean 
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of 1.78 (SD== .24). The child sex offenders were significantly less able to take the 
perspective of persons in both, non-specific sexual abuse situations, F (1, 38) = 
9.41, p< .01, and general situations, F (1, 38) = 13.63, p< .001 
. The emotional replication abilities of the child sex offenders and the non-offenders 
were also compared using a set of one way ANOVA's. Child sex offenders' had a 
mean emotional replication score of 0.60 (SD= 0.36) on the non-specific sexual 
items, whereas the non-offenders' produced a mean score of 1.18 (SD = .4 7). The 
difference between these means was significant, F (1, 3 8) = 19 .11, p< .0001. 
Evidently, the child sex offenders were less able to adequately replicate the non-
specific sexual individuals' emotional states than the non-offenders'. 
Child sex offenders had a mean emotional replication score of 0.55 (SD= 0.20) on 
the generalised items, whereas the non-offenders' had a mean of 0. 86 (SD =. 67). 
These means proved not to be significant, F (1, 38) = 3.98, n.s. Child sex offenders 
· therefore were equally able to replicate the emotional state of individuals in general 
empathy evoking situations, as non-offenders. 
Hypothesis 11. 
Child sex offender perspective-taking and emotional replication abilities will be 
· significantly different across the victim-specific, non-specific sexual, and 
generalised situations. 
Hypothesis 11 was generated upon concluding that the emotional replication abilities 
of the child sex offender appear minimal across all situational categories. Similarly, 
. the sex offenders appear to ·show significantly less ability to experience a vicarious 
emotional state relative to their ability to perspective take. Figure 1 graphically 
illustrates that the emotional replication abilities of the child sex offender appear 















· Figure 1. Child sex offender scores in each stage of empathic model 
across all situational categories 
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A set of one way ANOVA's was performed to test whether the differences between 
these means were significant. Emotional replication scores were significantly less 
than perspective-taking scores across all environmental categories. Emotional 
replication scores were significantly lower in non-specific sexual situations, F (1, 19) 
= 53.46, p< .00001, in generalised situations, F (1, 19) = 95.47, p< .00001, and 
during the actual sexual encounter, F (1, 19) = 7.03, p< .05. It is evident that child 
sex offenders are markedly deficient in their ability to experience a congrnent 





A psychometric measure may be described as a good test if it has certain 
characteristics. Psychometric measures need to be consistent (reliable) and must 
measure what they are purported to measure (validity). Both of these attributes are 
essential to the development of precise and accurate measurement instruments 
(Kline, 1986). The Emotional Apperception Test is newly developed and therefore 
untested in terms of its consistency and validity. 
Importance of reliability 
In the construction of psychometric instruments high reliability is an essential 
attribute, for the obvious reason that if part of a test is measuring a variable, then the 
other parts, if not consistent with it, cannot be measuring that variable (Guildford, 
1956; Nunnally, 1978; Kline, 1986). In psychometrics, reliability has two distinct 
meanings. One refers to test stability over time, the second to internal consistency. 
Reliability over time 
Due to the time constraints of the study, the consistency of the Emotional 
Apperception Test was unable to be tested over time. The child sex offender 
respondents were all either awaiting entry into, or were currently undergoing, the 
assessment phase of the Kia Marama Sex Offender Treatment Program (Hudson, 
Marshall, Ward, Johnston, & Jones, 1995). Since all child sex offenders were 
entering the program, one aim of which is to increase empathy, it was not possible to 
re-administer the EAT. This is particularly important considering treatment effects 
would enhance empathic ability and that at least a three-month period is 
recommended for a reliable estimate of test-retest reliability (Nunnally, 1978; Kline, 
. 1986, 1993). 
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Internal reliability 
Scoring the EAT required two independent raters to make subjective ratings for each 
question, based on an explicit set of criteria and instructions. Inter-rater reliability 
determined the consistency with which the two raters scored the EAT questions. 
The inter-rater reliability was very high, at .94, suggesting that the criteria set 
enabled the raters to independently yet consistently score each question. Moreover, 
high inter-rater reliability suggests that the independent raters consistently scored 
according to the procedure adapted for the EAT. 
Coefficient Alpha (Cronbach, 1971) was calculated to produce an estimate of the 
EAT internal consistency using both child sex offenders and the community control 
group. This gives a measure of the test's self-consistency, where each scored 
variable should be consistent with the scoring on the other similar variables. The 
internal consistency for the EAT was generally satisfactory, in that alpha should not 
drop below .7, a value stressed by both Guildford (1956) and Nunnally (1978). Only 
moderate internal consistency, however, was obtained for emotional awareness and 
perspective-taking categories for the non-specific sexual abuse items (.69 and .63). 
As the community control group did not complete section A of the EAT, an internal 
reliability study was conducted on the child sex offenders alone, including the actual 
sexual encounter and immediately following encounter items. Consequently the 
coefficient alpha values for the emotional awareness and perspective-taking stages of 
the empathic process were very similar to the first reliability study. However, the 
· inclusion of the victim-specific items caused a dramatic loss of consistency in the 
measurement of the emotional replication stage (from .84 to .37). This implies that 
the victim-specific items essentially measured a different variable in terms of 
respondent emotional replication. Incidentally, child sex offenders were markedly 
deficient in this ability. 
· The low emotional replication consistency could have occurred for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, the victim-specific items were arguably a 
different dependent variable than the ambiguous vignettes. The victim-specific 
vignettes (section A) required the child sex offender to retrospectively access his 
emotional states from an actual event (which may or may not have been recent). The 
offender would have had a variety of salient cues available. For example the 
· offender would have had, at least to some extent, background knowledge, salient 
distress cues· from the victim, and disinhibtition caused by the offenders' own 
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emotional state(s), alcohol, and sexual arousal. Each of these may have impacted on 
. his information processing ability. Comparatively, the hypothetical vignettes 
(section B) required interpretation of hypothetical situations without access to the 
more salient emotionally evoking cues. They involve more cognitive effort, whereas 
the retrospective victim-specific questions may elicit more emotional arousal. 
In this sense, these two sections were essentially measuring different aspects of 
emotional replication. One is possibly oriented towards retrospective accounts of 
. emotional states experienced, whereas the other is more oriented towards the limited 
experiencing of emotion elicited by written information. 
Secondly, it is suggested that ambiguous test instructions are a common source of 
unreliability (Kline, 1993). In the victim-specific items in the EAT, the respondent 
is asked Think again about the events and explain how you were feeling at this time'. 
Comparatively, section B items asked, "How does this make you feel?" The 
different te1minology used for each item may have caused the child sex offenders to 
respond differently. 
It is, however, important to note that the vignettes within section B of the EAT were 
constructed to be ambiguous, and that this ambiguity within the items may have 
. facilitated different emotional responding to the emotional replication questions. In 
this sense, a very high internal consistency would actually be antithetical to the 
validity of the EAT. For example, some vignettes concerned young children, others 
older children. The ages of these children also varied considerably. These factors 
may lead the offenders to respond differently in terms of their emotional reactions to 
the vignettes. In other words, if all the items were not ambiguous and in fact were 
highly correlated, then this would suggest that the test will be narrow and specific 
therefore easy, but not valid. Ease of interpretation in this case lessens the 
meaningfulness of the competency based design. Supporting this supposition, 
another study using ambiguous vignettes also had low internal reliability. Hanson 
and Scott (1995) also investigated the perspective-taking abilities of the sex offender 
using similar ambiguous vignettes. They also found a low internal consistency 
amongst their items (alpha ranging from .30 to .59). 
Validity 
Good reliability is a necessary condition for a psychometric instrument, but it alone 
is not sufficient. The second major characteristic of good psychometric instruments 
is validity. If a test measures what it purports to measure then it is considered valid. 
107 
Commonly, a psychometric test is compared to other tests that measure the same 
variable. If these tests correlate highly, then they purportedly measure the same 
variable, and concurrent validity is said to high. The Emotional Apperception Test 
was not, however, compared to other tests that reportedly measure the empathic 
abilities of sex offenders. This was for a number of precise reasons. Firstly, the 
EAT is a new competency based instrument which is designed to measure different 
aspects of empathy across different contexts. As opposed to other existing measures, 
it does not use self-rep01i scales as its means of gathering information from the 
respondent. 
Secondly, there are no specific tests that measure what the EAT is constructed to 
measure. There are no existing competency based tests that assess victim-specific 
empathy, only self-repmi scales (i.e., Victim Empathy Measure, Marshall et al., 
1994). Because of these different response formats, comparing the EAT findings 
with an administered generalised measure of empathy such as the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index may have at best, presented moderate correlations. This is 
manifestly unsatisfactory as an index of validity (Davis, 1994; Kline, 1993). 
Thirdly, it was thought antithetical to administer more than one empathy based test 
to the offender group, especially given that the EAT took a considerable length of 
time, and that administering two tests would have raised other methodological 
issues. 
In the absence of validity checks against other empathy measures, it is contented that 
the discriminatory ability of the Emotional Apperception Test will lend credence to 
the validity of the measure. Clearly, if a test fails to discriminate between 
individuals it would be unlikely to be valid. The EAT clearly discriminated between 
child sex offenders and the _control group, paiiicularly with respect to perspective-
taking and emotional replication abilities. It also discriminated between those with a 
high ability at each stage of the empathic process, and those with low levels of 
ability. Moreover, the EAT showed clear differences in the abilities of child sex 
offenders across the situational categories. For example, they were distinctly unable 
to take the perspective of their victim(s). Fmiher emphasising the discriminative 
capacity of the EAT, these clear distinctions were evident at high levels of 
significance (e.g., p< . 00001) thus the differences were statistically reliable. 
Significantly, demographic variables such as age (of victim and child sex offender), 
victim gender, and sentence length were not correlated with the EAT results. These 
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factors did not, therefore, impinge on the results and thus detract from the EAT's 
validity. Age factors were also controlled for in the Emotional Reactivity Index (see 
method section) so that this fundamental bias would not impact on the measurement 
of empathy in child sex offenders . 
. The Emotional Apperception Test also discriminated between empathy, in particular 
emotional replication abilities, and the concepts of sympathy and direct emotional 
arousal. Sympathy is, of course, a heightened attention to ones own feelings in 
response to the distress of another person. Elements of pity, condolence, and 
compassion epitomise a sympathetic response. Conversely, emotional replication is 
the experiencing of an emotion more appropriate to the distressed person. There 
must be adequate levels of self-other differentiation in order to be vicariously 
experiencing another person emotion. The EAT was able to discriminate between an 
adequate emotional replication and sympathetic responding. Similarly, direct 
emotional arousal in response to the emotion-evoking vignettes was also 
discriminated from an adequate emotional replication response. For example, a 
common response from an individual who did not vicariously experience the disgust, 
. or fear of a sexual abuse victim, was anger and hatred. This was not an emotional 
replication response. 
Empathy across the offence chain 
The Emotional Apperception Test demonstrated that there was no significant 
. difference in child sex offender empathic abilities during the two offence-specific 
stages of the· offence cycle. Child sex offenders did not differ in their relative 
emotional awareness, perspective taking, and emotional replication abilities during 
the actual sexual encounter compared to immediately following the encounter. 
These two stages are particularly relevant to the dynamic nature of the cognitive 
qistortions and cognitive deconstruction mechanisms, as both these processes are 
. clearly important in manifesting victim-specific empathy deficits (Ward, Hudson, & 
Marshall, 1995). 
The nature of the offence chain suggests that empathic abilities would have differed 
between these two stages. The sexual arousal and self-satisfying focus during the 
actual sexual encounter, which may include the child sex offender entering a 
. cognitively deconstructed state could facilitate a low capacity for empathy (Ward, 
Louden, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). Comparatively, immediately after the sexual 
encounter when the influence of sexual arousal is minimal, there is a self-evaluation 
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where the child sex offender may feel guilt and disgust, thus more likely to be 
. empathic. However, Ward; Louden, Hudson, and Marshall (1995) suggest that the 
child sex offender could also evaluate the situation positively, restructuring his 
cognitions appropriately. 
The EAT finding that there was no significant difference in empathy between these 
two stages, may be due to a number of factors. Firstly, it suggests that the sample of 
. child sex offenders probably consisted of (some) individuals who evaluated their 
sexual offending positively, thus also being unempathic immediately following the 
sexual encounter. Obviously in these individuals, cognitive distortions are important 
as they commonly blame the victim, minimise their behaviours, and reframe the 
encounter as education (Abel et al., 1989; Marshall et al., 1995). 
Secondly, it is possible that what they report now (in an assessment context) is likely 
to be very different from what they may have been able to report at the time of the 
offence. During the offending, the offender may have been intoxicated and/or highly 
aroused, and likely to be in a cognitively deconstructed state. 
Thirdly, there may not be a clear demarcation between the actual sexual encounter 
. and the events that immediately followed. For example, the offender may have 
masturbated.after the child had left, or he may not be able to state these time periods 
if the offending was over an extensive period of time. Furthermore, there is the 
methodological issue of whether the offender actually was referring to events 
immediately following the sexual encounter. The definition of 'immediately' may 
have differed for each individual. 
The extent of empathy deficits in child sex offenders 
The Emotional Apperception test results suggest that in comparison to other 
(potential) victims of sexual abuse and to children and adults in general emotion-
evoking situations, the child sex offenders were extremely unempathic towards their 
· own victims during, and immediately after, the sexual encounter. They displayed 
higher and similar levels of empathy towards other (potential) victims of sexual 
abuse and to the children and adults in general emotion-evoking situations. There 
was no discernible difference in sex offender empathic abilities between these two 
contexts. Clearly, these findings indicate a victim-specific empathy deficit in these 
offenders. 
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In order to demonstrate that child sex offender empathy deficits are predominantly 
victim-specific, their empathic abilities towards other victims of sexual abuse and 
other general emotion-evoking situations, were compared with a community control 
group. Contrary to expectations, the child sex offenders were significantly deficient 
in their ability to empathise with both other victims, and children and adults, in 
general situations when compared to the control group. The child sex offenders 
were therefore generally less empathic across all situational categories, but presented 
marked deficits towards their own victim(s) . 
. EAT consistency with recent research 
The Emotional Apperception Test results are generally consistent with other recent 
attempts to discern the extent of sex offender empathic difficulties. In fact, a clear 
pattern of results is emerging. Child sex offenders are clearly significantly less 
empathic towards their own victim(s). They are more (and equally) empathic 
towards other victims and children and adults in general everyday situations. These 
findings are ~onsistent with the theorising of Marshall, Hudson, Jones, and 
Fernandez (1995). They reviewed the existing sex offender empathy literature and 
concluded that there was little evidence suggesting that child sex offenders were 
deficient in generalised empathy, and that victim-specific measures would more 
accurately discern the empathic capacity of the sex offender. 
This is consi.stent with the recent sex offender empathy literature, which has 
specified that empathic deficits in the sex offender are most likely to be oriented 
towards the victim (Hanson & Scott, 1995; Hayashino et al., 1995; Hudson et al., 
1983; Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). However there has only recently been an 
attempt to develop adequate person-specific measures which can accurately assess 
the likely circumscribed empathic deficits of the sex offender. Marshall, Fernandez, 
Lightbody, and O'Sullivan (1994) used their own Victim Empathy Measure and 
found, similar to the EAT results, that child sex offenders were exceptionally unable 
to empathise with their own victim(s), both in terms of taking the victims 
perspective, and replicating the observed emotion(s). They also found that child sex 
offender empathic abilities were similar with other victims of sexual abuse and child 
accident victims. 
EAT inconsistencies with recent research 
The Emotional Apperception Test also found generalised empathy deficits. Contrary 
to recent theorising, this suggests that the empathy deficits of the child sex offender 
may, to some extent, manifest across all persons and situations. Indeed, recent 
· theorising and research, as outlined in the Introduction, would have suggested the 
opposite of these findings, that child sex offenders would be as empathic as the non-
offenders in general situations. For example, Marshall, Fernandez, Lightbody, and 
O'Sullivan, although finding victim-specific deficits, also found that the child sex 
offenders and non-offenders were equally empathic towards the accident and other 
victim scales. Child sex offenders were generally as empathic as non-offenders 
when self-reporting the child's and their own emotional state(s). Hence, this is 
inconsistent with the EAT results where the administration of a competency based 
measure (EAT) revealed general sex offender empathy deficits. 
It is interesting to speculate as to why this was the case. Perhaps it is worth noting 
that the variance in total scores on the generalised questions in the EAT, was quite 
• high among the control group, relative to the child sex offenders. This suggests that 
a few exceptionally empathic non-offenders possibly skewed the data. However as 
the significance level for the difference between the child sex offenders and controls 
was reliable at the .01 level, this explanation is perhaps optimistic. Administration 
of the EAT with increased sample sizes may clarify this issue . 
. It is also possible that the EAT, being a competency based device, is a better 
measure of general empathic abilities. The Victim Empathy Measure (Marshall et 
al., 1994) for example, used only a child accident victim as its measure of general 
empathy. This is problematic, especially considering a car accident is a very 
common and emotionally arousing situation. Most offenders would have had some 
experience with a car accident (issue of similarity), therefore being more able to put 
. themselves in the child's position. This enhanced perspective taking ability would be 
facilitated by the simple cognitive modes of empathic arousal such as direct 
association and classical conditioning. On the other hand, the EAT presented a 
diverse array of generalised situations, which arguably are more likely to access the 
offender's generalised empathic ability. A wide range of situations, some of which 
require a high level of cognitive interpretation, would surely represent a more 
. accurate generalised empathy. 
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Sex offenders presenting generalised empathy deficits is, however, consistent with 
the broad theoretical frameworks proposed to account for the etiology of sexual 
offending. For example, Marshall and Barbaree (1990) suggest that adverse early 
development experiences precede failure in socialisation tasks such as the 
development of adult empathic ability (p. 263). Similarly, attachment theory (Ward 
et al., 1995) is especially relevant in respect to generalised empathy deficits in sex 
offenders as caregiver and child attachmen, and early childhood experiences are 
recognised a_s being essential in the development of empathic abilities in adulthood 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Feshbach, 1987; Hoffman, 1982; Strayer, 1987). It is 
apparent that secure early attachment between the child and caregivers appears to be 
a major antecedent of early interest in others, and is seen as a necessary precondition 
for the development of empathy (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977). Development of 
empathy in this sense relates to a generalised empathic ability. 
Studies using generic self-report measures have found generalised empathy deficits 
in sex offenders. Rice, Chaplin, Harris, and Coutts (1990) administered two 
generalised empathy measures, both the Hogan Empathy Scale (Hogan, 1969) and 
the QMEE (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) to rapists and a control group. These 
measures revealed significant generalised empathy deficits in the rapists, relative to 
the control group. Similarly, Marshall, Jones, Hudson, and McDonald (1993) using 
the IRI (Davis, 1983a) found generalised empathy deficits in community child sex 
offenders but not in the incarcerated child sex offenders in their samples. However, 
both these studies suggested that the generalised empathy deficits found do not 
represent the core empathy difficulties for sex offenders. The EAT also suggests 
that although lacking in generalised empathic ability, the imp01iant and most 
dramatic empathy deficits are specific to the offender's own victim(s). 
Empathy deficits in terms of the empathic process 
It is suggested that the empathy is best conceived as a four-stage information 
processing model, with each stage necessary for an empathic response (Marshall et 
al., 1995). Now that it is evident that child sex offenders have particular difficulties 
in being empathic towards their own victims it is important to discern where, within 
the four-stage empathy model, these difficulties emanate. It has been implied that 
they may have difficulties at recognising emotions (Hudson, Marshall, Wales, 
McDonald, Bakker, & McLean, 1993), or taking the perspective of another person 
(Hanson & Scott, 1995), or_ experiencing a vicarious emotion in response to 
observing and interpreting the persons distress (Marshall et al., 1995). They may 
also have widespread difficulties at all of these stages. 
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To this point, the empathy deficits detailed from the EAT have referred to the 
measurement of the combined perspective-taking and emotional replication abilities 
of the individual. In context with the model of empathy, it is important to discern 
whether these deficits ( also in comparison with the control group) are evident at only 
one or all stages. 
The Emotional Apperception Test revealed that the child sex offenders and control 
group did not differ in their emotional awareness capabilities. They displayed equal 
levels of emotional awareness in terms of the emotional states of the children ( or 
adults) when they were other victims of sexual abuse or in generalised emotion-
evoking situations. The child sex offenders were, however, less able to take the 
perspective of the child (or adult) in both situational categories, and were particularly 
deficient at appreciating the perspective of their own victim(s). In terms of 
replicating the emotion observed in the other person, the child sex offenders were 
generally unable to experience the emotional states of any of the children ( or adults) 
in any of the situations. Relative to the non-offenders, they showed less ability with 
other victims, but unexpectedly were as capable as the control group to replicate the 
emotions of individuals in the general category. 
Emotional Awareness 
The Emotional Apperception Test revealed that, relative to the non-offenders, there 
were no significant deficits in the emotional awareness abilities of the child sex 
offenders towards their own victim(s), other sexual abuse victims, or towards general 
· emotion-evoking situations. This suggests that the child sex offenders and the non-
offenders were not dissimilar in their levels of emotional awareness towards any of 
the situational contexts. 
This is inconsistent with recent sex offender empathy research. Emotional 
awareness abilities being indiscernible between child sex offenders and non-
. offenders is in direct contrast to the findings of Hudson, Marshall, Wales, 
McDonald, Bakker, and McLean (1993). They used the Emotional Expression 
subtest (O'Sullivan & Guildford, 1976) to test child sex offender recognition of 
emotional states. This test requires the respondents to identify the most appropriate 
facial affect from six main emotional states (fear, surprise, disgust, anger, happiness 
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and sadness). They found that child sex offenders' in particular confused surprise 
and fear. Moreover, they found that child sex offenders were significantly less 
accurate in their recognition of child and adult emotions. Hudson and his colleagues 
suggested that, contrary to their expectations, child sex offender emotional 
recognition difficulties were not child specific but more global. 
Lisak and Ivan (1995) also measured emotional recognition skills using a photograph 
recognition test (Facial Affect Recognition, Ekman & Oster, 1979). They examined 
sexually aggressive and non-aggressive males finding that, again contrary to 
expectations, sexually aggressive males were less accurate at discerning affect on 
male faces, rather than female faces. This also suggests an emotional recognition 
deficit, but again a generalised deficit rather than one specific to adult females. 
The EAT does suggest, however, that child sex offenders are generally less empathic 
than non-offenders, but do not present emotional awareness deficits even of a 
general nature. This may be due to the nature of the concept of emotional awareness 
as measured in the EAT, as compared to visual affect recognition tests. The 
· emotional awareness measure used in the EAT is a more general assessment of an 
individual's emotional sophistication, whereas the emotional recognition tests used 
by both Hudson et al (1993) and Lisak and Ivan (1995) are more specifically 
oriented to facial affect. 
Emotional awareness, as assessed by the EAT, is an evaluation of the ability of the 
· individual to cognitively process the expression of emotion. The higher the level of 
ability in terms of emotional awareness, the more able the individual to recognise 
specific emotions. The EAT therefore accesses more of the cognitive ability to 
recognise emotions based on verbal representations of situations, compared to visual 
tests such as the Emotional Expression subtest that access emotional recognition 
through more overt stimuli. Furthermore, the EAT accesses emotional recognition 
· through more situational contexts, using overt behavioural (non-verbal) cues, rather 
than just simple facial recognition. Testing visual representations of emotion is 
significantly different from the more general emotional awareness ability so it is 
difficult to interpret the different findings between the EAT and those of Hudson, 
Marshall, Wales, McDonald, Bakker, and McLean (1993) and Lisak and Ivan 
(1995). 
In summary; the child sex offenders were not significantly dissimilar in their levels 
of emotional awareness relative to non-offenders, or towards their own victim(s), 
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other sexual abuse victim(s), or any other general emotional situations. This is 
inconsistent with recent research, which suggests that sex offenders have some 
difficulty in recognising facial affect in general situations. The EAT, however, 
accesses a different level (more general) of emotional recognition skill compared to 
the specific facial recognition instruments, which is based on situational contexts. 
Perspective-taking 
The Emotional Apperception Test results indicate that taking the perspective of 
another person is problematic for child sex offenders. Within the four-stage 
unfolding model of empathy (Marshall et al., 1995), empathic deficits emerge at the 
perspective-taking stage, where they have difficulties seeing things from another 
person's perspective. In particular, the child sex offenders were significantly 
deficient in their ability to appreciate their own victim's viewpoint during, and after, 
the sexual encounter. This suggests that they are able to adequately recognise the 
emotional state(s) of their victim, however they are unable to take the victim's 
perspective in order to fully comprehend the emotions perceived. 
Child sex offenders were significantly less able to take the perspective of their own 
· victim, particularly in comparison with their ability to appreciate someone else's 
viewpoint in more generalised situations. There was, however, contrary to 
expectations, no significant difference in their ability to take the perspective of other 
(potential) victims of sexual abuse and their own victim. Nor was there a significant 
difference between other victims and generalised situations. This appears to suggest 
that child sex offender perspective-taldng skills are extremely deficient towards their 
· own victim(s) and that they have problems also with taking the perspective of other 
victims. 
This may have been a function of the small sample size and high variance with own 
victim perspective-taking. High variance in this case suggests that there is a large 
array of ability, from highly able to complete! y devoid of the ability. This is not 
· surprising given the heterogeneity of child sex offenders. Comparison with the non-
offenders clarifies this issue somewhat. Child sex offenders were significantly less 
able to take the perspective of another person in both generalised and other victim 
situations. Child sex offenders appear to have enduring difficulties with perspective 
taking in general, and considerable difficulties when this involves their own victim 
during, and immediately after, the sexual encounter. 
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This is consistent with the studies that have sought to investigate the perspective-
taking abilities of the sex offender and have uniformly found deficits. Indeed, a 
trend is emerging that signifies that perspective taking deficits are most likely to be 
specific to the victim(s) of the child sex offender. Recent studies that have examined 
the perspective taking abilities of the sex offender have, in fact, found victim-
specific deficits. 
For example, the Victim Empathy Measure (Marshall, Fernandez, Lightbody, & 
O'Sullivan, 1994) assesses the perspective taking abilities of the child sex offender. 
Marshall and his collegues have repeatedly found (1994, 1996) that child sex 
offenders, relative to non-offenders, were similarly accurate at taking i:he perspective 
of the child in their accident victim scale and significantly less able to take the 
perspective of the child in the non-specific sexual abuse scale. Importantly, similar 
to the EAT findings, these sex offenders were especially unable to understand the 
viewpoint of their own victim. 
Hanson and Scott (1995) specifically created the Child Empathy Test to assess the 
perspective-taking abilities of a diverse group of convicted and community sexual 
offenders, and a comparison group of community non-offenders. Similar to the 
EAT, respondents read vignettes involving a child and adult interacting which were 
varied in degrees of abusiveness. Respondents were required to rate how the child 
· described was most likely to feel in each situation. The Child Empathy test did not 
discriminate between the various groups, however the child sex off enders did appear 
to have offence-specific perspective-taking deficits. 
Both of these studies investigating perspective-taking abilities of child sex offenders 
found victim/offence specific deficits. Similarly, the EAT demonstrates that 
· empathic deficits, particularly victim-specific, in child sex offenders emanate with 
their inability to understand the situation from the other person's viewpoint. In 
particular, the child sex offender appears to be able to recognise the victim's 
emotional state, given the situational context, but is unable to fully comprehend 
these emotional states in terms of the offence situation. Importantly, deficiencies at 
this stage, according to the _sequential nature of the empathic process, indicate that it 
· is unlikely that the child sex offender will be able to experience a vicarious emotion 
in response to the emotional state of the victim. 
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Emotional Replication 
The limited ability of the child sex offenders to appreciate the perspective of others, 
particularly their own victims, suggests that emotional replication abilities would be 
low. Indeed this proved to be the case. Child sex offenders had uniform difficulties 
with emotional replication, however these difficulties were not specific to their own 
victim, but evident with all emotion-evoking situations ( own victim, other victims of 
sexual abuse, and generalised). In comparison to their perspective-taking abilities, 
they also appeared to have notable emotional replication difficulties, with scores 
significantly less than their comparative perspective taking scores. 
Given that the child sex offenders were significantly less able to appreciate the 
perspective of other people compared to the control group, it is expected that in 
comparison the child sex offenders would subsequently manifest less ability at the 
emotional replication stage. This was true with the child sex offenders being less 
able to vicarious! y experience the emotional state( s) of other victims of sexual abuse. 
However, the child sex offender and control groups were equally able to take the 
perspective of the children and adults in the generalised situations. 
These findings suggest that, in general, child sex offenders have notable deficits in 
their ability to experience a vicarious emotional state, given that they recognise the 
person's emotional state and are able to take that person's perspective in order to 
comprehend the emotional state fully. Specifically, child sex offenders also had 
· notable deficits towards their own victim, however this was expected due to their 
low victim-specific perspective taking ability. 
Emotional replication is clearly lacking in child sex offenders. This is not an 
inability specifically towards their own victim, or even to other child (potential) 
sexual abuse victim, but a generalised deficiency. Child sex offenders are apparently 
· unable to replicate even a general emotional state of a child, or an adult. It is 
important to speculate why this is the case. It may be that they have only a relatively 
limited emotional range, although there is no evidence for this with the emotional 
awareness data. However, if they do have a limited emotional range, they are then 
able to recognise a wide range of emotional states, have difficulties appreciating the 
observed person's perspective, but do not have an emotional repertoire capable of 
· replicating the observed emotion. Or, they may have marked difficulties in labelling 
their own feelings, in response to another persons distress ( e.g., alexithymia, Taylor, 
1985). For example, if they are emotionally aroused by the distress of their victim, it 
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is possible that they may confuse this emotion with a salient emotional state from 
their limited repertoire such as loneliness, or other emotions commonly associated 
with low self-esteem (Hillbrand, Foster, & Hirt, 1990). 
Consistent with this supposition, a number of theorists have suggested that sex 
offenders may have a limited range of emotions (Groth, 1979; Hillbrand, Foster, & 
Hirt, 1990; Marshall & Barbaree, 1990; Marshall et al., 1995; Scully, 1988). For 
example, rapists are commonly presented as individuals who predominantly 
experience negative emotions such as hate, anger, and power, whereas child sex 
offenders are individuals low in self-esteem, presenting only a limited number of 
emotional states. 
Inconsistencies 
It is important at this point, to refer to the EAT findings, specifically the 
inconsistencies with child sex offenders in comparison to non-offenders. The 
control group were as deficient as the child sex offenders in replicating the 
emotion(s) of the observed individuals in the general situations. This is unexpected 
and difficult to explain, especially as the control group were significantly better with 
the non-specific victim of sexual abuse scenarios. There could be two reasons for 
this inconsistent finding. Firstly, it could be that there were some extremely 
unempathic individuals in the control group, who replicated the emotions of victims 
of sexual abuse purely because it was what they assumed the researcher wanted to 
hear. The high variance for the control group (mean= .86, SD = .67) compared to 
the child sex offenders (mean= .55, SD= .20), suggests that this may have been the 
case. In other words, because the control group were aware that the EAT examined 
emotions, and that they were acting as a comparison group to sex offenders, they 
responded in a socially desirable way to the sexual abuse items. They were, in 
effect, presenting themselves in a favourable manner. 
Secondly, as it seems the control group had difficulties with replicating the observed 
· emotions in the generalised items, it may have been due to the fact that the 
generalised vignettes were not particularly emotionally arousing. This would also 
explain the low emotional replication abilities in non-offenders as well as child sex 
offenders. The innocuous "How does this make you feel?" question also may not 
have accessed non-offenders emotional states, partly through the low levels of 
arousal, and partly through the pairing of the word 'feel'with cognitive states. 
· Respondents may have answered with a cognitive conjecture rather than an affective 
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state that they were feeling (if they were emotionally aroused). For example, one 
subject responded "I hope Charles reacts accordingly" to the How does this make 
you feel?' question for a generalised item. Because the item requires cognitive 
, interpretation, and there are no salient behavioural cues that evoke high levels of 
emotion in the written vignettes, respondents may not have felt emotionally aroused. 
This is a problematic methodological issue with the Emotional Apperception Test 
that needs to be assessed further with a larger number of subjects. 
Of the four stages of the empathy model, emotional replication has been the less 
· amenable to research. Not surprisingly research of the emotional ability of sex 
offenders is predominantly interview based ( e.g., Freeman-Longo, 1986; Gilgun & 
Connor, 1989; Scully, 1988). However, the Emotional Apperception Test findings 
are consistent with these interview based studies which suggest that sex offenders 
may have a limited emotional repertoire, or at least difficulties in accurately labelling 
their own emotional states. Scully (1988), for example, investigated the self and 
victim perceptions of a large sample of incarcerated rapists. The majority of rapists 
reported feeling nothing towards their victim during the actual rape, whereas a 
minority of the rapists expressed a limited range of emotional responses, typically 
anger and hate. Immediately after the rape, the majority again reported either no 
feelings at all, or a limited range of responses such as feeling sexually satisfied. 
Obviously, these responses indicate negligible emotional replication of the distress 
· inflicted upon their victims. A minority of rapists did however report feeling guilt or 
shame. 
Other studies have measured the self-reported general ability of the sex offender to 
experience the emotions of others in an empathic context. These studies have 
commonly used the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983a) which is a 
· general measure of empathy that suggests that empathy consists of four different 
components. One of these components is labelled empathic concern, or the tendency 
to experience feelings of compassion for unfortunate others. Marshall et al. (1995) 
specify that the empathic concern component, at least in part, evaluates vicarious 
emotional responding. 
· Marshall, Jones, Hudson, and McDonald (1993), for example, examined the 
generalised empathic abilities of community and incarcerated child sex offenders. 
They found that emotional replication abilities, as measured by empathic concern did 
not differ between these child sex offender groups. Moreover the empathic concern 
abilities of these sex offenders did not significantly differ from a community sample 
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stated in Salter (1988). Furthermore, the empathic concern scores of these child sex 
offenders were within the normative range supplied by Davis (1980, 1983a). 
Similarly, Hayashino, Wurtele, and Klebe (1995) examined the empathic abilities of 
a variety of incarcerated sex offenders, using the perspective-taking and empathic 
concern components of the IRI (Davis, 1983a). Again, there were no significant 
differences in empathic concern scores between incestuous and extrafamilial child 
sex offenders and the other offending and non-offending groups. 
The studies by Marshall et al. (1993) and Hayashino et al. (1995) both inadvertently 
assessed a generalised emotional replication ability by using self-report measures of 
generalised empathy. Obviously, this kind of test is not able to present the 
situational emotions such as distress and disgust that are prevalent in victims of 
sexual abuse. Arguably then, generalised self-report measures that seem to assess 
emotional replication abilities in sex offenders probably do not do so. A situational 
test, such as the EAT, where the child sex offenders are presented with arousing 
child affective states, is more likely to access their ability to vicariously experience 
these states in response to the situation. These studies therefore do not show an true 
indication of the extent of sex offender emotional replication abilities. 
The EAT finding that child sex offenders were generally deficient in their ability to 
experience the affective states more appropriate to the victim ( or distressed person) 
was consistent with other situational based studies (i.e. interview), but inconsistent 
with selfreported emotional replication studies. Clearly, this suggests that 
situational measures of emotional replication may reveal the true extent of the sex 
offender emotional limitations. However, it may be that the methodological issues 
concerning the assessment of emotional replication may obscure the real emotional 
replication abilities of child sex offenders. Notwithstanding these possible 
methodological problems, it is, however, clear that child sex offenders do have 




The Emotional Apperception Test provided a clear indication of the extent and true 
nature of empathy deficits in the child sex offender. In doing so, it has, to a large 
extent; ameliorated the confusion relating to the conception of empathy, its 
measurement, and the actual empathic capacity of the sex offender. It has also 
. presented a focus for future research, which will further define sex offender empathy 
deficits. Methodologically, the Emotional Apperception Test was reliable and valid 
to the extent that it clearly discriminated empathic ability. The results were thus 
meaningful and provided clear patterns that were generally consistent with 
expectations based on recent empirical findings. Moreover, it was shown that age 
and other demographic variables did not significantly influence responding on the 
EAT. The principal findings to emerge from the administration of the EAT are as 
follows. 
• The Emotional Apperception Test demonstrated that the empathic capacity of the 
child sex offender did not vary across two stages of the offence chain. The 
dynamic nature of affect and cognitive processes during, and immediately after, 
the actual sexual encounter suggests that empathic ability may also fluctuate. 
Contrary to expectations, emotional awareness, perspective taking, and 
emotional replication abilities were consistent during, and immediately 
following, the sexual encounter with the child. Child sex off enders were 
unempathic throughout these offence-specific stages of their offence chain. 
• As predicted, the child sex offenders presented salient victim-specific empathy 
deficits. This is consistent with recent theorising and empirical research that 
suggests that child sex offenders demonstrate a significant inability to empathise 
with their own victim(s). In comparison, the offenders were more able to 
manifest empathy towards other victims of sexual abuse and generalised 
emotion-evoking situations. They showed a similar level of empathy to both 
these sce.narios. However, they were still deficient in comparison to a group of 
non-offenders who presented significantly higher levels of empathy to other 
sexual abuse victims and other generalised situations. This suggests the child sex 
offenders were generally less empathic than non-offenders. 
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• The Emotional Apperception Test was able to discern where, in the four-stage 
empathy model, victim specific empathy deficits emanated. 
• Relative to non-offenders, child sex offenders did not display any 
difficulties in recognising the emotional state(s) of their victim, other 
victims, or other persons in general. Their level of emotional 
awareness (stage 1) was equivocal towards each of these situational 
categories. 
• Empathic deficits emerged with their inability to take the perspective 
of another person (stage 2). Relative to the non-offenders, the child 
sex offenders presented significant perspective taking deficits. They 
were significantly unable to appreciate another person's perspective, 
in general situations, with other sexual abuse victims, and most 
significantly towards their own victim(s). This suggests that they 
were eminently unable to fully comprehend the emotional state(s) 
elicited by their victim, thus unable to understand what these 
emotions meant in terms of the offending situation. 
• Not surprisingly, given their low perspective taking ability, the child 
sex offenders' demonstrated a clear inability to experience a vicarious 
emotional response to the distress of others. They were generally 
unable to replicate the emotional state(s) experienced by all other 
persons in all situations (stage 3), however they displayed pronouned 
emotional replication deficits towards their own victim. Given that 
they demonstrated victim specific perspective taking deficits, and that 
the four-stage model is sequential, this was not unexpected. An 
unexpected result was obtained, however, in relation to the non-
offenders. They, as anticipated, were better at replicating the 
emotional states of sexual abuse victims, but were equally inept at 
replicating the emotions of persons in general everyday situations. 
This was a confusing, yet interesting, artefact of the EAT results. 
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Chapter 7 
Limitations and their resolutions 
This was the first attempt to create an empathy measure that is designed to 
circumvent existing methodological and conceptual problems concerning the lack of 
empathy in sex offenders. Due to the rudimentary nature of the research, some basic 
limitations should be noted. These limitations can be grouped into two sections. 
The first describing broad general limitations, the second detailing more specific 
Emotional Apperception Test weaknesses. 
General Limitations 
Sex offenders as subjects 
Child sex offenders are clearly a heterogeneous group, from which many offender 
· typologies have been generated to aid in assessment and treatment (Knight & 
Prentky, 1990). The current study, in view of a lack of empathy being a presumed 
critical and common characteristic of the child sex offender and the preliminary 
nature of the EAT, did not distinguish between any offender typologies, such as the 
MTC:CMI (Knight & Prentky, 1990) and 'fixated'versus regressed' offenders 
(Groth, 1979). Cross-validation of the EAT to these and other offender typologies 
· would greatly enhance it's applicability. In particular, the attachment typologies 
recently developed by Ward, Hudson, and Marshall (1995) would be of particular 
interest due to attachment and empathy being functionally linked (see Eisenberg & 
Strayer, 1987). 
The cmTent study used incarcerated child sex off enders who had volunteered for 
· treatment at a medium security treatment programme. Finkelhor (1986) and Hall 
and Hirschman (1993) argue that such a sample is particularly biased by reporting 
and judicial procedures. The child sex offenders are incarcerated, and therefore 
possibly more likely to be more prolific and/or extreme offenders, and are 
volunteering for treatment which infers that they admitted to their offending. 
Moreover, incarceration tends to present self-presentation biases, whereby the 
· offender attempts to present himself in as favourable manner as possible. 
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These factors may limit the generalisability of the EAT to other child sex offending 
populations. The obvious solution is to expand the population of child sex offenders 
· covered by the EAT, to include those living in the community and testing these in 
comparison to incarcerated offenders. Recent research generally follows an 
experimentation paradigm where non-offenders, non-violent offenders, violent 
offenders, rapists, and child sex offenders are used (Ward, Hudson, Marshall, & 
Siegeli, 1995). The use of these groups allows for the confounding effects such as 
incarceration and levels of violence. 
Sample size· 
Small sample size was another obvious limitation of the study. The sample of child 
sex offenders, the control group of community controls, and the 'expert'population 
that established the criterion responses were all small groups (n = 20). These 
relatively small groups may not reflect the true scope and extent of empathic abilities 
of each population. In particular, a larger group of 'expelis' would have strengthened 
the criteria that is used for the EAT (Kline, 1986). Large sample sizes are essential 
to strong results (Kline, 1993 ), especially in this instance when a new measure has 
been created. Future validation of the EAT must use larger sample sizes. 
· Emotional Apperception Test Weaknesses 
Creating a new psychometric measure is invariably a difficult task especially when 
the rationale is largely based on pragmatism (Kline, 1986). The EAT was no 
exception to this heuristic. Indeed there are several possible weaknesses and 
limitations that should be considered when administrating the EAT. These range 
· from simple design factors such as the length and the subsequent time taken to 
complete the EAT, to more psychometrically serious factors that may negate the 
discriminating ability of the EAT. 
Length of EAT 
• The first, and most observable, potential weakness is the length of time taken to 
complete the EAT. Due to the open-ended responding required in the EAT, the test 
takes longer to complete than a simple rating scale. The respondent has to read, 
process, and interpret each of the written vignettes. The scenario in each vignette is 
matched to personal and societal schemata in order to assess the emotional state(s) 
that the individual in question is most likely to exhibit. Then the respondent has to 
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atiiculate his response. Obviously this is a time consuming process. Indeed, the 
EAT actually took the child sex offenders about 90 minutes (on average) to 
complete. The question is whether this length of time is clinically applicable. Both 
Kline (1993) and Fife-Shaw (1995) suggest any psychometric test that amounts to 
• more than 45 minutes may be susceptible to bias, either from boredom or fatigue. 
The obvious·remedy is to decrease the amount of vignettes from 24 to perhaps 16 by 
removing 4 vignettes from the each situational specificity in section B. The 
vignettes to be removed would be those that contributed least to the test. Internal 
reliability testing (i.e. item-total correlations) can be used to identify the least 
effective vignettes. 
This long length of time taken to complete the EAT involves processing a large 
number of affect arousing vignettes. It has been suggested that presenting a series of 
stimuli vignettes may 'overload'the empathic capacity of the individual (Strayer, 
1987). The presentation of a number of vignettes requiring the interpretation (and 
experience) of different emotional states, may lead to the respondent being unable to 
differentiate their emotional reactions, or in fact to be emotionally aroused over the 
whole extent of the test. Recognition of different emotional states would therefore 
be difficult. However, this notion of overloading is very much an empirical question 
that has yet to be tested (Davis, 1994). Perhaps to investigate this phenomenon, a 
primacy versus recency comparison could be undertaken. Responding to generalised 
questions, for example, could be compared at the beginning and at the end of the 
. test. A significant difference may mean that empathic responding is restricted 
towards the end of the test due to the constant evocation of emotional arousal. 
Open-ended format 
There are also the methodological limitations involved in using an open-ended 
. response format. For instance, the respondent articulating emotional states presents 
a potential problem of contextual meaning (Batson, 1987). Unidimensional words 
may for different people have a different meaning, or intensity. Words may also 
have multiple meanings depending on context. The adjectives used by the 
respondent to desctibe the interpretation of the emotional state(s) involved varied 
considerably depending on verbal ability. For example, respondents may use words 
. that have not been used by experts in the criteria such as "I feel like a shit-house". 
The independent raters were required to interpret the meaning of these adjectives. 
Seemingly, this would increase the amount of independent rater coding errors. 
However, the high inter-rater reliability suggests that the successful procedure 
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adapted from Ickes and colleagues (1993), together with the concise criteria created 
by collapsing a large range of emotional descriptors enabled consistent coding. 
Subjectivity of criteria 
A potential weakness of the EAT is the reliance on the 'expert' sample to establish 
the criteria. The validity of the criteria rests on the plausible assumption that the 
psychological 'expert' sample are collectively highly empathic, when this fact is not 
known. It was only assumed that these experts were, in fact, highly empathic 
individuals, although the literature suggests that this assumption was justified. The 
solution is obviously to test these experts on general empathy measures ( e.g., IRI, 
Davis, 1983a) to establish whether they were highly empathic in comparison to the 
normative data provided with the general tests. 
The establishment of a criterion was also a problem for the own victim items, which 
relate to the child sex offender's most recent sexual encounter with a child. The 
offender's own description of the events taking place acted as the vignette that the 
offender interpreted in te1ms of the emotional states involved. Consequently, there 
was no explicit criterion for section A. Obviously the sample of 'experts' were not 
able to furnish the highly empathic responses, as in section B. The independent 
· raters therefore congruently assessed the competency of the offenders'based on a set 
of semi-structured instructions. The independent raters essentially acted as the 
experts. This clearly may increase the level of subjectivity involved in coding. As 
subjectivity in coding is known to increase the number of potential coding e1Tors 
(Fife-Shaw, 1995) this is problematic. However, the high inter-rater reliability 
suggests that the independent raters used the same criteria based on the semi-
. structured instructions to judge empathic competency. 
Emotional replication is one of the stages of empathy assessed by the Emotional 
Apperception Test. However, this has been particularly problematic to assess in past 
measurements of empathy (Davis, 1994; Strayer, 1987), and the EAT proved to be 
no exception. Both the child sex offender's and the community control group scored 
· lowly on emotional replication ability. The reasons conjectured for this were that: 
(a) the vignettes were not particularly emotionally arousing, (b) the question aimed 
at accessing this ability may have been too ambiguous or innocuous to evoke 
accurate responding (this was also relevant to the own victim items), and/or (c) it 
may have lead to an expectation that cognitive responses were required, ( d) the issue 
of similarity between responding and the criteria, or ( e) emotional replication items 
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are the most susceptible to self-presentation biases. Any, or all, of these issues may 
have obscured any real deficits or discriminations between the respondent groups. 
Access to a respondent's ability to vicariously experience the emotional state(s) of 
the individual in question may best be accessed by physiological measures (see next 
· section). 
Evidently, there are a number of (potential) weaknesses in this study. However, the 
advantages of using a new measure, or at least the attempt to avoid the current 
methodological and conceptual confusion concerning empathy in sex offenders, 
argues for the future development of the EAT. To further our knowledge towards 
· assessment and treatment of the sex offender and in particular the concept of victim 
empathy, it is imperative that we endeavour to expand promising yet enigmatic 
research methods in the face of subversity from those who emphasise objective 
methods to the exclusion of other more pragmatic yet relevant methods. 
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Chapter 9 
Future Research Suggestions 
Research implications 
The Emotional Apperception Test has revealed that child sex offenders have 
significant victim-specific empathy deficits. This is an important finding. The next 
stage is to consider the research and clinical implications of this finding, particularly 
the causal mechanisms that generate victim-specific empathy deficits. Empathy has, 
of course, been seen as a critical characteristic of the sex offender. But until 
recently, the exact nature and extent of these empathy difficulties has not been 
known. The study of empathy deficits in sex offenders has been hampered by a lack 
of a framework to guide model building and empirical research. Now that is clear 
that empathy deficits are predominantly specific to their own victim(s), and that 
· specific deficits exist particularly within perspective taking and emotional replication 
abilities, the foundation exists from which to construct a framework of empathy 
deficits in sex offenders. 
As yet, this model of empathic deficits in sex offenders has not been formulated. 
The following is a brief description of important mechanisms behind victim-specific 
· deficits in child sex offenders based on the EAT and recent literature findings. It is 
not a model,' or even a framework of sex offender empathy deficits, but a description 
of three mechanisms that may influence the manifestation of empathy in the child 
sex offender considerably. A brief descriptive model is presented as a summaiy of 
the mechanisms most likely to influence the manifestation of victim-specific 
empathy deficits. Future reassert should endeavour to further develop this model. 
The manifestation of victim-specific empathy deficits in sex offenders 
It is suggested that sex offender empathy deficits are best considered a function of 
the distorted patterns of thinking evident in the sex offender, that serve to rationalise 
and justify their inappropriate sexual behaviours with children (Abel et al., 1989; 
· Stermac & Segal, 1989; Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 1996). However, it is 
also clear that these cognitive distortions fluctuate throughout the offence chain of 
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the offender, depending on sexual arousal and affective states (Ward, Louden, 
Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). Subsequently, another related mechanism that has been 
· suggested to influence the empathic capacity of the sex offender, particularly during 
the sexual offence, is cognitive deconstruction, a process whereby the offender 
attempts to avoid negative self-awareness (Ward, Hudson, & Marshal, 1995). 
In order to further our ability to assess and treat the sex offender, it is necessary to 
extent our knowledge of the role of these mechanisms that function to reduce 
· feelings of remorse and guilt before, during, and after the offence, therefore 
producing a iack of victim empathy. This is particularly important given that the 
Emotional Apperception Test found that sex offenders are deficient in victim 
empathy both during and immediately following the offence. Only once we have 
fully examined the causal mechanisms, during and after the offence, of victim-
specific empathy, will we be able to design and develop complete assessment and 
· treatment programmes for empathy deficits. 
Empathy deficiencies manifested preceding and during sexual encounter 
Empathic deficiencies directly preceding and during the actual sexual encounter are 
particularly important because at this stage, victim distress cues such as fear and 
· disgust are especially salient. The offender needs to be unaware of, or reduce, block, 
or suspend any awareness of victim harm in order to maintain a lack of empathy that 
allows the offending behaviour to continue without inhibition. It is suggested that 
the concept of cognitive deconstruction (Baumeister, 1991; Ward, Hudson, & 
Marshall, 1995) is a plausible mechanism that holds considerable promise in 
explaining victim-specific empathic deficiencies directly preceding, and during, an 
· offence (Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995; Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 
1996; Marshall, 1996). 
Cognitive deconstruction is the process by which individuals attempt to avoid the 
negative implications of their behaviour and subsequent negative self-evaluations 
(Baumeister, 1991 ). In the sex offender, this process both predisposes and 
· perpetuates further sexually inappropriate behaviours. Essentially, entering a 
cognitively deconstructed state is the equivalent to focusing self-awareness on the 
most basic lower level feelings and awareness. In a cognitively deconstructed state 
the sex offender concentrates on proximal goals and actions, such as sexual pleasure, 
essentially natTowing his temporal awareness and suspending any appreciation of the 
wider implications of his behaviour (e.g., victim distress and harm) (Ward, Hudson, 
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& Marshall, 1995). Moreover, an awareness of emotion, both of the self and victim, 
is most probably absent. 
. This reliance on lower level perceptions during the offence suggests that empathic 
capabilities would be suspended in order for the offender to concentrate on proximal 
pleasurable actions. In this sense, victim-specific empathy deficits are manifested 
through the offender entering a cognitively deconstructed state whereby preference 
is for immediate gratification and this focus on pleasurable bodily sensations means 
the offender is not acutely concerned for the welfare of the victim and would not 
evaluate his actions negatively. Any recognition of distress or harm inflicted upon 
his victim is able to be suspended in order to focus on these proximal lower level 
goals (Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). So, by virtue of the cognitively 
deconstructed state the offender may suspend usual judgement processes and self-
regulatory behaviour to allow the offending behaviour to continue without the 
inhibitory feelings of guilt and remorse. 
In terms of tp_e empathy process (Marshall et al., 1995), this is particularly relevant 
to the perspective taking ability of the offender. Consistent with the Emotional 
Apperception Test findings, the offender may be able to recognise the emotional 
state(s) of his victim, but is unable to fully comprehend the meaning of these states 
by being unable to take the perspective of the victim. Focusing on the lower level 
bodily sensations is likely to diminish the cognitive ability of the offender in terms 
of his perspective taking abilities. The offender does not think of the implications of 
the distress cues elicited by the victim. This lack of comprehension means that the 
offender is very unlikely to experience a vicarious emotional state congruent to that 
of his victim. 
Empathy deficiencies manifested after the sexual encounter 
Sex offenders are obviously able to maintain victim-specific empathy deficits due to 
their inability to feel empathy for their victim(s) in an assessment context, as 
opposed to during the actual sexual encounter. If cognitive deconstruction is the 
mechanism that induces victim-specific empathy deficits, then the cognitive 
distortions that sex offenders manifest preceding, and following, the sexual 
encounter may the mechanism with which empathic deficits are maintained. 
Cognitive distortions are basically self-serving maladaptive beliefs and distorted 
ways of thinking, that are emanate to deny, minimise, and justify sexual offending 
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(Abel et al., 1989). These cognitive distortions serve to lessen the awareness of 
victim harm and subsequent negative self-evaluative feelings that arise following a 
sexual encounter with a child. For example, passivity or compliance on the part of 
the victim is seen as confirmatory evidence that the victim enjoyed the sexual abuse 
(Murphy, 1990). Essentially, the offender in this case, is unable to take the 
· perspective of the victim as he is confusing the emotional state of the child. He is 
able to recognise this stage, but unable to adequately comprehend these emotional 
states. Clearly, the offender to unlikely vicariously experience these emotional 
states. So, it seems that to justify their past offending the sex offender is likely to 
deliberately adopt a lack of empathy for his victim(s) in order to reduce the negative 
self-evaluative feelings (Abel et al., 1989; Marshall et al., 1995) that are likely to 
accompany offending. 
This will lead to a persistent pattern of behaviour in which the sex offender can 
effectively reduce or eliminate negative feelings following an offending situation. 
Essentially then, the sex offender suspends his capacity for empathy towards the 
victim in order to justify his behaviour and this follows, rather than precedes the 
. behaviour (Abel et al., 1989). However, the cyclic nature of offending behaviour 
would mean that the adoption of these distorted rationalisations and justifications 
would also serve to reduce empathy preceding an offence situation, and maintain 
offending as they would persist and strengthen over subsequent offending situations. 
The Effects of Similarity (situational specificity) 
The two mechanisms described thus far are important to all the stages of the 
empathy model. According to the Emotional Apperception Test results, victim-
specific empathy deficits manifest particularly during the perspective taking 
information processing stage. One factor that may influence the appreciation of the 
victims' perspective is the similarity between the victim and the offender. 
It has generally been thought that a greater similarity between the observer and the 
observed person is likely to increase the likelihood of an empathic response from the 
observer (Davis, 1994; Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Eisenberg & 
Strayer, 1987; Marshall et al., 1995; Stotland, 1969). This has assumed a degree of 
importance in the research of aggression in humans (see Bandura, 1973). 
In terms of the empathy model (Marshall et al., 1995) similarity is of the greatest 
importance at the perspective taking stage. Greater similarity enables the subject to 
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more readily take the victim's perspective. The more similar the observed person, 
the easier it is to put oneself in their shoes and take their perspective of events. 
Because the EAT found vic;tim-specific empathy deficits to manifest at the 
perspective taking stage, similarity becomes an important factor. 
Less empathy would be expressed towards people that the sex offender sees as 
different from himself, such as children and/or women. This seems plausible, that 
child sex offenders are more able to emotionally associate with accident victims 
rather than with their own victim or other victims. However, Marshall et al. (1994, 
1995) have found that child molesters were equally able to show empathy towards 
sexual abuse victims other than their own victim, and general child accident victims. 
Importantly, this showed that child molesters were able to empathise with children in 
general, whom the child molester should have seen as dissimilar. Importantly, the 
EAT found child sex offenders to be generally unempathic, but having marked 
victim-specific deficits. Sex offenders had difficulties empathising with children in 
general. However, it was not investigated whether these offenders were more 
empathic in the generalised vignettes that consisted of two adults interacting. This 
issue is certainly worth pursuing further. 
Introducing a descriptive model of victim-specific empathy deficits for future 
research 
It is now appropriate to tie together these factors that may influence the evocation of 
victim empathy in sex offenders. Figure 2 is a simple descriptive model of the 
manifestation of victim-specific empathy deficits. It presents a summary of the 
factors that may impact on the ability of the sex offender to be empathic towards his 
victim(s). Each of the factors has been mentioned in the discussion of the Emotional 
· Apperception Test results. Future research on victim-specific empathy deficits could 
use a similar model to fully assess individual sex offender empathic capabilities. It 
is necessary that the influence of each of these factors is determined in order to 
provide precise assessment and treatment of the sex offender. 
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Figure 2. A descriptive model of the factors that may manifest victim-specific 












If the Emotional Apperception Test is to be applicable in clinical settings, further efforts 
must be made to assess its reliability and validity, the two prerequisites for a good 
psychometric instrument (Kline, 1993; Hammond, 1995). It is essential that future 
research can provide a fuller estimate of the EA T's consistency, particularly when one 
acknowledges that reliability is a prerequisite of validity (Kline, 1986; Guildford, 1956). 
In order to show that the EAT is self-consistent (reliable) and consistent over time it is 
necessary that internal reliability estimates are made with large sample sizes. Moreover, 
test-retest estimates (Guildford, 1956) must be made to ensure that the EAT is consistent 
over time. 
It is also essential to further assess the validity of the EAT. In order to see if the EAT is 
measuring what it supposed to measure, a large number of respondents are needed to 
validate the test and provide normative data. There is a lack of existing tests with which 
to compare the EAT to, however convergent and divergent validity tests should be 
unde1iaken. For an example of convergent validity testing, the EAT could be compared 
to the Abel's Cognitive Distortions Questionnaire (Abel, Gore, Holland, Camp, Becker, 
& Rathner, 1989). Presumably, lower empathy scores on the EAT, particularly victim-
specific, would correlate with high levels of distorted thinking. To test its divergent 
validity, the EAT could be correlated against the Marlowe-Crowne Scale of social 
desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). A negative relationship would be expected. 
It is also important to test the validity of the EAT with respect to the empathy model 
(Marshall et al., 1995). The empathy reconceptualisation conceives of empathy as a four 
stage sequential model. Whether the EAT results support the sequential nature of the 
model is yet to be assessed. This could be examined in terms of conditional 
probabilities. For example, if the respondent has a high level of emotional replication 
(stage 3), then according to this model, they must have had, firstly a high level of 
emotional awareness, and secondly a high level of perspective taking ability. This needs 
to be assessed further. 
EAT Design 
The Emotional Apperception Test was able to provide informative material on the first 
three stages of the empathy model (Marshall et al., 1995). In order to fully assess the 
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empathic ability of the sex offender, it is imperative that the response decision stage 
(stage 4 of empathy model) is somehow incorporated into the future revisions of the 
EAT. This win indicate the behavioural response of the respondent to his (lack of) 
empathic feelings. For example, simply asking a behavioural question such as "If you 
were watching this situation, what would you do?" or something similar may access the 
decision of the respondent whether to act on the basis of his feelings or not. This 
question would control for offenders who do have the empathic capacity needed to 
inhibit their offending, but are able to choose to ignore this inhibition. This is an 
important point that needs futiher clarification. It is highly likely that sex offenders are 
able to suspend their empathic capabilities in order to offend. 
Accessing Transitory States 
Also important to the suspension ( or lack of) empathy is the issue of transitory states. 
Davis (1994) has suggested that high arousal manifested by transitory states may 
override empathic abilities. Sexual arousal, alcohol, and negative affective states all 
may therefore impede on the sex offender's empathic ability during the offence chain. 
These factors are not surprisingly impmiant in the manifestation of a cognitively 
deconstructed state (Baumeister, 1991) and are commonly present, to some extent, in the 
off ending context. 
Victim empathy may therefore differ dramatically in an assessment context as compared 
to the actual offending behaviour (Lipton et al., 1987; Marshall et al., 1995). This is 
quite logical, that emotional states differ in an emotionally aroused offending state 
compared to the comparatively disaroused state evident in assessment contexts. 
Therefore, to accurately access the actual victim empathy of the sex offender, ideally 
assessment should take place in as naturalistic a setting as possible. The optimal context 
would be when the offender is disinhibited by one, or more, of the transitory states 
(negative affect, sexual arousal, alcohol, social contagion) at which the sexual offending 
occurred, and is likely to be in a deconstructed state. 
Obviously though, this poses methodological and particularly ethical problems. To 
induce a sexual offender into a sexually aroused or angry state requires considerable care 
and consideration. Furthermore, if ethical constraints were surpassed, it would be 
imperative to sustain this transitory state for the duration of the EAT in order to 
adequately access offender empathic ability in different situational categories. This may 
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be difficult due to the cognitive processes required to respond to the assessment. These 
may tend to ove1Tide arousal levels (Hanson & Scott, 1995). However, it may be that 
the use of videotaped stimuli could induce similar offence-specific emotional states in 
the offender. It seems necessary that the emotional arousal be measured during the 
empathy asses.sment context, particularly if videotaped stimuli vignettes are used. 
Demand Characteristics 
Presently, the vignettes in the EAT are presented in narrative, in which characters are 
described and pmirayed in contexts likely to evoke emotional responses from the 
respondent. A reasonable level of cognitive ability is therefore required to process the 
information presented in a written form. It has been suggested that this may be an 
inappropriate demand characteristic to access emotional states (Eisenberg & Miller, 
1987; Feshbach, 1978; Iannotti, 1978; Strayer, 1987). 
Intuitively, the use of videotaped vignettes (visual and audio) would provide more 
behavioural cues, such as verbal, tonal, postural, and facial to allow the respondent to 
process the situation more readily (Davis, 1994; Hanson & Scott, 1995; Strayer, 1987). 
These important situational cues are currently inaccessible in the EAT, and would 
increase respondent emotional arousal. This may circumvent existing problems with 
assessment of emotional replication ability. The use of video vignettes would further 
control for the possibly confounding effects of education, and verbal ability in the 
recognition of emotional states, thus enhancing at the very least the face validity of the 
EAT. This is not a new procedure with sex offenders. Lipton et al (1987) successfully 
used video taped vignettes to assess heterosexual social inf01mation processing of 
rapists, while Rice et al. (1994) and Chaplin, Rice, and Harris (1995) have both used 
audio and/or visual scenarios to assess generalised empathy in sex offenders. However, 
for the EAT, a problem arises with the use of video and the assessment ofvictim-
specific empathy. Presenting the off ender's own victim situation and measuring the 
consequential empathy is problematic for this procedure. 
Physiological measures in conjunction with the EAT? 
Recently, empathy researchers have stressed the need for more objective and sensitive 
measures of empathy (Batson, 1987, Davis, 1994, Eisenberg & Farbes, 1990). 
Eisenberg and Farbes (1990), for example, suggest empathy could, perhaps should, be 
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measured using physiological and/or facial indices. They suggest that these could be 
used in conjunction with self report and would, at least theoretically, be of particular use 
when a negative or differentiated affective state was induced (p. 142). 
The advantage of using a variety of physiological assessment is that emotional arousal 
tends to be associated with changes in physiological responses as assessed by skin 
conductance, heart rate, skin temperature, vasoconstriction, and EMG procedures (see 
Eisenberg, Fabes, Bustamante, & Mathy, 1987). Thus, a purely objective measure of 
emotional arousal is possible. The problem however, is that these measures are largely 
undifferentiated, so it is not easy to distinguish between specific affective states. 
However Stotland (1969) and Krebs (1975) have shown that the use of both 
physiological and self report enables specific labelling of emotional arousal, in terms of 
an empathy situation. Given that both self report and physiological measures could be 
used together, a measure of skin conductance in association with the emotional 
replication reporting on the EAT could give a good indication of (a) the strength of the 
vicarious emotional response, and (b) whether the respondent was merely projecting an 
emotional state. 
This could aid in the identification and reduction in self-presentation biases that may be 
prevalent in typical questionnaire-only measures of empathic ability. Specifically, 
physiological measures used in conjunction with the EAT could possibly measure 
emotional arousal across the situational categories. The assumption would be that for 
victim-specific situations, arousal would be either high or low depending on the 
offenders self reported feelings. If the offender reported feeling nothing for the victim, 
these measures would be low, however if the offender reported remorse and guilt, then 
presumably this would register to some extent on a physiological measure considering 
these feelings should induce emotional arousal. These physiological measures could 
~lso be used to assess emotional arousal between the groups of subjects. 
Phallometric assessments could be used to examine the extent to which sexual arousal 
contributes to a lack of empathy. Presumably, the greater the sexual arousal in the child 
sex offender, the less able he will be to feel empathy towards the person in question. In 
this sense, sexual arousal may function as a inhibitor of empathy. This is explained by 
cognitive deconstruction theory (Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1995). Again, the 
measurement of sexual arousal could be used to measured across the different situational 
categories. It is expected that sexual arousal should be greatest when the offender is 
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presented with visual/audio stimuli that represent an offending situation similar to his 
own. 
Sex Offenders 
The EAT was designed to assess victim empathy in the child sex offender. Child sex 
offenders are, however, a heterogeneous population. Given the conglomerate of 
offender categories it is plausible that offenders in each category may manifest different 
empathic capabilities. The first step would be to administer the EAT to community 
based child sex offenders. The next step in developing the EAT (and assessing sex 
offender empathy) is to expand the instrument ( or develop variations of) so that it can 
assess the empathic abilities of different sex offenders typologies. Of particular interest 
would be the investigation of the extent and nature of empathy in different attachment 
typologies of child molesters (Hudson et al., 1995; Ward et al., 1995; Ward et al., 1996), 
especially since empathy and attachment are functionally linked. 
Of course, different child sex offenders may react differently to different vignettes. This 
would be expected especially with obviously important variables such as victim gender, 
age, and relationship to the offender (Stermac & Segal, 1989). This is important to the 
concept of victim-specificity. It may be that the offence pattern or behaviour may be the 
extent to which specificity should apply. Future research should consider these variables 
when assessing the empathic abilities of sex offenders. Moreover, since assessment and 
treatment are associated, it is pertinent that empathy assessment is done at both pre- and 
post-treatment as an evaluation of empathy treatment effects (Marshall, 0 'Sullivan, & 
Fernandez, 1996). A variation of the Emotional Apperception Test should also be 
created to measure victim-specific empathic competency in rapists and other offender 
populations such as violent offenders. Vignettes in a version of the EAT for rapists 
would involve adult persons and ambiguous rape type scenarios, obviously adhering to 
the principles that directed the construction of the EAT. 
All these variations of the EAT are pertinent to the accurate assessment and treatment of 
the child sex offender. If the research implications and future research suggestions are 
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Emotional Reactivity Index 
Information and consent 
You are invited to participate in the first stage of a research project, examining empathy in sex 
offenders. Empathy is conceptually thought as being a multicomponent process, whereby 
different components are each important to the content of an empathic response. This 
questionnaire will be used to develop an instrument that will measure each of these stages that are 
essential to an empathic response. From this initial study, questions will be chosen for inclusion 
in a further study administered to sex offenders. These questions will be based on your 
cumulative responses to this questionnaire. This will enable a more specific and accurate 
definition of empathy to be used to assess empathy deficits within various offender types, such as 
violent and sexual offenders. 
All that is required is that you complete the following questionnaire which is entirely anonymous, 
and you will not be identified as an informant. Due to the sensitive nature of this study, you may 
at any time withdraw your pa1ticipation, including withdrawal of any infonnation you have 
provided. By completing the questionnaire, however, it will be understood that you have 
consented to participate in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the 
project with th(; understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
Importantly, due to the sometimes sensitive nature of the stories that you will read, a list of phone 
help lines are attached to the end of this questionnaire for your use if deemed necessa1y. To 
reiterate, you may withdraw your participation from this study at any time. This questionnaire 
will take approximately 25-30 minutes to complete. Thank you for your time. 
This study is being carried out by Jayson Ware who can be contacted during office hours at 
University (ph. 366-7001, ext. 7190) with any questions or concerns. 
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The Emotional Reactivity Index 
Instructions 
You will read brief stories involving two persons in various circumstances. Some of the stories 
· may involve an abusive/hannful situation, whereas others may involve a nonabusive/nonharmful 
situation. In some other stories, it may be quite difficult to tell whether the situation is hannful or 
not. You are simply asked to weigh up each situation in terms of the various factors involved and 
give your best guess as to how the individual in question is feeling in each st01y. The age of the 
individuals in each story change, so be careful to consider how a person of each age group would 
feel about the situation. It is important to note that there are no right or wrong answers, so all that 
is required is your best judgement for each story. Please answer each question, even when you 
are not sure of your answer. 
This questionnaire is enirely anonymous and you may at any time withdraw your participation. 
By completing the questionnaire, however, it will be understood that you have consented to 
particpate in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the project with the 
understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
Demographic Details 
Please indicate your gender ( circle correct gender) 
1. Male 2. Female. 




Rebecca, age 9, and her best friend Julie were playing on the swing at Rebecca's house. Julie 
started swinging harder an harder until the swing broke. Rebecca's mother came running out 
when she heard the noise. She saw the broken swing and told Julie to go home, and Rebecca to 
go to her room. She blamed Rebecca for breaking the swing. Rebecca is most likely feeling 
(circle your best guess) 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. · slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 2. 
One Saturday morning, Sarah, age 12, was walking home from the local shops by herself. 
Just before she reached the end of the street, John, age 36, who had been drinking all night 
failed to stop at a red light, lost control of his car and slammed into Sarah, crushing her into a 
wall. Sarah suffered massive internal injuries as well as numerous broken bones. She is now 
out of hospital but will live with a permanent disability and is afraid to walk alone next to a 
road. Sarah most likely feels 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 3. 
Richard, age 30, caught the bus to town one Saturday morning. He almost missed the bus and 
only got to the bus stop just in time. Even now he was running late for a meeting in town and was 
hoping that the bus would not stop again on the way into town. The bus stopped at an 
intersection, and Richard saw an elderly woman trying to wave down the bus so it would stop for 
him. The bus driver did not see the old woman and can·ied on. Richard would most likely feel 
1. very upset or unhappy .. 
· 2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4 neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 4. 
A man is walking down the street. An eight year old girl approaches the man and asks him 
directions. They have seen each other in the neighbourhood, but they have not met before. They 
talk briefly. The girl is smiling. Before she leaves, the man gives her a hug and a kiss. As she 
leaves, the girl is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
· 4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 5. 
Keren, age 13, was walking to the dairy. It is a warm summers day and she is wearing shorts and 
a T-shirt. On the way there, she passes a single sex high school for boys. Even though school has 
finished there are still alot of boys sitting around by the gates. As she walks past, one of the boys 
says, "Nice day isn't it"?. Keren has never seen this boy before. She says, "Yeah, it is", and 
continues walking past. The boy then says, "And you look nice, too". When Keren hears this, 
she is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. cannot tell, neutral. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 6. 
· Terry, age 23, had a particularly bad day. He got fired from work, and on his way home got a 
ticket for speeding. He decided to stop at the pub on the way home. When he arrived home, he 
was drunk and extremely angry. He crept into his daughter's bedroom and climbed into bed with 
her. He woke her up and whispered that she was the only one who really understood him. His 
daughter most likely would feel 
1. ve1y upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
· 4. cannot tell, neutral. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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. Question 7. 
Jack has a good relationship with his daughter, Tracey, who is now turning 13. Jack still 
occasionally tucks Tracey into bed at night. One night, Jack sits on the edge of Tracey's bed and 
rnbs her back. He then massages her shoulders. She tells her father that she has had enough 
massage, and that she would like to go to sleep now. Jack gives her a kiss on her forehead, and 
leaves. Tracey is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. cannot tell, neutral. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 8. 
· Stuart, age 18, often comes to play with his nephew, Chris, age 12. They often play sports. One 
day, Stuart brings Chris a couple of magazines with pictures of naked women. When asked ifhe 
wanted to see them, Chris said yes. As they look at the magazines, Stuart notices from a bump in 
Clnis' pants that Chris is getting an erection (hard-on). Stuart reaches over and touches the bump 
in Chris's pants. Cln·is is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
· 4. cannot tell, neutral. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 9. 
Katie, age 7, fell off a swing and brnised and cut her back and bottom. Her mother took her to see 
. Dr. Reid, age 43, who was their family doctor. Dr. Reid cleaned the cuts, and put plasters on 
Katie's bottom As he did this, he told Katie that she was a brave little girl and that the cuts 
would heal quickly. Before Katie left, Dr. Reid gave her a small kiss on her forehead. Katie 
would most likely feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. cannot tell, neutral. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 10. 
Stefan, age 34, works until late at night. When he arrives home he always checks on his daughter 
Rachael, age 9, to see if she is alright. One night, he sees that she is tossing and turning in her 
sleep. He sits on the bed next to her, kisses her on the cheek, and cuddles her tightly. Rachael 
wakes up with a fright, but sees that it is her father. Rachael is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset orunhappy. 
4. cannot tell, neutral. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 11. 
Lisa, age 11, does not get on with her parents, whom she regards as being unfair, and mean. One 
day, Lisa's father sends her to her room for not eating her tea. Lisa runs away, and is gone for a 
week. She stays at her friends house. Her parents do not know where she is. When she returns 
home a week later, her father is most likely to feel 
1. ve1y upset or unhappy. 
· 2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 12. 
Jason, age 28, enjoys drinking at the local pub every Friday night with his friends. One night he 
is talking with his ex-girlfriend, Sarah, age 26, when her current boyfriend arrives. He does not 
look particularly impressed that Sarah is talking to Jason, even though he does not realise that 
Jason and Sarah used to go out. Jason offers to buy him a drink, but he declines telling Jason 
that he is a loser and to get out of his sight. Jason is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 13. 
Simon, age 24, asked his girlfriend to put a bet on for him at the TAB. It was the Melbourne Cup 
and Simon was sure number 4 was going to win, so he bet quite a lot of money on it. When he 
arrived home from work to watch the race, his girlfriend gave him the betting ticket. It was the 
wrong horse, but it was the horse that got second, whereas number 4 did not get anywhere. Simon 
is most likely feeling 
1. very upset or unhappy .. 
· 2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 14. 
Ngaire, age 9, was riding home from school on her new mountain bike that she got for her 
birthday. As she was riding past the shopping centre, an old lady opened her car door in front of 
Ngaire. Ngaire could not stop in time and she hit the open door, falling over her handlebars and 
on to the road. Ngaire was not hurt apart from a few small cuts and scratches, but her bike was 
broken. A man who had seen the accident helped Ngaire and explained to her that "she was really 
lucky that she was not seriously hurt. It could have been a lot worse". Ngaire was most likely 
feeling 
, 1. very upset or unhappy. · 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. ve1y good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 15. 
Megan, age 25; raised her daughter Beth, age 4, by herself as Beth's father left Megan for another 
woman. One morning, when Megan was washing Beth, She inserted her finger in Beth's bottom 
to clean her thoroughly. She then cleaned Beth's vagina in the same manner. Beth is mostly 
feeling 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
· 4. cannot tell, neutral. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 16. 
Terry's older brother died of cancer when Teny was only 5 years old. Terry spent a long time 
getting over his loss. One day while at work, one of his female work mates mentioned that Teny 
was looking very attractive. But she knew that Teny had a girlfriend, so she told Teny that ifhe 
had a brother she would go out with him. On hearing this, Teny is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy . 
. 3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutrnl, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 17. 
Sandra, age 46, was never very close to her mother. Her mother was very disciplined and sh·ict 
when Sandra was young, and she remained cold and negative when Sandra got married and had 
children. However Sandra's mother was always very kind and loving to Sandra's children, and 
showered them with gifts. They were always happy when they were with their grandmother. One 
day, Sandra heard that her mother had just died. Sandra would most likely feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 18. 
Kahu, age 8, often plays by himself by the river. One day when he is down by the river, he sees 
Sam, who owns the local dairy. Sam comes up to Kahu and they talk for a while. Sam tells Kahu 
that he could get a lot of candy if he would play a special game. Kahu agrees. Sam then takes 
down his pants.and tells Kahu to play with his penis. Kahu does it. Kahu is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. cannot tell, neutral. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful . 
. 7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 19. 
Peter, age 24, and his friend work together at an accounting firm. They usually work together on 
the big projects that they are given. There is a prize given annually to the best performance of the 
year in terms of the quality of work done on a work project. Peter and his friend work hard to win 
this prize. At the end of year party the winner is announced, it is Peter's friend. How is Peter 
most likely to feel? 
1. Very upset or unhappy. 
2. Moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. Slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. Neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. Slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. Moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. V cry good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 20. 
Rita, age 13, didn't like the milk boys who delivered milk to her street. She loved to hide in the 
large tree in her front yard and poke fun at the milk boy delivering milk below her. She would call 
them names and laugh at them. One day it was really hot and she had decided to throw cold water 
over the milk boy. Just before the milk boy arrived, she slipped on a bent branch and fell to the 
ground. She just sat there stunned. The milk boy saw her fall and is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. ve1y good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 21. . 
John, age 19, enjoys playing poker with his friends on every second Friday night. They usually 
bet $5 per game and some nights John has won over $200, whereas other nights he has lost over 
$150. One night, they decide to increase the stakes and play for $20 a game. John does not think 
he should do this as he has to buy a birthday present for his 6 year old son, Richard. During the 
night, John loses badly. He has lost over $250, but he has a good final hand for the night. To 
make sure he wins, he cheats by sneaking a look at his friend's cards. Sure enough he wins heaps 
of money. As he is thinking of the present he will buy his son, he notices his other friends are 
laughing at his friend who lost. John is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 22. 
Jenny, age 11, and her family rarely visit her Aunt Margaret, age 28, because Margaret lives out 
of town. One time when Jenny's family is visiting Margaret, Jenny's parents want to go to housie. 
Jenny hates housie, and decides to stay behind with Margaret. Margaret and Jenny play for a 
while, and then Margaret asks if she would like a massage. Jenny says "yes." Margaret asks her 
to strip down to her underwear and then Margaret gently rubs Jenny's whole body. Jenny is most 
· likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 23. 
Jane, age 9, visits her cousin Raymond, age 18, about once a month. Jane usually rides her bike 
by herself to Raymond's house. Raymond lets her play with his computer games and exercise 
equipment. One day, Jane tells Raymond that she is a big, strong girl now and she could wrestle 
Raymond to the ground. Raymond accepts the challenge and wrestles with her (not really trying) 
for several minutes before allowing himself to be pinned on his back. He then threatens that if she 
. does not let him go he will kiss her and give her "boy germs." Jane then pauses for a moment and 
then gets off him. Jane is most likely feeling 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 24. 
Peter is sitting on the edge of a cliff watching the ships sailing into the harbour. It is a quiet spot 
where he usually goes to relax. He hears some voices behind him, talking about how isolated it is 
up here on the cliff. The voices come closer and he sees a group of young men, one of which is 
coming toward him. Peter is likely to feel 
· 1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 25. 
Kere, age 5, often plays on her bike at the park just down the road from her house. One 
afternoon, she notices a man watching her. He is wearing a big hat which Kere thinks looks 
funny. After a short while, the man waves to Kere and stands up to leave. Kere rides closer to 
say goodbye. The man smiles, waves again and walks off. Kere is most likely feeling 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 26. 
Talalofia, age 67, enjoys looking after his grandson, Malafunga, age 9. One day, Malafunga was 
riding his bike around the backyard when he fell off, cutting his knee. Talalofia heard Malafunga 
crying and to comfort him, he picked Malafunga up and bounced him up and down on his lap. 
When Malafunga finished crying, Talalofia continued to bounce him on his lap. Malafunga is 
most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 27. 
Anna, age 6, goes with her parents to visit Uncle John, her mother's brother. John lives by 
himself and has never married. John seems pleased to see Anna and her parents. He gives Anna a 
big hug, lifting her completely off the ground and calls her "his favourite niece." Anna is most 
likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
· 3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 28. 
Eric, age 22, and Charles, age 18, like to run on the beach every Sunday. They do this to relax 
and talk about their weeks. One summer morning, they decide to have a race along the beach for 
· a couple of dollars. Charles reaches the stated finish line first. He looks back to sec that Eric has 
stood on something, and is sitting on a log. Charles is mostly likely to be feeling 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
. 7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 29. 
Sally, age 12, was waiting in the queue at the supermarket when the man in front of her dropped a 
twenty dollar note on the ground. Sally looked around and it seemed that no one had seen this. 
She quickly picked it up and put it in her pocket. When she was outside the supermarket, she 
· heard the man telling his wife he must have dropped twenty dollars. His wife told him to go back 
into the supermarket and look for it. Sally is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
· 7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 30. 
Moana, age 23, was having lunch at a restaurant with close friends that she hadn't seen for ages. 
Everyone is enjoying their meal and drinking a lot of good wine. After desert they were having 
coffee when one ofMoana's friends accidentally knocked her coffee over, spilling it over 
Moana's new dress, which she had brought for the occasion. Moana most likely felt 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 31. 
Hayley, age 14, plays volleyball every Tuesday after school. One day during a game against one 
of the top teams in the competition, Hayley injured her ankle when she fell after sc01ing a point. 
It was an important game for Hayley as it was the first game her father had come to watch and 
they had to win to reach the finals. Hayley injured her ankle in the first couple of minutes and 
could not play in the rest of the game. Hayley's father left to go back to work when he saw his 
. daughter could not continue playing. Hayley's team won. Hayley is most likely feeling 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 32. 
Brent, age 12, lives with his parents and two younger sisters. His cousin, Jackie, age 19, moved 
in with them a year ago after she found a job in that city. One summer day when Jackie is 
walking in the park with Brent, she asks him ifhe has ever seen a woman's breasts. He says "no." 
She then slowly removes her top and asks him ifhe wants to touch her breasts. He touches them. 
She then reaches down and starts to undo his pants. Brent is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
· 7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 3 3. 
Nathan, age 16, usually stops at the 24 hour service station on his way home from town on Friday 
nights. He regularly buys a packet of cigarettes and a bottle of coke. He is always served by a 
young woman attendant who is really unfriendly towards him. One Friday night, while Nathan is 
waiting in line to buy his cigarettes, a young boy in front of him tuns out of the shop without 
· paying for anything. The woman attendant could not catch him. She looks really distressed. 
Nathan is most.likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
. 7. ve1y good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 34. 
Pam, age 34, asked her neighbour ifhe could help her repair an old wooden desk. Jeff, her 
neighbour readily agreed. They had to take two legs off to repair the underneath of the desk. As 
they were putting the last leg on, Jeff asked Pam to hold the long nail straight as he couldn't reach 
it properly. Pam did this. While Jeff was hammering, Pam shifted slightly causing Jeff to miss 
the nail and hit Pam's finger. Pam didn't do anything. Jeff would most likely feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 3 5. 
David, age 13, often goes over to his friend Reewa's house to read comic books and 
build model planes. Reewa's father, Mr Te Whaka, frequently looks in on the boys and chats to 
them about what they are doing. One day, David goes over to finish a model he left at Reewa's. 
Mr Te Whaka answers the door and says that Reewa would not be back until late, but that he 
could come in and work on the model anyway. David comes in and Mr Te Whaka stays with 
David, talking and helping him with his model. David has to leave before Reewa is due back. Mr 
Te Whaka puts his hand on David's shoulder and tells David that he enjoyed his visit and that he 
is free to come by whenever he wants. As David leaves, he is mostly to feei 
1. ve1y upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 36. 
Sven, age 11, had complained of a sore throat for a couple of days. His mother took him to see 
their local doctor who diagnosed a bad case of the flu, which was going around at that time. He 
prescribed medication that was supposed to reduce the soreness in Sven's throat. The next day 
after taking the medicine, Sven broke out into a large rash all over his body which lasted for 
several days even though his sore throat got better. Sven have would most likely felt 
1. very upset or unhappy. . 
- 2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 3 7. 
Richard and Belinda have been seeing each other for 2 years and have lived together for 6 
months. Recently, Belinda moved out to start a new job in a different city. Richard was unable to 
shift with her. Richard feels badly that she is away. She does not have enough time to talk when 
he calls and she discourages him from coming to see her in the weekends, claiming that it is too 
expensive. One evening she rings Richard wanting to break up with him. Richard is not home, 
but a woman answers the phone. Belinda is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. ve1y good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 38. 
When Sarah, age 14, is walking home, she decides to take a short cut through the woods. As she 
is walking, she notices that there is a man following her. She has never seen the man before, but 
. she notices that he is ve1y attractive. The man walks fast and catches her up. Without saying a 
word, he holds onto her arm. Sarah is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 39. 
Julia, age 6, loves playing in the sand pit at her uncle's house. Every time she visits her uncle she 
would play in this sand pit, even if it was raining or cold outside. One day after visiting her uncle, 
she arrived home with her family to find a sand pit in her own backyard. Julia would most likely 
feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset orunhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 40. 
John, age 17, often visits his Uncle's house in the weekends so he can watch the rugby on Sky 
TV. His cousin, Roderick, age 7, often watches too. One weekend, John and Roderick are 
watching Sky movies, when a adult movie comes on. John tells Roderick that he should watch and 
learn from the movie. Half way through the movie, John shows Roderick his erect penis. 
Roderick is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell . 
. 5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 41. 
James, age 20, coaches a hockey team for 6 year old boys. One of his favourite players is Troy, 
who always asks James for a ride home after the game. Troy's parents never watch him play 
hockey. After winning their first game of the season, James asks Troy ifhe would like to go to 
MacDonalds to celebrate. But first they should go home to James' flat to shower and change into 
. clean clothes. Troy quickly agrees. Troy is likely to be feeling 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 42. 
Solomon, age 14, had always wanted to cook tea for his family. One winters day his mother and 
father were both sick with the flu, so Solomon decided to make them a special meal. His mother 
warned him not to make too much of a mess as his Aunty was coming around later. Solomon 
cooked a big meal and tided up the kitchen. After he finished his meal he went back into his 
parents bedroom to collect the dfshes. His mother and father had hardly touched their dinner, but 
told him it was nice. His father got up to check the kitchen. Solomon would most likely be 
feeling 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 43. 
Ashley, age 7, spends a lot of time with her step-father, Luke. She feels really close to him and 
they talk about all s01is of things together. Ashley rarely sees her mother. Her mother comes 
home late from work and goes out on the weekends. When her mother does come home, Ashley 
often hears her arguing with Luke. One night when Ashley was in bed, she heard her door open. 
· Luke walks in, wearing only a loose bathrobe. He climbs into bed with her. He tells her that he 
loves her more-than he loves her mother. Ashley lies quietly, saying nothing, as he caresses her 
back and kisses her. Ashley is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
· 6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 44. 
John, age 34, coaches a rngby team for boys 10 to 12 years old. After a game at the end of the 
season, he invites the team to his house for fish and chips. The boys have fun at John's house 
playing with his video games and looking at his rngby books and magazines. As all the other 
. boys leave, John asks Mark to stay behind. John then tells Mark that he is really special and that 
he would like to keep in contact with him even though the rngby season is now over. John pats 
Mark on the shoulder as Mark leaves. Mark is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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. Question 45. 
Nathan's mother tucks him into bed most nights. Even now that he is 10, she comes into his 
bedroom before he falls asleep. She usually talks to him briefly, tells him that she loves him, and 
then turns out the lights. One day, after telling him what a special little boy he is, she says that 
she is going to tuck him in especially good that night. She then tucks the blankets around his 
body, kisses him on the forehead, and turns out the lights as she is leaving. Nathan is most likely 
to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. · 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 46. 
Frank and his wife often babysit Lucy, age 4, for their neighbours. One morning, the neighbours 
asked Frank if he would mind baby sitting even though his wife was working that day. Frank 
readily agreed. After watching a movie on television, Frank decided it was time to give Lucy a 
bath, which Lucy happened to like. When the water was warm enough Frank undressed Lucy and 
put her in the bath. He washed Lucy with a warm flannel and soap. Lucy is most likely to feel 
1. ve1y upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
· 3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. ve1y good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 4 7, 
. Em, age 67, wanted to buy his granddaughter a really nice gift for her 10th bi1ihday. In order to 
buy what he wanted, he had to sell his war medals that he had treasured for so long. His wife was 
not very happy about this. When Em gave his granddaughter her present, his wife told everyone 
in the room that he had to sell his treasured war medals in order to get this present. On hearing 
this, his granddaughter is most likely to feel 
1. ve1y upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Question 48. 
Daniel, age 16, hated going to school. It bored him and he always had trouble paying attention to 
the teacher. He wanted to leave, but he knew that his parents would be really upset and angry 
. with him, so he decided to bunk school and spend most of his days at his friends place. One 
morning at the _school assembly, he was sent to the headmaster because of his bunking school. He 
was suspended from school for a week, and the headmaster phoned his parents to tell them. 
Daniel most likely would feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 49. 
Brad, age 11, lives with his parents. His older brother Richard, age 19, moved out last summer. 
Today is Brad's birthday, but there is not going to be a party today because his father is working 
an afternoon shift. When Brad walks home from school, he expects to find the house empty since 
his mother does not get home until after 5pm. To Brad's surprise, the front door is open. His 
brother is inside smiling broadly, holding a present. "I couldn't let my little bro be alone on his 
birthday." Richard gives Brad a big hug. Brad is most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neuh·al, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
· 7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
Question 50. 
Katherine, age 11, got a cramp in her wrist while playing netball. She sits on the sideline, nursing 
her wrist, until the game finishes. Mike, the coach, age 29, stays behind after all the other girls 
have left. He massages her wrist and hand. His touch hurts at first, but gradually the pain in her 
wrist goes away completely. He tells her that she is a really good player and reminds her of the 
. practice next week. Katherine is.most likely to feel 
1. very upset or unhappy. 
2. moderately upset or unhappy. 
3. slightly upset or unhappy. 
4. neutral, neither unhappy or happy, I cannot really tell. 
5. slightly good, happy, cheerful. 
6. moderately good, happy, cheerful. 
7. very good, happy, cheerful. 
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Appendix B 
The Emotional Apperception Test 
Information Sheet 
• You are invited to take part in a project looking at emotions in sex offenders 
called The Emotional Apperception Test. The aim of this project is to 
explore the meaning of empathy, and create a new measure that will identify 
the emotional abilities of men who offend against children. As part of this 
study I will be looking at prison records as well as collecting data from the 
questionnaire entitled 'The Emotional Apperception Test.' Your taking part 
in this project will simply involve you answering a questionnaire that looks at 
your recognition and understanding of emotion. 
• The questionnaire is in two parts. The first involves you thinking about your 
most recent offence against a child. The second part requires you to read a 
series of short stories that involve two person's in varying circumstances. 
Usually, these involve a child and an adult. All you need to do is to think 
carefully about each question and then answer in your own words, in as many 
or as little words as necessary. Importantly, there are no right or wrong 
answers in this questionnaire. This questionnaire will take approximately 1 
hour for you to finish. 
• The results of the project may be published, but you can be assured of 
complete anonymity as no one will know that the questionnaire was 
completed by you. To make sure of this, your questionnaire will be given a 
code number, with the completed questionnaire safely stored with access 
limited to the researcher only. 
• You are under no pressure to take part and if you want to withdraw your 
participation you may do so at any time. Importantly, if you choose to take 
part in this project, it will have no effect on your sentence or future parole. 
• This project is being carried out by Jayson Ware, who can be contacted at the 
University of Canterbury on 366 7001 (ext 7190). He will be happy to talk 
about any concerns or further questions you may have about participating in 
this project. 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee. 
CONSENT FORM 
University of Canterbury 
Department of Psychology 
'THE EMOTIONAL APPERCEPTION TEST 
I have read and understood the information sheet of the above 
named project. On this basis I agree to participate in the 
project, and I consent to publication of the results of the 
project with the understanding that anonymity will be 
preserved. I understand also that I may at any time withdraw 






The Emotional Apperception Test 
Instructions 
This questionnaire is in two sections. 
In Section A, you are required to imagine yourself in certain circumstances and 
answer the corresponding questions to the best of your ability. Initially you will 
have to describe some events that have occun-ed in your own words. Then you 
. will have to think about the feelings and thoughts you had at that time, and to try 
and put these feelings and thoughts into words. You may make your answers as 
brief or as long as necessary to express how you felt or would feel. 
This is quite difficult and you may take as much time as necessary to do this. 
You are also required to think about the other person involved in these events and 
his or her feelings as well as your own. Again, you will have to try and express 
these thoughts and feelings in words. It is important to remember that there are 
· no right or wrong answers, so you need to give your best judgement as to the 
thoughts and feelings that would have occun-ed. 
In Section B, you will read brief stories involving two persons in various 
circumstances. Some of the stories may involve an abusive/harmful situation, 
whereas others may involve a nonabusive/nonharmful situation. In most sto1ies, 
it may be quite difficult to tell whether the situation is harmful or not. 
You are simply asked to weigh up each situation and the various factors 
involved, and to write down in as many or as little words as needed, how the 
individual in question is feeling in each story. The age of the individuals in each 
story change, so be careful to consider how a person of each age group would feel 
about the situation. Again, it is important to note that there are no right or wrong 
answers, so all that is required is your best judgement for each story. Please 




Please think carefully about the last sexual encounter you had with a child. 
Think through the experience you had starting with the events leading up to the 
sexual episode. Try to think about what happened and how you and the child 
would have felt and acted at certain moments. This is not easy so take your time 
to imagine the situation. 
Question 1. 
Please describe how you were feeling at each of the following times during the 
sexual encounter with the child. You may make your answers as brief or as long 
as necessary to express how you felt. Remember there are no right or wrong 
answers, just your best judgement as to how you were actually feeling at the time. 
Think about the events directly leading up to the sexual encounter. Try to 
recall what actions you took prior to behaving sexually with the child, how the 
child reacted, and what the child did. Try to remember the thoughts and feelings 
that you felt during this time and also think about how the child would probably 
have felt. 
Describe in as many or as little words as necessary the events leading up to the 
actual sexual encounter. 
Explain in your own words, to your best ability, how you think the child was 
feeling at this time. 
Now, thinking again about the situation explain in your own words how you 
were feeling directly leading up to the sexual encounter. 
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Now think about the actual sexual encounter that you had with the child. 
Think about the situation and try to recall what you did, how you acted, how the 
child acted, and the thoughts and feelings of both the child and yourself. 
Describe in as many or as little words as necessary the actual sexual encounter 
that you had with the child.· 
Explain in your own words, to your best ability how you think the child was 
feeling at this time. 
Now, explain in your own words, as well as you can, how you felt during the 
encounter with the child. 
Think about the events that immediately followed the sexual encounter with 
the child. Recall the way both the child and yourself reacted to the encounter 
and try to remember the thoughts and feelings that you experienced. Also try to 
think about the thoughts and feelings the child would have had. 
To your best ability, describe the events that immediately followed the encounter 
with the child. 
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Explain in your own words as best you can, how you think the child would have 
felt at this point of time. 
Now, explain in your own words how you felt immediately after the sexual 
encounter with the child. 
Now, think again about the sexual encounter that you had with this child and 
how you and the child feel about it now. Try to think about the emotions, 
thoughts and behaviours that the child would now be experiencing because of the 
encounter. Also think about your own feelings and thoughts concerning the 
sexual encounter with the child. 
Explain in your own words· as best you can, how you think the child is most 
likely to currently feel about the experience they had with you. 
Now, explain in your own words how you now feel about the experiences that 




Daniel, age 16, hated going to school. It bored him and he always had trouble 
paying attention to the teacher. He wanted to leave, but he knew that his parents 
would be really upset and angry with him, so he decided to bunk school and 
spend most of his days at his friends place. One morning at the school assembly, 
he was sent to the principal because of his bunking school. He was suspended 
from school for a week, and the principal phoned his parents to tell them. 
Daniel most likely would feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question 2. 
A man is walking down the street. An eight year old girl approaches the man and 
asks him directions. They have seen each other in the neighbourhood, but they 
have not met before. They talk briefly. The girl is smiling. Before she leaves, 
the man gives her a hug and a kiss. 
As she leaves, the girl is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Question 3. · 
Kahu, age 8, often plays by himself by the river. One day when he is down by 
the river, he sees Sam, who owns the local dairy. Sam comes up to Kahu and 
they talk for a while. Sam tells Kahu that he could get a lot of candy ifhe would 
play a special game. Kahu agrees. Sam then takes down his pants and tells Kahu 
to play with his penis. Kahu does it. 
Kahu is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question4. · 
Terry's older brother died of cancer when Terry was only 5 years old. Terry 
spent a long time getting over his loss. One day while at work, one of his female 
work mates mentioned that Teny was looking very attractive. However she 
knew that Teny had a girlfriend, so she told Terry that ifhe had a brother she 
would go out with him. 
On hearing this, Teny is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Question 5. 
Talalofia, age 67, enjoys looking after his grandson, Malafunga, age 9. One day, 
Malafunga was riding his bike around the backyard when he fell off, cutting his 
knee. Talalofia heard Malafunga crying and to comfort him, he picked 
Malafunga up and bounced him up and down on his lap. When Malafunga 
finished crying, Talalofia continued to bounce him on his lap. 
Malafunga is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question 6. 
John, age 17, often visits his Uncle's house in the weekends so he can watch the 
rugby on Sky TV. His cousin, Roderick, age 7, often watches too. One 
weekend, John and Roderick are watching Sky movies, when an adult movie 
comes on. John tells Roderick that he should watch and learn from the movie. 
Half way through the movie, John shows Roderick his erect penis. 
Roderick is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Question 7 .. 
Hayley, age 14, plays volleyball every Tuesday after school. One day during a 
game against one of the top teams in the competition, Hayley injured her ankle 
when she fell after scoring a point. It was an important game for Hayley as it was 
the first game her father had come to watch and they had to win to reach the 
finals. Hayley injured her ankle in the first couple of minutes and could not play 
in the rest of the game. Hayley's father left to go back to work when he saw his 
daughter could not continue playing. Hayley's team won. 
Hayley is most likely feeling? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question 8. 
Lisa, age 11, does not get on with her parents, whom she regards as unfair and 
mean. One day, Lisa's father sends her to her room for not eating her tea. Lisa 
runs away, and is gone for a week. She stays at her friend's house. Her parents 
do not know where she is. 
When she returns home a week later, her father is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Question 9. 
Jane, age 9, visits her cousin Raymond, age 18, about once a month. Jane usually 
rides her bike by herself to Raymond's house. Raymond lets her play with his 
computer games and exercise equipment. One day, Jane tells Raymond that she 
is a big, strong girl now and she could wrestle Raymond to the ground. Raymond 
accepts the challenge and wrestles with her (not really trying) for several minutes 
before allowing himself to be pinned on his back. He then threatens that if she 
does not let him go he will kiss her and give her "boy germs." Jane then pauses 
for a moment and then gets off him. 
Jane is most likely feeling? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question 10. 
Solomon, age 14, had always wanted to cook tea for his family. One winters day 
his mother and father were both sick with the flu, so Solomon decided to make 
them a special meal. His mother warned him not to make too much of a mess as 
his Aunty was coming around later. Solomon cooked a big meal and tided up the 
kitchen. After he finished his meal he went back into his parents bedroom to 
collect the dishes. His mother and father had hardly touched their dinner, but 
told him it was nice. His father got up to check the kitchen. 
Solomon would most likely be feeling? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Question 11. 
Stefan, age 34, works until late at night. When he arrives home he always checks 
on his daughter Rachael, age 9, to see if she is all right. One night, he sees that 
she is tossing and turning in her sleep. He sits on the bed next to her, kisses her 
on the cheek, and cuddles her tightly. Rachael wakes up with a fright, but sees 
that it is her father. 
Rachael is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question 12. 
Jason, age 28, enjoys drinking at the local pub every Friday night with his 
friends. One night he is talking with his ex-girlfriend, Sarah, age 26, when her 
current boyfriend arrives. He does not look particularly impressed that Sarah is 
talking to Jason, even though he does not realise that Jason and Sarah used to go 
out. Jason offers to buy him a drink, but he declines telling Jason that he is a 
loser and to get out of his sight. 
Jason is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Question 13. 
Richard and Belinda have been seeing each other for 2 years and have lived 
together for 6 months. Recently, Belinda moved out to start a new job in a 
different city. Richard was unable to shift with her. Richard feels terrible that 
she is away. She does not have enough time to talk when he calls and she 
discourages him from coming to see her in the weekends, claiming that it is too 
expensive. One evening she rings Richard wanting to break up with him. 
Richard is not home, but a woman answers the phone. 
Belinda is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question 14. 
Eric, age 22, and Charles, age 18, like to run on the beach every Sunday. They 
do this to relax and talk about their weeks. One summer morning, they decide to 
have a race along the beach for a couple of dollars. Charles reaches the stated 
finish line first. He looks back to see that Eric has stood on something, and is 
sitting on a log. 
Charles is mostly likely to be feeling? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Question 15. 
Peter, age 24, and his friend work together at an accounting firm. They usually 
work together on the big projects that they are given. There is a prize given 
annually to the best performance of the year, in terms of the quality of work 
done on a work project. Peter and his friend work hard to win this prize. At the 
end of year party the winner is announced, it is Peter's friend. 
How is Peter most likely to.feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question 16 . 
. Megan, age 25, raised her daughter Beth, age 4, by herself as Beth's father left 
Megan for another woman. One morning, when Megan was washing Beth, She 
inserted her finger in Beth's bottom to clean her thoroughly. She then cleaned 
Beth's vagina in the same manner. 
Beth is most likely feeling? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Question 1 7. 
Jack has a good relationship with his daughter, Tracey, who is now turning 13. 
· Jack still occasionally tucks Tracey into bed at night. One night, Jack sits on the 
edge of Tracey's bed and rubs her back. He then massages her shoulders. She 
tells her father that she has had enough massage, and that she would like to go to 
sleep now. Jack gives her a kiss on her forehead, and leaves. 
Tracey is most likely to feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question 18. 
Terry, age 23, had a particularly bad day. He got fired from work, and on his way 
· home got a ticket for speeding. He decided to stop at the pub on the way home. 
When he arrived home, he was drunk and extremely angry. He crept into his 
daughter's bedroom and climbed into bed with her. He woke her up and 
whispered that she was the only one who really understood him. 
His daughter most likely would feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
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Question 19. 
Richard, age 30, caught the bus to town one Saturday morning. He almost 
missed the bus and only got to the bus stop just in time. Even now he was 
running late for a meeting in town and was hoping that the bus would not stop 
again on the way into town. The bus stopped at an intersection, and Richard saw 
an elderly woman trying to wave down the bus so it would stop for her. The bus 
driver did not see the old woman and carried on. 
Richard would most likely feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
Question 20. 
Katie, age 7, fell off a swing and bruised and cut her back and bottom. Her 
mother took her to see Dr. Reid, age 43, who was their family doctor. Dr. Reid 
cleaned the cuts, and put plasters on Katie's bottom. As he did this, he told Katie 
that she was a brave little girl and that the cuts would heal quickly. Before Katie 
left, Dr. Reid gave her a small kiss on her forehead. 
Katie would most likely feel? 
How does this make you feel? 
Appendix C 
Brief EAT Coding Sheet 
Emotional awareness 




There is a table of expert generated emotional states. Explicit adherence to the criteria 
is necessary. The respondent perspective taking level is scored for each vignette by 
matching the respondent generated emotional states to the criteria table. The criteria 
table lists the optimal highly empathic responses for each vignette. These vary 
considerably and consist of categorised negative and positive emotional states. 
The respondent is scored based on the similarity between his/her articulated emotional 
states and the broad categorised expert criteria. Scores are based on a 3-point system as 
follows: 
0 for answers that contain {essentially different content}, 
1 for answers that contain { similar but not same content}, 
2 for answers that contain { essentially the same content}. 
Emotional Replication 
Emotional replication entails coding the "How does this make you feel?" question in 
accordance with the expert generated criteria. The degree to which the respondent feels 
the same as the individual in question is also scored according to the 0-2 similarity 
paradigm (as above). 
Potential areas of difficulty 
• When the criterion contains descriptors for only one affective state, i.e., positive, 
this is scored highly if the respondent either includes one of these descriptors or 
adequately conveyed this content. For example, a respondent articulated 'awkward' 
to Q6 (confused, fearful, uncomfortable, curious). This scored 2. Therefore a 2 is 
scored fairly easily. If the question criterion included both negative and positive 
affect, this is also receives the maximum score if an appropriate answer for one of 
the affective states was atiiculated. For instance, Q8 requires answers of 'angry' and 
'relieved'. If one of these emotional labels is used, then this will score 2. 
• A popular response is to answer 'confused'. This descriptor is a cognitive state, so 
this response will score a 1, if it was the only aiiiculated answer. However, If it 
accompanies another affective label, then the other label is scored for 
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appropriateness. For example, Ql3 needs some reference to hurt, rather than simply 
'confusion'. 
• If a response is not congruent to the PT, but is an appropriate emotional response to 
the situation, this scores O (or 1 if similar). For instance, if the child was feeling 
"upset, conflicted" and the respondent himself felt 'disgusted' or 'angry', this is 
scored a O as being essentially different content. This is due to the lack of an 
adequate self-other differentiation. 
• If the respondent does not reply in terms of emotional states but rather their 
cognitive thoughts, this also scores 0. For example, a respondent may answer "how 
does this make you feel?'by condemning society, or complaining about the parents 
not being there. 
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AppendixD 
Tht? LEAS consists o·f 2(, scen·arios which ··a're ea.ch rc4.ted 
an a 5 paint seal~. · These scores a-;,P sL111imed to generate a 
maximum possible total score of 100. The 9uiciel1nes 
descri6ed below address how the 5 point rating for each 
scenario is made. 
There are three separate ratings which mLtst be made for 
each scenario: 1) sel·f 7, oth;?r 3) total. The t·at1n8S for 
"self" and "ottier" are.made in e:-:actly the =',ame 1-1ay: the 
description uf emotion tor ~acn person is assi~ned the level 
scot·e tram O to 4 1•1hich is tr,e highest level achieved for 
that item. · Yhus, ·there 0 is .one "self" score from O to 4 anti 
one "other" score from Oto 4 for each scenario. Every 
feelin~ mentioned in a scenario can potentially be rated for 
".self" or "other". 
In makinq these ratings, the criteria 1isted below 
sh• l.dd be foliov1ed e;:plic.itly. t~,.!-.qtion v1hicr:, .i~ -~.!nP.Uf:d by 
or can be ·inferred from a response but which 1s not ·· 
~-'.~pJ_i_c: i t l y_ s_ta ted sh1.,1.tl cl r:igJ;_ be scored.){ .lf__i.\._.JJWl 1 r~g __ i_ s 
expl1citly_m~ntioned but denied, e.g. I wouldn·t feel 
embat'rassed; it is· scoro:?d as 1 -i- tne emotion in 9u,2s ti on 1-,as 
pt~esent. ~ If a feeling_ 1_s not spec1fical lv ,r,nr1buted to··· 
selt.or other·but:t_o ".soml'!o(,e" or "one" i;, is not. rated, 
Sim1liirly, if e@:;t1ons arP- de,;,cribed_\•Jhich ,:,1.: not a 
response to the scenario per ·se but rather reflect the 
genera i belief system o·f thee respondent, the emotions are 
no_t rated. Incidental comments contained in the description 
which convey emotion such as "I hope"~~~ rated if they are 
•·• embedded in the emo~ional resp~nse . .. 
All 1•10rds io t_he glossc:1.ry are classified according to 
the level that they best fit. T-f there is another le·vel 
that they might also fit less commonly, that sE•conciat'y level 
is indicated in parenthe::;es. \•Jc.rds must tie intF.!t'pt•eted in 
rel~,ticin to the E-Cenari,J, r2.<1. ·pai~1 in the fit·~,t s1:enar10 is 
scored 1, v,hile 1n .. s1:enario l'2,1s scored:-:::. 
ihe "total~ sco~e ior_eac~ item is th~ h1qhesl o~ these 
two (us~:?l·f" and "otner"i scoresi e:-:cept in thr.-1-1:;.,;;P- o·t tl'Jo 
levE•l 4 scores .in v1hich case the qu1delines for level 5 
should be followed~ All of.the s~or1ng guidelinei for these 
ratings are listed below. 
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At least one ot tr,e ·follrn-1ir1~.1 guJ.delines must b[~ iTH?t: 
1, No response given to the item. 
2. Description ot a thougnt or impression which reflects an 
act of ccJgnit1on without any 1n<Hcation o·f tr1e Eirnotional 
reaction which followed from the cognitive act. A good rule 
o-f thwnb here i.s i-f the word "think" cr.1n substit1.tt<:? ·for the 
w• t'O "fel,!l" withrJut any chan~1e (n m;;:•anin'::1, e.g. I would ·fl'!el 
tha\; they weri;J viron9; I vlDuld ·fec~l th,cl.t the rem,:1rks were? 
j Lt st i f i ed • 
3, Words that describe cognit1ve states, e.g. puzzled, 
confused, uncertain. 
4. Words that rf?flec:t conc:lusic:m£, reacr11:.1d -ft'• m ,:.1v-c:du,1t1•,'e 
Judgements which do not cons~stently have an associated 
positive or negative emotional tone, e.g. adequate, alone, 
Justified. 
L_EVEL. . l 
At least one of the following guidralines must be met: 
1, Expli~it, simple statement th~t the ~P•-~0~ would ~eel 
nott-,ing, a statement that ttie rE;sponclr~nt Jo,?.s not kncH·1 how 
the person in 9u£~st1on 1-1<:lt.tld -fe;:d, or ,;1 stat,:?,ni-:;nt 
acknowledging the possibility of having feelings w1tnout 
speci·fyin9 wh0.t they are, e,<:J, cleic,,~:;ij, denial, 1nd1·HerE?nt. 
2. Any bodily sensation or pr1ys1cal feeling, e.·3. I cl tE!el 
pain, t1n8lin•3, achy, nauseated. 
LEVEL 2 
At least one cf the following guidelines must be met: 
1. ~\n al:tion tendency, e.9. I'd ·:;,l?.f?l Ii.kn punching- ti-,e 
wall. A responr,;e 1·muld bt:; sc::nt'E!cl hEWE' i-f the pE.1 t'SGr1 i:elt 
lih,· lioing somf-:;th1ng.v1hich re9ui.r(?.d medi,cl.t1on by the 
voluntary motor system. Actions per se are not rated as 
·feel 1ngs. 
2. r:.:eferEmce to a cor1sc1ous state which is globa.l in nature 
and focuses en a ~ey word whose usualv mean1nq 1s not 
emotional,. e,,3. l'c:1 ·h?el ... •3ood, bad, upset~ a1~ful, 
terrible, gre,,•.t, 1-11erd, etc. \•,lords suc:h as "stronq" or· 
"we~k '' would be scored here if thev do not clearl~ refer to 
a physi.c.::d st<"-te., 
3. Personality traits which have an inherent action 
component where the person is the 1nit1ator of the behavior, 
191 
e.g. authcw1tc1ric:1n, pompous, pi1triotic, defen'.:;lVf:!, gre,•:dy, 
haL19h ty. 
4. Passively eKperienced actions with emotional• 
connotat1ans, e.g. ~oandonea, offended, soothed, 
man1pL1l'="'ted, 
5, ·Actions that inherently convey emotion, e.g. mope, 
l~ugh, cry, ~oothe, console. 
6. Nonspecific emotions th;,t c,mnot oe categ.:wized 1•1ith any 
one pr'.iml'lry emotion, e.g. irrit,::d;ec;d, upset, aro1.1s,;;d. 
7. Words that reflect cogn1t1cns tnat have distinctly 
positive or negative emotional connotat1or~~ e.g. fortunate, 
triumphant, Ltrn•ior·thy, lucky. 
LEVEL __ .3 
At least one of tne.following guidelines must be met: 
1, Emotions that have a well-differentiated connotat1on, 
e.g. hc.,ppy, sad, angry, 1·1ant, ant1c1pate, disc:\ppo1nted, etc. 
2, Wot'ds wh1c11 are.closely al.lied to specific !::rnot1 • n'.:;, 
e. g, pissed off, look for1-1ard, dying for, let drn·m. 
3, Words that inherently convRy an exchange of emotion, 
e.g. sympathize, empathize, comm1sserate. 
4. Comple:-: ~:?motions such c\S "remot'i;;,2 11 are sr:orerJ h~:re it 1t 
is the only emotion°ment1oned. 
5, Single 1-1cwds 1·1hich re:·t,.?r to mul.t1ple emotions 1•1• Llld be 
scored het·e 1f the multiple emot1rms 1•1t'?re not spF.!cif1ed or' 
refEH'red to 1n S(Jme 1>1ay, e.g. "l 'd ·feel ambiv~dent", 
6, lf two or more feelings are expressed which are so 
similar 1n mean1n9 that they cannot be readily 
'distinguishFc!d, i.1:i. lev~l 'l cr1tG>rion WZ is not f;ar.·,sf1ed. 
LEVEL __ 4 
At least one of the following guidelines must be met: 
1. Opposing f2motions r.1rf~ describecL E:-:r.1mples of opposing 
dyaos incl ud12 ,Joy-sadness, in tE!t'f=:stEid-bor·ed, anSE't'----fear, 
sur-prise-ant1cip,,1tion, c'ccept,cincr::-disgust. 
2. Qualitatively oistinct emotions are described. The test 
\~ of whether a fe~l1n9 st~te 1s d1stinct is if an outside 
obsE?t'Ver· could look et b•10 people, E'acti of 1-1hom is 
manifesting the facial expression of one of the emotions 
which Ls to be contrasted, &nd reliably 1dent1fy who 1s 
feeling v1hat, 
3. Quantitatively distinct emotions are described'through 
the-~se of words that describe different emotions, not use 
of ~dvet•bs. such as "more" or "less", e.g. "11y feeding 1-,as 
somewhere between ecstatic and delighted", Another 
suffiiient but not necessary criterion for making 
qua~titative distinctions is that provided by #2 abovE, 
4. Wnen different reasons are gi~en for a single emotional 
·response, e.s. I 1-1m.tld feel-·.;in•:31·-y \•nth mysel·f and anf,ry 1-11th 
my neighbor. 
5. When a met•phor or simile is used to describe an 
emotional state which 1s particularly vivid, e.g. He would 
feel as though the world was collapsing on him; I would feel 
as if I was in a bad movie. Another example would oe a 
detailed elaboration of a single word which\evokes a 
powerful and vivid sense of an emotion. 
LEVEL .. 5 
All of the following guidelines must be met. 
1. Each indiv1d1.1al 's emot1nn;.i.l t't'?,action meF.:ts level 4 
gLtinelines: 
2, The reaction of the t1•10 individuals at·e clearl 11 
difterent from each other, either 1n specific content or 
overal I tone, 
3, Unlike in level 4, the major emotions which are 
mentioned must b~ understandable to the rater. For example, 
~he respondent should ·specify which aspect of the situation 
accounts for each of two opposing emotions. If the emotions 
which cont~ibute to the level 4 score in each o-f the two 
indjviduals are the same, reasons should be 91ven to account 
+or di-ffer·ences in tho 0'/(7J'Edl tor112 of the tl•10 reactions. 
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